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The latest in a long line of reform proposals, health courts have been called “the 
best option for fixing our broken system of medical justice.” And, if health courts’ 
supporters are to be believed, these specialized courts are poised to revolutionize 
medical malpractice litigation: They would offer faster compensation to far more 
people, while restoring faith in the reliability of legal decisionmaking. But these 
benefits are, as some leading supporters have acknowledged, “hoped for, but 
untested.” The question remains: Will health courts actually operate as effectively as 
proponents now predict?  
The best evidence to answer that question comes, I suggest, from the Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program (VICP)—a Program that employs very similar 
procedures to handle very similar claims and that had, at its birth, a very similar 
ambition. Mining nearly three decades of previously untapped material concerning 
the VICP’s operation, this Article analyzes how an American compensation 
program that wrests jurisdiction from traditional courts has, in practice, fared. 
Findings are discouraging. Though the VICP and health courts share many of the 
same procedural innovations, those innovations, in the VICP context, have largely 
failed to expedite adjudications and rationalize compensation decisions. This fact 
carries significant implications for health courts, suggesting that they won’t operate 
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nearly as effectively as their proponents now predict. More broadly, this study of an 
American no-fault regime, in action and over time, enriches—and at times 
complicates—current understanding of the prospects, promise, and “perceived 
virtues” of other specialized courts and alternative compensation mechanisms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Health courts are the reform du jour.1 Health court legislation—which 
would wrest medical malpractice cases from common law courts in favor of 
adjudication in specialized, dedicated tribunals—has been introduced in 
more than half a dozen states,2 while bills to charter pilot projects have been 
introduced in both houses of Congress.3 President Obama has expressed 
cautious support.4 Health courts are, apparently, popular with the American 
 
1 In the words of the President of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
“[h]ealthcare courts are an idea whose time has come.” COMMON GOOD, AN URGENT CALL FOR 
SPECIAL HEALTH COURTS 7 (2005). 
2 States include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
See S.B. 1134, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (creating health courts); H.B. 897, 2013 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2013) (same); S.B. 141, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013) (same); H.B. 3166, 97th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011) (same); Assemb. B. 8066-A, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2007) (authorizing health court pilot projects); S.B. 655, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) 
(establishing medical malpractice court); S.B. 678, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (proposing 
demonstration program); S.J. Res. 90, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006) (authorizing continuation 
of subcommittee studying the feasibility of a pilot health court, and ultimately a system of health 
courts); H.R.J. Res. 183, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006) (same); see also Freeman L. Farrow, The 
Anti-Patient Psychology of Health Courts: Prescriptions from a Lawyer-Physician, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 
188, 193 n.26 (2010) (citing additional state legislation).  
3 Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005); Medical Liability Pro-
cedural Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1546, 109th Cong. (2005); see also THE PATIENT CHOICE, 
AFFORDABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND EMPOWERMENT ACT 8 (2015), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/114/20150205
-PCARE-Act-Plan.pdf (stating that states have the option to establish health courts presided over 
by a judge with expertise in health care). 
4 President Obama’s 2012 Federal Budget allocated funding for state medical justice reforms, 
including health courts. See Press Release, Common Good, President Obama’s Budget Includes a 
Breakthrough to Address Medical Malpractice Reform and Move Beyond Partisanship (Feb. 16, 
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public.5 And, the health court concept has been endorsed by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM),6 the U.S. deficit commission,7 leading editorial boards,8 
powerful non-profits (including the American Medical Association (AMA)9), 
distinguished think tanks (including the nonpartisan Brookings Institute,10 
the left-leaning Progressive Policy Institute,11 and the right-leaning Heritage 
 
2011), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/president-obamas-budget-includes-a-
breakthrough-to-address-medical-malpractice-reform-and-move-beyond-partisanship-
116313134.html. Further, the Affordable Care Act encourages states to “to develop and test 
alternatives to the civil litigation system” and authorizes $50 million in grants to develop such 
alternatives. See Health Reform and Medical Malpractice Reform, NAT’L CENTER FOR POL’Y 
ANALYSIS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=20587, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K6EV-SBFK. 
5 Press Release, Common Good, Nationwide Clarus Poll Reveals that a Large Majority of 
U.S. Voters Think Legal System Increases Cost of Health Care (May 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nationwide-clarus-poll-reveals-that-a-large-majority-
of-us-voters-think-legal-system-increases-cost-of-health-care-155365335.html (reporting that a 2012 
survey funded by Common Good found that 66% of voters support the health court concept). But 
cf. Maxwell J. Mehlman & Dale A. Nance, The Case Against “Health Courts” 95-96 (Apr. 1, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1785383 (identifying problems with the design of similar surveys).  
6 See COMM. ON RAPID ADVANCE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: HEALTH CARE FIN. & 
DELIVERY SYS., INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING 
FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 10, 83 ( Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002). 
7 See Press Release, Common Good, Federal Deficit Commission Endorses Health Courts 
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/federal-deficit-commission-
endorses-health-courts-111387224.html. 
8 See, e.g., Docs in the Dock: Why Not Set Up Special Courts for Malpractice Suits?, FIN. TIMES, 
July 13, 2004, at 12; Editorial, ‘Health Courts’ Offer Cure, USA TODAY, July 5, 2005, at 12A; 
Editorial, Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2005, at 50-51; see also Editorial, Guilty in 
Health Court: Cut Medical Bills by Clipping Wings of Ambulance Chasers, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, 
at B2 (“The sensibility of health courts is so accepted that lawmakers seem to take their eventual 
adoption for granted.”). 
9 See AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES 1 (2007) (“AMA policy indicates that 
health courts are a promising reform proposal that merits further investigation.”); AM. MED. 
ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW!: THE FACTS YOU NEED TO KNOW TO ADDRESS 
THE BROKEN MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 31 (2014) (stating that “the AMA supports the testing 
and evaluation of health court pilot projects as an innovative way to address the medical liability 
problem”).  
10 See ENGELBERG CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, BROOKINGS INST., BENDING THE 
CURVE: PERSON-CENTERED HEALTH CARE REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CARE 
AND SLOWING HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH 32 (2013), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/04/person%20centered%20health%2
0care%20reform/person_centered_health_care_reform.pdf (suggesting the federal government 
should help fund “innovative reform models” for medical liability). 
11 See NANCY UDELL & DAVID B. KENDALL, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., HEALTH 
COURTS: FAIR AND RELIABLE JUSTICE FOR INJURED PATIENTS (2005). 
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Foundation12), respected academics,13 and politicians from both sides of the 
proverbial aisle.14  
Central to health courts’ appeal is the contention that these tribunals—
featuring specialized adjudicators, neutral experts, circumscribed damages, 
and a relaxed liability standard (“avoidability” rather than negligence)—will 
expedite medical malpractice adjudications, quell the adversarialism of 
dispute resolution, and provide consistent, rational rulings that would 
“restore faith in the reliability of medical justice.”15 Yet in more sober 
moments, health court advocates also acknowledge that these administrative 
benefits are not certain to materialize.16  
Though it’s rarely discussed, much rides on whether health courts will or 
won’t achieve these lofty objectives. For one, health courts’ ability to 
actually expedite, simplify, and rationalize compensation decisions is crucial 
to a fairness analysis, for if health courts are apt to resolve plaintiffs’ claims 
in a speedy, streamlined, and reliable manner, all parties will derive a clear 
benefit from health courts’ creation. On the other hand, if these “benefits” 
are illusory, health courts might start to look like a one-sided, rather than 
even-handed, reform. So, too, whether health courts will expedite and 
streamline adjudications is central to the cost question, for nearly all agree 
that far more injured patients will file claims in a health court system, as 
compared to the relative few who file claims currently. This means that if 
 
12 See RANDOLPH W. PATE & DEREK HUNTER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., CODE BLUE: 
THE CASE FOR SERIOUS STATE MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM 12-14 (2006) (discussing the 
benefits of establishing special health courts).  
13 See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 231-32 (2008) (listing health 
courts’ distinguished academic supporters); Paul Barringer, Let’s Create Health Courts, NAT’L L.J., 
May 2, 2005, at 22 (reporting that health courts have been endorsed by ten university presidents 
and eleven medical school deans). 
14 For example, health courts have been endorsed by both the Senate Republican Policy 
Committee and the Democratic Leadership Council. See U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY 
COMM., MEANINGFUL HEALTH CARE REFORM BEGINS WITH HEALTH COURTS (2006); 
Health Courts for Fair and Reliable Justice, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COUNCIL ( June 30, 2008), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060207071234/http://www.dlc.org/print.cfm?contentid=253435. 
Common Good, a nonprofit that has relentlessly championed health courts, boasts an Advisory 
Board that spans the political spectrum, from Bill Bradley on the left to Newt Gingrich on the 
right. See Leadership, COMMON GOOD, http://commongood.org/pages/leadership (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ATD8-PD79.  
15 Philip K. Howard, Just Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at A27; see also, e.g., UDELL & 
KENDALL, supra note 11, at 15 (“Health courts would make the malpractice system swift and 
reliable for all.”); infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
16 Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for Medi-
cal Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 76 (2008) [hereinafter 
Mello et al., Policy Experimentation] (cataloging health courts’ anticipated advantages, while 
recognizing that they are “hoped for, but untested”). 
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the cost per adjudication does not plummet, the aggregate price of claim 
resolution could soar.17  
Finally, but less obviously, health courts’ capacity to expedite, 
streamline, and rationalize compensation decisions is critical to resolving 
simmering constitutional questions. Constitutional questions loom large 
because if health courts are enacted, opponents are sure to challenge these 
tribunals. Opponents will allege that, in curtailing victims’ compensation 
and denying them the right to a trial by jury, health courts violate victims’ 
rights to due process and equal protection and run afoul of many states’ 
open court, separation of powers, and right-to-jury-trial guarantees.18 
Evaluating these constitutional claims, many reviewing courts will 
presumably ask the same question they’ve asked and answered on other 
occasions: In abrogating victims’ common law remedy, did the legislature 
accompany the abrogation with a sufficient tangible benefit? Was there, in 
other words, an adequate quid pro quo?19 So far, those defending health 
courts’ constitutionality have suggested that a tangible benefit justifying the 
withdrawal is “the system’s promise to deliver faster, more reliable 
compensation decisions.”20 Whether that “promise” is or is not realistic thus 
takes on weighty constitutional significance.  
So the answer to the question—Will health courts actually expedite, 
streamline, and rationalize compensation decisions?—is profoundly 
 
17 Currently, some suggest that “creating reliable health courts . . . would save tens of billions 
of dollars a year.” Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., Why We Need Health Courts for Medical Cases, 
NEWSDAY (Feb. 17, 2013, 10:35 PM), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/howard-why-we-
need-health-courts-for-medical-cases-1.4665357, archived at http://perma.cc/69MZ-YMHM. 
18 See Amy Widman, Why Health Courts Are Unconstitutional, 27 PACE L. REV. 55, 81 (2006) 
(asserting that health courts unconstitutionally “strip the right to redress in the courts without 
offering anything up in return”); Francine A. Hochberg, The Injustice of Health Courts, TRIAL, May 
2008, at 42, 52 (“The most significant problem with the proposed health courts, and the true 
impediment to their widespread adoption . . . is constitutional.”); see also Mehlman & Nance, supra 
note 5, at 107-11 (raising constitutional objections). If Congress were to enact health courts, 
additional constitutional issues would emerge. For a discussion of these issues, see generally E. 
David Elliott et al., Administrative “Health Courts” for Medical Injury Claims: The Federal Constitu-
tional Issues, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 761 (2008); Amy Widman & Francine A. Hochberg, 
Federal Administrative Health Courts Are Unconstitutional: A Reply to Elliott, Narayan, and Nasmith, 
33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799 (2008).  
19 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (upholding New York’s 
workers’ compensation law against constitutional challenge because, though the “employee is no 
longer able to recover as much as before . . . he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of 
injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy”); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 
541, 555 (Kan. 1990) (“Due process requires that the legislature substitute the viable statutory 
remedy of quid pro quo (this for that) to replace the loss of the right.”). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has not yet clearly incorporated a quid pro test into its due process analysis, though it has toyed 
with the idea. See Widman, supra note 18, at 76. 
20 Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 101-02. 
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important. Yet while many have taken sides on the broader health court 
controversy, this question has received remarkably little attention. Beyond 
referencing the positive experiences of a few somewhat analogous systems 
overseas,21 and the decidedly mixed experiences of neurological birth injury 
funds in Florida and Virginia,22 health court champions have said little 
 
21 Health court proponents have studied the no-fault experiences of New Zealand, Sweden, 
and Denmark because, they say, those nations’ experiences “shed[] light” on how health courts 
would operate in the United States. MICHELLE M. MELLO ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND, PUB. NO. 1517, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL INJURIES: LESSONS 
FROM THREE FOREIGN SYSTEMS 2 (2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/ 
media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Jul/1517_Mello_admin_compensation_med_injuries.pdf; 
see also Allen B. Kachalia et al., Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation, 66 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 387 (2008). Yet while there is value to this international study, I suggest that 
the experiences of these foreign systems are, for at least three reasons, of limited relevance. I say 
this, first, because, as compared to the countries proponents study, the United States has a unique 
“way of law”—including a far better-financed, more sophisticated, and more politically powerful 
plaintiffs’ bar and a more deeply embedded preference for the adversarial resolution of claims. See 
generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). 
Shedding this adversarial culture is unlikely to be easy. Second, the countries’ medical malpractice 
environments are notably dissimilar. At the time New Zealand enacted its transformative 
Accident Compensation Act, for example, New Zealand had almost no medical malpractice 
litigation to speak of, with fewer than 100 arguably serious claims filed each year. See Marc A. 
Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 653, 670 (1975). Or, at the time Sweden adopted its patient compensation system, 
medical malpractice compensation flowed to approximately ten patients annually. See Patricia M. 
Danzon, The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Myths and Realities, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
453, 454 (1994). Not so in the United States today. Third, the underlying provision of social 
services is strikingly different—meaning the job of accident compensation in New Zealand, 
Sweden, and Denmark is far less demanding than the same job within the United States. See 
Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault 
Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199, 228 n.193 (1992); see also FRANK A. 
SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 302-03 (2008) (identifying additional 
differences between the tort systems of Sweden and New Zealand on the one hand and the United 
States on the other).  
Of course, though, the question remains: Do these (and myriad other) differences matter 
when it comes to the on-the-ground performance of no-fault mechanisms? My intuition is they 
do. Indeed, the rocky vaccine injury experience recounted herein suggests that the United States is 
distinctive. Automobile no-fault legislation does as well—as our auto no-fault experiment was 
broadly seen as a bust as the system became bloated and bogged down (leading to its repeal in 
many states), while in New Zealand, for example, auto no-fault has been widely heralded as a 
success. Compare Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61 
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012) [hereinafter Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation] (tracing the rise 
and fall of the American experiment with automobile no-fault legislation), with TERENCE G. 
ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME 187 
(1980) (discussing the success of automobile no-fault in New Zealand).  
22 See, e.g., Gil Siegal et al., Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims in Florida and Virginia: The 
Experience of a Landmark Experiment in Personal Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 493 
(2008); David M. Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In: Florida’s Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 499 (2000) [hereinafter 
Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In]. The programs instituted in Florida and Virginia are much 
 
  
1638 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1631 
 
about why and how health courts will achieve these all-important objectives. 
And health courts’ many detractors, while raising strenuous objections to 
health courts’ constitutionality,23 cost,24 fairness,25 independence,26 
stinginess,27 and susceptibility to political capture, have mostly surrendered 
on this score.28 Meanwhile, no one has carefully assessed this question using 
the best evidence currently available. What is that best evidence? I suggest 
it comes from the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP or 
Program), which has been quietly compensating those suffering from 
vaccine injury in the United States since October 1, 1988.  
Adjudication within health courts mimics adjudication within the VICP 
along many relevant dimensions. In terms of substantive reach, both resolve 
medical claims, where technical evidence is common and causation 
questions loom large.29 In terms of ambition, both health courts and the 
VICP seek to be generous, rather than tightfisted, with the articulated aim 
of providing adequate, though circumscribed, payments to a higher 
proportion of injured individuals. In terms of applicable law, both modify—
and liberalize—the traditional tort standard of recovery. Health courts 
would apply an “avoidability” standard that straddles strict liability and 
negligence, while the VICP discards fault entirely. In terms of personnel, 
both dispense with lay juries and generalist judges in favor of adjudication 
 
smaller than the VICP. For example, as of 2007, Virginia’s program had received only 192 claims. 
See Siegal et al., supra, at 502. For criticism of the programs’ performance, see infra notes 318-19, 
389 and accompanying text.  
23 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
24 See Maxwell J. Mehlman & Rebecca G. Maine, Health Courts Will Not Cure All Liability 
Ills, BULLETIN, Mar. 2013, at 32, 35 (assailing health courts as an “expensive bureaucracy that 
infringes on the rights of injured, vulnerable patients”). 
25 See Farrow, supra note 2, at 197 (opposing health courts because these courts “will inevita-
bly be pro-medical industry and anti-patient in their operation”). 
26 See Emily Chow, Note, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with 
Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 387, 410 (2007) (opposing 
health courts because, given the charged nature of malpractice decisions, “political pres-
sures . . . would inevitably pervade the health court bench”). 
27 See Joanne Doroshow, The Health Courts Facade, TRIAL, Jan. 2006, at 20, 27 (opposing 
health courts because, inter alia, they would “result in severe undercompensation for most 
patients”). 
28 For limited exceptions, see, for example, Peters, supra note 13, at 260-68 (expressing skep-
ticism that health courts could increase efficiency without sacrificing decisional accuracy and 
substantive fairness); Widman, supra note 18, at 79 (noting that “claims of efficiency and speed of 
process are belied by almost every other alternative compensation system, each of which is 
plagued with a host of bureaucratic . . . problems”); Doroshow, supra note 27, at 22 (stating, in 
passing, that “[c]laims that health courts would be more efficient at meting out justice are 
unfounded”). 
29 There is, in fact, literal overlap between claims adjudicated within the two systems as the 
Vaccine Act preempts certain claims against physicians. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.  
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by specialist triers of fact. In terms of procedure, both admit evidence 
pursuant to flexible and informal standards, encourage reliance on 
independent experts, and compel the publication of decisions. In terms of 
time to adjudication, both systems underscore the importance of speed. 
Health court advocates suggest that these tribunals would offer justice 
within a year, while the VICP imposes a hard statutory deadline requiring 
that compensation decisions “shall” be issued “not later than 240 
days . . . after the date the petition was filed.”30 In terms of decision aids, 
both health courts and the VICP feature a special and highly touted 
innovation: accelerated compensation events (ACEs) and the Vaccine Injury 
Table, respectively. Created by experts and periodically updated in light of 
scientific evidence, both ACEs and the Table identify injuries that are 
caused by inadequate healthcare or vaccines, respectively, and then fast-
track qualifying claims for easy resolution. Finally, at the tail end of 
litigation, both health courts and the VICP restrict damages, limit payments 
to petitioners’ counsel, and permit appeals, though only pursuant to a 
highly deferential standard of review.  
Given the systems’ obvious similarities, and given that we have nearly 
three decades of experience with the VICP—a tribunal that has, so far, 
adjudicated over 14,000 petitions31—it seems essential that lessons from the 
VICP be brought to bear as we weigh whether to embark on the health 
court experiment.32 
Furthermore, a study of the VICP does not just matter in its own right. 
The study contributes to two broader, and enduring, debates. The push to 
enact health courts can first be seen as part of a larger effort, dating back 
over a century, to shuttle categories of cases out of courts of general 
jurisdiction and into specialized, dedicated tribunals. Like health courts, 
these specialized courts (now numbering in the dozens) are often 
 
30 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012). For more on this requirement, see infra note 154 
and accompanying text. 
31 See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,  
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: MONTHLY STATISTICS REPORT 
(2015), available at http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statisticsreport.pdf. 
32 Others, in passing, have said as much. See, e.g., MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, 
EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM: A REPORT TO THE 
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (MEDPAC) 29 (2010) (suggesting that policymak-
ers can make some predictions about health courts’ likely administration based on study of, inter 
alia, the VICP); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Medical Liability and Patient Safety: Are Health 
Courts and Medicare the Keys to Effective Change?, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 252, 276-77 
(2006) (observing that the VICP and health courts are similar in many respects and that the VICP 
“model deserves much more attention than it has received”). This is the first Article to offer the 
analysis.  
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championed for offering litigants increased efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity.33 But, though the contention that judicial specialization 
expedites case resolution, elevates the quality of judicial decisionmaking, 
and breeds consistency is surely logical and intuitively appealing, it has, too 
often in the past, been accepted on faith. Much has been said—by health 
court proponents, as well as others—about what specialization ought to do. 
Relatively little has been said about what specialization does do.34 Moving 
beyond the familiar incantation of specialized courts’ “perceived virtues,” 
this Article starts a grounded inquiry into what judicial specialization has 
actually, in context and over time, managed to achieve.35 
Moreover, the VICP is not just a specialized court. It is also what some 
call a “replacement regime”—it is a regime that jettisons tort law, with its 
individualized consideration of fault and idiosyncratic calculation of 
damages, in favor of a government-administered no-fault alternative.36 
Replacement regimes are the go-to weapon in serious tort reformers’ 
 
33 See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 32-33 (2011) (dubbing these the “neu-
tral virtues” of judicial specialization); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: 
Specialists Versus Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 793 (2013) (“The conventionally claimed 
benefits of specialized courts go to their potential efficiency, subject matter expertise, and, if they 
are given a monopoly over the subject matter, uniformity of decisions.”). While specialization is 
often celebrated for the reasons above, others identify potential pitfalls, including that specialized 
judges might, on average, display a tendency toward insularity or tunnel vision and be more 
susceptible to politicization, political capture, or outside influence. For more on these, and other, 
possible drawbacks, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 16 (1990); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 95 (2013); Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the 
Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 550-56 (2008); David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, 
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
68-75, 84-85 (1975); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
377-82; Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 857-
65 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 88-109 (1995). 
34 See BAUM, supra note 33, at 34, 218 (decrying the paucity of proof and stating, for example, 
that “efficiency is the virtue most closely associated with specialization . . . but there is little 
evidence on this issue”); id. at 210 (“To the extent that participants in the policy-making process 
think explicitly about how specialization might affect court outputs, they tend to act on the basis 
of folk theories that rest on common-sense notions of causality rather than on extensive and 
systematic analysis.”); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration 
Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1541 (2010) (observing that “effects that seem nearly certain to follow 
from specialization do not necessarily occur in practice”); Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 33, at 
794 (recognizing that “there is still no empirical foundation for the proposition that specialized 
judges are more efficient than generalists in the production of judgments”).  
35 See Oldfather, supra note 33, at 849-50, 865 (observing that there “exists a relatively large 
body of literature” outlining specialized courts’ “perceived virtues” but asserting that much of the 
literature is contradictory or inadequately supported). 
36 For more on “replacement” regimes, see THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND 
LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 38-41 (2002). 
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collective arsenals. Over the past century, such schemes have been 
advocated dozens of times, proposed for everything from motor vehicle 
accidents,37 to nuclear accidents,38 to airline accidents,39 to railway 
accidents,40 to those who contract HIV after transfusion with tainted 
blood,41 to those hurt in schoolyard play,42 to those injured in athletic 
competition,43 to those harmed following contact with (variously) 
prescription drugs,44 medical devices,45 contraceptives,46 asbestos,47 lead 
paint,48 cigarettes,49 and firearms.50 Yet even as reformers frequently call for 
tort’s replacement, and even though many reformers explicitly model their 
proposed regimes on existing no-fault mechanisms (including, frequently, the 
VICP itself ),51 surprisingly few have paused to consider how these no-fault 
 
37 See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE 
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). 
38 See, e.g., Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
39 See, e.g., Gail Appleson, Airlines Seek Reform of Compensation System, 68 A.B.A. J. 1071 (1982). 
40 See, e.g., Arthur A. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV. 
L. REV. 705 (1916). 
41 See, e.g., Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV 
Infection, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 384 (1993). 
42 See, e.g., JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE 
FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975). 
43 See, e.g., Paul Grant, No-Fault Insurance for Sports Injuries, FREE LANCE-STAR, Sept. 27, 
1983, at 15. 
44 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 21, at 237.  
45 See, e.g., JAMES R. COPLAND & PAUL HOWARD, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RE-
SEARCH, PROJECT FDA REPORT NO. 1, IN THE WAKE OF WYETH V. LEVIN: MAKING THE CASE 
FOR FDA PREEMPTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION (2009); Amalea Smirniotopou-
los, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the Potential for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 793 (2011). 
46 See, e.g., Janet Benshoof, Protecting Consumers, Prodding Companies, and Preventing Concep-
tion: Toward a Model Act for No Fault Liability for Contraceptives, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 403, 405 (1997).  
47 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). 
48 See, e.g., DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUS-
TRIES: GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 228 (2010). 
49 See, e.g., id. at 222-23. 
50 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley & John G. Culhane, Op-Ed., Make Gun Companies Pay Blood 
Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, at A21. 
51 See, e.g., Garza, supra note 41, at 390-91 (proposing a compensation system for victims of 
transfusion-related HIV infection, explicitly modeled on the VICP); Jackson, supra note 21, at 235-
36 (advocating a no-fault system for pharmaceuticals modeled on the VICP); Finley & Culhane, 
supra note 50 (calling for a government-administered fund to compensate victims of gun violence, 
explicitly modeled on the VICP); see also COPLAND & HOWARD, supra note 45 (promoting a 
compensation system for those injured by drugs and medical devices “modeled on” the VICP); 
Malika Kanodia, The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of Riegel v. Medtronic: Should Congress 
Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 834 (2009) (same, while suggesting that such a system would 
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systems, long in operation in the United States, have thus far fared.52 
Drawing on previously untapped material, this Article offers a sustained 
empirical account of the VICP to begin the process of bridging that gap.53 
The remainder unfolds as follows. Part I identifies the problems that 
plague the medical malpractice system, catalogs the various (misdirected) 
medical malpractice reforms initiated over the past four decades, and closes 
with a description of health courts—a new and seemingly promising reform 
designed to revolutionize the adjudication of medical injury claims within 
the United States. Part II shifts gears to focus on vaccines. It provides 
background on the problem of vaccine injury, which crested in the mid-
1980s; discusses Congress’s subsequent enactment of the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986; and introduces the VICP, a 
specialized court which has, over the past three decades, adjudicated 
thousands of petitions for what is, essentially, medical injury. Part III then 
considers health courts and the VICP side-by-side. Detailing the systems’ 
many similarities, Part III suggests that the VICP offers a near-ideal context 
to test whether health courts’ many procedural innovations are apt to fulfill 
proponents’ hopes of dramatically expediting adjudications (delivering 
 
permit payments to be “made in a more even-handed, predictable, and timely fashion than the 
current tort system allows”). 
52 For example, in a recent New York Times op-ed, Professors Finley and Culhane propose a 
compensation fund for innocent victims of gun violence, modeled on the VICP. In so doing, they 
assert that the VICP “avoids the time, expense and inefficiencies of litigation.” Finley & Culhane, 
supra note 50. As we shall see, a close study of the VICP casts doubt on that assertion. See also, e.g., 
Garza, supra note 41, at 390 (stating that the VICP “has proved effective in administering 
compensation of injured vaccinees” and asserting “[b]ecause vaccinees and persons injured through 
blood transfusions are similarly situated, one can expect similar positive results”). Researchers 
have conducted a limited number of studies of American no-fault regimes in action. See, e.g., 
JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH 
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 7 (2010); JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT 
& REVIEW COMM’N OF THE VIRGINIA GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF THE VIRGINIA BIRTH-
RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2003) [hereinafter VIRGINIA 
AUDIT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT-P-30-84-20, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT 
VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES (1985); 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-8, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: 
PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY AND EASILY 2 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 
GAO REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-142, VACCINE INJURY 
COMPENSATION: MOST CLAIMS TOOK MULTIPLE YEARS AND MANY WERE SETTLED 
THROUGH NEGOTIATION 2 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 GAO REPORT]; Randall R. Bovbjerg & 
Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 55 (1998); 
Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 497; Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In, supra note 22, at 499. 
53 Via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, I have obtained thousands of pages of 
transcripts from quarterly meetings of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines 
(ACCV). The ACCV is a nine-member commission charged by Congress with “advis[ing] the 
Secretary [of HHS] on the implementation of the Program,” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(f ) (2012), and 
transcripts of their meetings offer a behind-the-scenes view of the VICP in action.  
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compensation decisions within one year of filing), quelling adversarialism, 
and eliminating decisional discrepancies.  
With that prefatory work completed, Part IV reveals that, despite its 
many procedural innovations, the VICP has struggled to resolve claims 
consistently or quickly. Despite predictions at enactment that the VICP 
would “guarantee” equal treatment to similarly situated claimants, a lack of 
consistency continues to bedevil the Program.54 Notwithstanding Congress’s 
demand that special masters “shall,” with limited exceptions, issue decisions 
within 240 days,55 adjudications within the VICP often take years and, in 
fact, take longer than litigation, to judgment, within the traditional tort 
system.56 And, notwithstanding the many procedural shortcuts the VICP 
employs to simplify damage calculations, the calculation of damages tends 
to tack on another year—or sometimes two—to the resolution of petitions.57 
Part IV further identifies concrete reasons why the VICP’s challenges ought 
to give health court proponents pause, suggesting that the problems that 
have plagued the VICP seem just as likely to plague health courts going 
forward. To be sure, this analysis does not prove that health courts won’t 
outperform the tort system.58 Nor does it prove, more broadly, that health 
courts aren’t worthwhile. But it does call into question certain crucial—and 
heretofore conventionally accepted—claims about health courts’ ostensible 
administrative advantages.  
Finally, Part V steps back to consider why the VICP has stumbled. This 
examination identifies four issues that have plagued the VICP since its 
inception, contributing to many of the concrete problems identified above. 
These include: the difficulty of establishing “actual causation” in certain 
(identifiable) contexts; the double-edged nature of decision-aids; the burden 
of boundary definition, especially in non-self-contained substantive areas; 
and creeping party adversarialism. Further, a careful analysis reveals that 
these four issues have not only bedeviled the VICP. Drawing on research 
concerning workers’ compensation, neurological birth injury funds in 
Florida and Virginia, and state automobile no-fault plans, I show, instead, 
 
54 See Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A 
Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 162-63 (1988) (predicting that the 
VICP would “guarantee” equal treatment). For further discussion on decisional disparities, see 
infra Section IV.A. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012). 
56 See infra Section IV.B and particularly infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
57 For damage calculation difficulties, see infra Section IV.C. 
58 Indeed, though this Article raises numerous concerns about the VICP, only rarely can I 
show that the VICP underperforms vis-à-vis the tort system when it comes to adjudicating similar 
claims.  
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that these problems have similarly and quite consistently plagued other 
American no-fault mechanisms. Identifying these persistent challenges—
and, also, in certain instances, the conditions that tend to make them 
worse—the Article closes with insights that ought to inform not only our 
expectations for health courts, but also, and more generally, our design and 
deployment of future specialized courts and tort replacement mechanisms. 
 I. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH COURT CONCEPT 
A. Origins: Medical Malpractice’s Heavy Toll 
Viewed from any perspective, medical mistakes are a serious problem. 
Medical errors affect a significant proportion of patients. Indeed, the best 
evidence suggests that roughly 1% of hospitalized patients are victims of 
bona fide medical malpractice,59 while another 1% to 1.5% of hospitalized 
patients are “preventably,” though not necessarily negligently, hurt by the 
care they receive.60 Because U.S. hospitals admit roughly 35 million patients 
each year, preventable errors affect as many as 700,000 Americans 
annually.61 Further, some of these injuries are serious. Each year, 44,000 to 
98,000 Americans die because of medical mistakes,62 which means that 
 
59 See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 20 (1985) (reporting results of the 1974 California study, which estimated that the risk 
of negligent injury was 1 per 126 hospital admissions); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF 
MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 
43 (1993) (“Our results indicate that in New York in 1984 . . . about 1 percent of all patients 
hospitalized suffered a negligent medical injury.”); David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and 
Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 253 (2000) [hereinafter 
Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice] (suggesting that the negligent injury rate in Utah 
and Colorado hospitals in 1992 was approximately 0.9% and 0.8%, respectively). 
60 See Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of 
the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377, 378-79 (1991) (finding that, of 
30,195 hospitalized patients, 1133 suffered adverse events and 58% of all adverse events stemmed 
from management errors—suggesting that roughly 2.2% of patients suffered preventable adverse 
events); Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255, 259 
(1999) (estimating that, of studied hospitalized patients in Utah and Colorado, approximately 1.9% 
suffered preventable adverse events).  
61 See Hospital Admissions per 1,000 Population by Ownership Type, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/admissions-by-ownership (last visited Apr. 24, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/TQ8F-B2VS. (reporting annual admission data by state). 
62 See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda 
T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Even this may understate medical injury’s toll, as the figures do not 
include deaths due to medical negligence that occur in nonhospital settings (including doctors’ 
offices, nursing homes, and outpatient clinics). Additionally, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
derived its estimate from studies (including those cited above) that identified errors via medical 
records, though it is quite well established that medical records do not memorialize all medical 
mistakes. See generally Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice 
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medical errors may cause more deaths per year than all other accident types 
combined.63  
The medical malpractice system—which is to say the civil liability 
system’s response to the above injuries—also takes a significant toll. The 
system’s direct economic cost is substantial. Indeed, research suggests that 
administrative costs alone (in legal fees and insurer overhead) total more 
than $6 billion.64 Its indirect costs are also considerable, as physicians report 
that fear of liability impacts the tests they perform, the medication they 
prescribe, and the referrals they make.65 This contributes to “defensive 
medicine” (care provided solely, or primarily, to reduce the probability of 
litigation), which, studies suggests, adds billions of dollars to the nation’s 
annual healthcare bill.66 And, by all accounts, the physicians who are sued 
are deeply, and negatively, affected. Charges of malpractice are associated 
with depression, anger, and frustration, and doctors who have been sued are 
significantly more likely to consider an early retirement, advise their 
children not to practice medicine, and stop seeing the patients they perceive 
as more likely to sue going forward.67  
Further, the system has, in recent decades, imposed greater and greater 
costs. Though lawsuits have dropped in recent years,68 viewed from a longer 
time horizon, the picture reflects sharply increased activity. Malpractice 
insurance premiums have spiraled upward over the past few decades, from 
just under $500 million in 1960 (in inflation-adjusted dollars) to roughly $10 
 
Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357 (2005) (finding, on the basis of a hospital observational 
study, a sizable gap between reported and actual errors). 
63 See WEILER ET AL., supra note 59, at 55 (“Medical injury . . . accounts for more deaths 
than all other types of accidents combined . . . .”). 
64 See Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. 1569, 1570 (2010) [hereinafter Mello et al., National Costs]. 
65 See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians 
in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2609, 2612 (2005) (reporting that 
93% of surveyed physicians in high-risk specialties admitted altering their clinical behavior because 
of the risk of malpractice liability). 
66 There is little consensus concerning just how widespread defensive medicine is or how 
large of a toll it takes, though most agree its cost is substantial. See, e.g., Mello et al., National 
Costs, supra note 64, at 1572-74 (estimating that defensive medicine accounted for $45.6 billion in 
healthcare costs in 2008). 
67 See Peters, supra note 13, at 256-57 (synthesizing relevant evidence).  
68 See CYNTHIA G. LEE & ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1, 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/highlights/18_1_medical_malpractice_i
n_state_courts.ashx (showing a steep drop in medical malpractice case filings in courts of general 
jurisdiction from 1999 to 2008). 
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billion today,69 while physicians’ likelihood of facing a claim has also 
ballooned. Prior to 1960, only one in seven physicians was named in a 
malpractice claim in an entire career, while in recent years, one in fourteen 
faces a malpractice claim annually.70 Further, the medical malpractice system 
touches, in some direct way, nearly every doctor. By retirement age, “75% of 
physicians in low-risk specialties and 99% of those in high-risk specialties 
[a]re projected to face a [malpractice] claim.”71 And, because claims take so 
long to resolve, the average physician spends more than four years—or 
roughly 11% of her career—practicing medicine under the shadow of an 
open and unresolved malpractice allegation.72 
Finally, and many think worst of all, the situation has never been 
particularly satisfactory from the injured patients’ perspective. A tiny 
fraction of those hurt by medical error (on the order of 2% to 3%) ever even 
attempt to claim compensation.73 Of those who do initiate claims, many fall 
short: Doctors prevail in roughly three-quarters of medical malpractice jury 
trials,74 and, overall, approximately 40% of patients who retain counsel never 
 
69 In 1960, medical malpractice insurance premiums totaled $60 million. See Robert H. Brook 
et al., The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1197. 
Adjusted for inflation, this would be approximately $476 million. See CPI Inflation Calculator, 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BC9C-U9EY. In 2012, premiums totaled $10 billion. See NAT’L 
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION: KEY FACTS AND MARKET TRENDS 
(2013). It is worth noting, however, that premiums have not soared on an inflation-adjusted, per-
physician basis, particularly when compared to other practice expenses. See Marc A. Rodwin et al., 
Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income: Perceptions of a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 750, 751-52 (2006). 
70 Compare KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT 
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 105 (2008) (“Before 1960, only one out of every 
seven physicians experienced a malpractice claim in an entire career.”), with Anupam B. Jena et 
al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629, 632 (2011) 
(reporting that, in any given year, from 1991 through 2005, 7.4% of all studied physicians 
experienced a malpractice claim).  
71 Jena et al., supra note 70, at 633. By age 65, 71% of physicians in high-risk specialties can be 
expected to make an indemnity payment. See id. at 634. 
72 See Seth A. Seabury et al., On Average, Physicians Spend Nearly 11 Percent of Their 40-Year 
Careers with an Open, Unresolved Malpractice Claim, 32 HEALTH AFF. 111, 111 (2013). 
73 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 62, at 370 (reporting that, of patients who were seriously 
affected by medical mistakes, only 2.2% initiated claims for compensation); Studdert et al., 
Negligent Care and Malpractice, supra note 59, at 253-55 (finding that only 2.5% of patients injured 
due to medical error filed a malpractice lawsuit).  
74 See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NJC 223851, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4 
tbl.5 (2009) (reporting that plaintiffs won only 22.7% of medical malpractice trials); David M. 
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2026 (2006) [hereinafter Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensa-
tion Payments] (reporting that plaintiffs prevailed in 21% of trials). Note, however, that some losing 
 
  
2015] A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts 1647 
 
recover a penny.75 Even when compensation does come, it comes slowly,76 
and it is often inadequate, particularly for the catastrophically injured.77 
And even when an injured patient does recover, friction costs are 
substantial. For every dollar that reaches the plaintiff, another dollar is 
spent getting it there.78  
B. Reform Initiatives So Far 
Understandably unsatisfied with the status quo, the past three decades 
have witnessed a flurry of med-mal-related legislative activity. Typically 
spearheaded by physician groups and liability insurers, reforms have 
generally ignored (or stubbornly denied) the well-documented problems of 
widespread injury and pervasive under-claiming and have instead sought to 
limit physician and hospital liability. Undertaken by every state, these 
initiatives have taken a number of forms, including caps on noneconomic 
(and sometimes total) damages, modifications to joint and several liability, 
the elimination of the collateral source rule, caps on contingency fees, the 
imposition of certificate-of-merit requirements, restrictions on statutes of 
limitations, and the creation of professional screening panels.79 The stated 
justification for these initiatives has been to deter frivolous claims and 
reduce the size and curb the unpredictability of large (often dubbed 
“windfall”) payments.80 Just as important—if less often articulated—by 
 
plaintiffs do not walk away empty-handed, as some proceed to trial against one defendant having 
already settled with another. See Neil Vidmar, Juries and Medical Malpractice Claims: Empirical 
Facts Versus Myths, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 367, 368 (2009).  
75 WEILER ET AL., supra note 59, at 5 (reporting that approximately 60% of represented claim-
ants “receive some settlement or award”); Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, 
supra note 74, at 2026 (reporting that, of all patients who filed a medical malpractice claim—defined 
merely as a written demand for compensation—roughly 56% received compensation).  
76 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
77 See Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the 
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997, 1028-29 (1990).  
78 See Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2031. 
Finally, no discussion of the medical malpractice system’s woes would be complete without 
noting that the system itself sometimes errs. Some injury victims with meritorious claims get 
nothing, while some individuals with non-meritorious claims get paid. I address this problem 
below at notes 240-41 and accompanying text. 
79 For more on these initiatives, see generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of 
the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2006). 
80 In so doing, reformers have sought to increase physician supply, curb defensive medicine, 
and lower medical malpractice insurance premiums (and, indirectly, healthcare costs). Reforms’ 
actual effects on the above are “mixed.” See generally Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of 
Tort Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 513, 520-37 ( Jennifer 
Arlen ed., 2013). 
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limiting the expected value of claims (and attorneys’ fees earned thereon), 
proponents have sought to dampen plaintiffs’ desire and capacity to sue. 
Notwithstanding their popularity, these incremental reforms are 
susceptible to serious criticism.81 For starters, traditional reforms do nothing 
to help (and, in fact, likely exacerbate) the two most pressing problems 
when it comes to medical injury: (1) the prevalence of medical mistakes, and 
(2) the paucity of adequate compensation for those hurt. Further, to the 
extent one actually believes that the worst thing about medical malpractice 
is the lawsuits it engenders, when it comes to those lawsuits, existing 
reforms just fiddle at the margins, leaving intact the basic structure for the 
compensation of medical mistakes. To the extent the medical malpractice 
system is truly broken, in other words, limiting damages doled out by juries 
or capping the fees lawyers can earn does not fix the system, it merely offers 
“less of the same.”82 Then, as a final kicker, to the extent existing reforms do 
have an effect, that effect is unevenly, and often unfairly, felt—
disproportionately targeting those who are grievously hurt and those who 
are particularly disempowered and especially vulnerable, such as women, 
children, and the elderly.83 
C. Health Courts: The Basics 
Breaking with the status quo, health courts would offer not incremental, 
but wholesale, reform,84 targeting not merely medical malpractice litigation 
 
81 See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 3 (2005) (arguing that “the 
real problem is too much medical malpractice, not too much litigation”); Michael J. Saks, Medical 
Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 693, 694 
(1994) (book review) (“[L]egislative reforms of the past two decades have been aimed at shielding 
health care providers, especially doctors, from the principal legal device designed to deal with 
accidental injuries, thereby assuring that injuries and deaths remain high and compensation 
inadequate.”). 
82 Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury: 
Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148 (1991) (“[R]eforms need to offer a demonstrable improvement, not 
merely ‘less of the same,’ like conventional tort reform’s pro-defendant changes in legal rules.”).  
83 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Promoting Fairness in the Medical Malpractice System (calling cer-
tain reforms “transparently unfair”), in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 137, 142-43 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); Saks, supra note 81, at 722 
(“Caps are a cruel and perverse solution.”). See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of 
Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004) (finding that noneco-
nomic damage caps impose a disproportionate burden on women, children, and the elderly); 
David M. Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in 
California, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 54 (finding that noneconomic damage caps most 
severely restrict the compensation of those victims with the most catastrophic injuries). 
84 Health courts are the most recent in a long line of scholarly calls for fundamental reorien-
tation of the medical injury compensation system. Other bold reform proposals have called, inter 
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but the far more serious epidemic of medical injury. In crafting this reform 
initiative, health court architects have specifically seized on four problems 
with the current system: the negligence standard, victims’ low rate of 
claiming, the inaccuracy and inconsistency of judgments, and the system’s 
sometimes interminable delays.85  
First, health court proponents take issue with the negligence standard, 
which traditionally governs lawsuits alleging medical injury. This standard, 
they say, defies easy administration, contributing to decisional inaccuracy; is 
fundamentally misdirected, as many medical injuries arise not from the 
personal “fault” of any individual physician but rather from broader 
“systems failures” within hospitals and healthcare organizations;86 and, 
owing to its connotation of “moral misbehavior,” inhibits physicians’ 
willingness to disclose errors, which, in turn, impairs providers’ ability to 
learn from their mistakes.87  
 
alia, for states to adopt enterprise liability, see, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, 
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
381, 398-401 (1994), and base liability on contract, rather than tort, principles, see, e.g., Richard A. 
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case For Contract, 76 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 93-94 (1976). 
Health courts themselves are an outgrowth of two earlier proposals. The first called for the 
creation of an administrative entity to resolve liability disputes pursuant to a list of “compensable 
events.” Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, “Medical Adversity Insurance”—A No-Fault 
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK Q. 125, 131-34 (1973). The 
second, from the AMA, sited adjudications within “an expert administrative agency,” altered 
applicable legal standards, and curtailed damages. MEDICAL LIABILITY PROJECT, AM. MED. 
ASS’N / SPECIALITY SOC’Y, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR 
RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM at i, 
17-60 (1988). Health courts differ from these other reform ideas, in part, because they have 
actually made the leap out of the academy and into policy debates and (to a lesser extent) popular 
consciousness.  
85 A number of health court proposals exist, and plans vary on the particulars. The foregoing 
discussion attempts to distill the core features of the leading plans, focusing, when possible, on the 
model set forth in Michelle M. Mello et al., “Health Courts” and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 
MILBANK Q. 459 (2006) [hereinafter Mello et al., “Health Courts”]. For a detailed discussion of 
how various plans differ, see generally Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5, at 15-28.  
86 See INST. OF MED., supra note 62, at 49 (“The problem is not bad people; the problem is 
that the system needs to be made safer.”). 
87 On this latter point, health court proponents reason: (1) we cannot reduce mistakes with-
out disclosing them, (2) the tort system’s naming and blaming culture inhibits disclosure, and (3) 
the “avoidability” standard, by eliminating any connotation of moral misbehavior, would 
encourage physicians to reveal, and learn from, their mistakes. See, e.g., Mello et al., “Health 
Courts,” supra note 85, at 472-74. Not surprisingly, others are not convinced. Some question the 
syllogism’s second step, arguing that, rather than inhibiting disclosure, medical malpractice 
lawsuits “reveal[] valuable information about weaknesses in hospital policies, practices, providers, 
and administration.” Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1224, 1224 (2013). Zeroing in on the third step in the syllogism, others show that 
there is little evidence that error reporting fluctuates alongside the threat of liability. See, e.g., 
George J. Annas, The Patient’s Right to Safety—Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation 
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Second, health court proponents target medical malpractice victims’ 
very low rate of claiming (of 2% to 3%) and seek to expand the pool of 
compensated claimants, while limiting payouts thereto. Broadening 
compensation, proponents say, would be both salutary in its own right (in 
keeping with tort’s compensation ambition) and would also amplify tort’s 
(currently muffled) deterrent signal.88 Reduced payouts, they reason, are 
needed to keep costs from skyrocketing.89  
Third, health court proponents aim their fire at the medical malpractice 
system’s “unreliable” judgments, which they liken to a lottery—or worse.90 
According to health court advocates, many of the most serious problems 
plaguing the medical malpractice system have their roots in decisional 
inaccuracy and inconsistency. This lack of reliability, they say, contributes to 
defensive medicine (as doctors, uncertain about what care is required, pile 
on unnecessary precautions) and also interferes with the tort system’s ability 
to deter mistakes (as physicians believe that litigation outcomes are 
untethered to the underlying merit of the claim).91 Thus, health court 
proponents seek to “eliminate,” or at least dramatically reduce, decisional 
disparities.92 This they would accomplish by basing decisions, whenever 
 
Against Hospitals, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2065 (2006) (pointing out that error reporting 
rates are similar in the United States and New Zealand); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, 
Believing Six Improbable Things: Medical Malpractice and “Legal Fear,” 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
107, 110 (2004) (“[T]he empirical literature indicates that there is massive underreporting of errors 
throughout the health care system, regardless of the level of liability risk that providers face.”); 
Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1633, 1635 (2002) (“No link 
between [error] reporting and litigation has ever been demonstrated.”). 
88 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 (“A primary goal of health court 
proposals is to expand the pool of injured patients who are eligible for compensation.”). For how 
infrequent claiming muffles tort’s deterrent signal, see Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, 
Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 
1618-20 (2002). 
89 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 470 (“Although more claims would be 
filed, the average award would likely be considerably lower.”). Curbing payouts also eradicates 
windfall awards and promotes horizontal equity. See id. at 469-70. 
90 For proponents’ assertions about the system’s unreliability (as well as a critique of certain 
overheated rhetoric), see infra subsection IV.A.2. 
91 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 469, 472 (“[T]he malpractice case tends 
to be compared to a lightning strike as simply a random event not associated with quality.”). For 
the link between unpredictability and defensive medicine, see Philip K. Howard, Special Health 
Courts: The Cure for Defensive Medicine, ATLANTIC (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
national/archive/2010/02/specialhealthcourtsthecurefordefensivemedicine/36564, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y69D-CWH4. 
92 See Howard, supra note 17 (asserting that “unreliable justice” can “be eliminated by creat-
ing specialized administrative health courts”); accord UDELL & KENDALL, supra note 11, at 4 (“The 
health court system would thus provide an essential benefit where our current system of medical 
justice fails: it would provide consistent, rational rulings . . . .”); Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra 
 
  
2015] A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts 1651 
 
possible, in objective evidence and vesting decisionmaking authority in 
trained and specialized experts.93  
Fourth and finally, health court proponents zero in on the sometimes 
interminable delays that attend contemporary medical malpractice 
litigation. Charging that these delays exacerbate stress on doctors, deny 
compensation to needy and deserving claimants, encourage malingering, 
complicate insurance pricing, and impede physicians’ efforts to learn from 
their mistakes, health court architects seek to speed up case resolution 
considerably.94 In fact, proponents assert, health courts would resolve cases 
within one year of the date of filing.95  
To achieve the above objectives, health courts would alter the traditional 
tort system in seven fundamental respects. First and most importantly, 
health courts would alter the substantive standard pursuant to which 
physicians and hospitals are judged, substituting a new “avoidability” 
standard for negligence. Straddling strict liability and negligence, this 
“avoidability” standard would render compensable all injuries that would 
not have occurred but for the physician’s failure to follow “best practices” or 
the hospital’s failure to impose “an optimal system of care.”96 (This differs 
from the negligence standard, which turns on whether a physician’s care fell 
below the “customary,” rather than the “best,” standard within the 
profession.)  
Second, health courts would impose on hospitals a new outreach 
obligation. Health courts would compel hospitals to determine whether each 
patient’s iatrogenic injury (injury arising out of medical treatment) was 
avoidable and, if it was, to notify the patient of his or her possible 
 
note 85, at 469 (suggesting that health court innovations will “reduce the incidence of liability 
determinations that do not match the underlying merits of the claim”). 
93 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461, 465. 
94 See William M. Sage, Malpractice Reform as a Health Policy Problem (cataloging these con-
cerns), in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 30, 37. 
95 See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2 (suggesting 
that a key principle for health court architects is that resolution should be “expeditious . . . with a 
goal of resolving all claims within one year from the filing date”); COMMON GOOD, supra note 1, 
at 5 (“Most cases would be resolved within months.”); Philip K. Howard, Beyond Obamacare: How 
to Fix Our Enormous, Inefficient Health-Care System, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/beyondobamacarehowtofixour-
enormousinefficienthealthcaresystem/256765, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y8R-B6FD (“Patients 
injured by mistakes can get justice within a year, not the five years it takes today.”); accord Mello 
et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85 at 465 (predicting that, even if cases are contested, the ALJ 
could hold a hearing and “make a decision within a few weeks”). 
96 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461, 464, 474. Not all who endorse health 
courts accept the avoidability standard. The AMA, for instance, would retain negligence as the 
threshold for patient compensation. See AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 9, at 2.  
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entitlement to relief.97 (Currently, despite various exhortations to share this 
information, such notifications are exceptional.98)  
Third, health courts would limit damage awards. Though health courts 
would continue to reimburse victims’ entire economic loss,99 these tribunals 
would eliminate the collateral source rule (thereby excluding compensation 
for expenses covered by other plans, programs, or health insurance)100 and 
award noneconomic damages only pursuant to a schedule or sliding scale 
tied to injury severity.101  
Fourth, health courts would create a new layer of pre-adjudication expert 
review. Immediately upon a claim’s receipt, health courts would compel the 
hospital or physician’s insurer (the “respondent”) to convene a group of 
neutral experts to review the claim and render a judgment as to its 
compensability. If this “expert panel” determined that the claim was entitled 
to compensation, it would supply the claimant an offer of compensation; if 
not, the expert panel would provide “a written report” outlining reasons for 
its denial.102 If either the claimant or the health care provider were 
 
97 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 462. To ensure compliance, health courts 
could impose fines or “surcharges” on hospitals that shirk their notification obligation. Id. For 
more on this reporting obligation, see Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5, at 63-65. 
98 See Andrews, supra note 62, at 371.  
99 Most health court plans envision the full recovery of economic loss. See, e.g., AM. COLL. 
OF PHYSICIANS, EXPLORING THE USE OF HEALTH COURTS—ADDENDUM TO “REFORMING 
THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SYSTEM” 6 (2006) (stating that the “ACP strongly 
supports a health court model that pays 100% of the patient’s economic damages”); AM. MED. 
ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2; Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 
85, at 467 (indicating that health courts would award full economic damages, subject to a 
collateral-source offset rule); Howard, supra note 15 (“With a special health court, damages would 
consist of all lost income and medical costs . . . .”). Some, however, envision cabining both 
economic and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 13 at 247-48 (describing a 
“schedule of benefits” for both economic and noneconomic damages); UDELL & KENDALL, supra 
note 11, at 11 (same).  
100 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 467. A caveat is that this may be easier said 
than done, as federal law protects the status of certain entities as secondary payors. See David M. 
Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical 
Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 251 (2001) (cautioning that “fairly well-
established statutory and common law will restrict opportunities for state sponsors of no-fault 
experimentation programs to adopt offset arrangements against Medicare and Medicaid as a 
means for saving resources”). 
101 Proponents explain: “The schedule would consist of a number of injury-severity tiers 
based on an existing injury-severity scale . . . . Dollar value ranges (both floors and ceilings) would 
be assigned to each tier based on decision-science research about how the public values various 
utility losses and public deliberation about reasonable compensation.” Mello et al., “Health Courts,” 
supra note 85, at 468 (citation omitted). 
102 Id. at 464. 
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dissatisfied with the expert panel’s eligibility determination or damage 
calculation, a formal health court adjudication would ensue.103  
Fifth, in the course of these adjudications, health courts would take two 
new steps to promote predictability. First, and most fundamentally, health 
courts would remove medical malpractice cases from generalized courts and 
locate them, instead, in a specialized tribunal overseen by an ALJ schooled 
in, and devoted to, medical injuries.104 Appointed by a board assembled by 
the governor or other appropriate body, these ALJs “would have special 
training and experience in medical matters, but would not typically be 
trained as physicians.”105 Meanwhile, health courts would arm ALJs with 
decision aids dubbed “accelerated compensation events” (ACEs). Identified 
ex ante by an expert body (and periodically updated as new evidence 
becomes available), ACEs would identify certain injuries that would not 
typically occur if a doctor provided optimal care. If a claimant sustained an 
injury matching “the specifications and clinical circumstances of an item on 
an ACE list,” she would be adjudged presumptively eligible for 
compensation, thus eliminating individual fact-finding.106  
Sixth, health courts would take steps to abridge and expedite 
proceedings: Live hearings would be convened only at a party’s or the ALJ’s 
request, and hearings themselves would be simplified; evidence, for 
example, would be admitted pursuant to “basic but relaxed” rules.107  
Last but not least, health courts would limit appeals and regulate 
payments to petitioners’ counsel. Though either party could appeal—first to 
a higher-level administrative tribunal, then to a judicial court—this review 
would be limited: The ALJ’s decision would be affirmed unless it was 
“arbitrary and capricious.”108 Meanwhile, in regards to payments to 
petitioners’ counsel: “Claimants would pay their attorneys on a contingent 
basis (i.e., only if the claim resulted in a compensation payment), but the 
 
103 See id.  
104 See Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 64-65.  
105 Id. at 65. 
106 For a description of ACEs, see Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461, 466-67; 
Tancredi & Bovbjerg, supra note 82, at 149-53. It is not clear what proportion of cases ACEs 
would cover. Cf. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ROBERT A. BERENSON, URBAN INST., SURMOUNT-
ING MYTHS AND MINDSETS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8 (2005), available at 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411227_medical_malpractice.pdf (suggesting that 
“[a]voidable classes of events (ACEs) would probably cover most injuries”).  
107 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465. 
108 Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 69. 
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fee would be based on a multiple of hours worked rather than a percentage 
of the award.”109  
Figure 1 below offers a visual depiction of claims’ path through the 
health court system. 
Figure 1: Health Court Process 
 
 
 
 
109 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 463. Other health court proponents have 
rejected this lodestar idea, in favor of contingency fees subject to a 20% cap. See COMMON GOOD, 
supra note 1, at 5. 
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II. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE VICP 
Today, reformers complain that the medical malpractice system is too 
selective in its compensation, too unpredictable in its decisions, and too 
slow in its judgments—and they hold up specialized courts as the much-
needed cure. As we shall see, in the mid-1980s, many voiced near-identical 
complaints about the vaccine injury litigation environment. And, like health 
court proponents, policymakers settled on a specialized court as the 
necessary reform.  
A. Origins: Mounting Dissatisfaction and Litigation’s Rising Tide 
Vaccines are a triumph of modern medicine.110 Yet for all the good they 
do and all the lives they save, vaccines cause a small proportion of those 
inoculated to sustain grievous, and sometimes fatal, injury. These side 
effects received little attention until the 1970s when three unrelated events 
seemed to conspire to unsettle the status quo. The first was the “notably 
troublesome” case of Anita Reyes.111 While an infant living near the 
Mexican border, Reyes received a dose of Wyeth’s polio vaccine and, shortly 
thereafter, contracted polio, resulting in her near-complete paralysis. Her 
parents initiated suit on her behalf, a jury ruled in her favor, and, in 1974, 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.112 Both the Fifth Circuit’s holding and its 
reasoning were, for vaccine companies, ominous. Reyes v. Wyeth, that is, 
substantially expanded liability for vaccine manufacturers and also explicitly 
invoked enterprise liability principles to justify that expansion—suggesting 
that, going forward, between victims and vaccine manufacturers, the latter 
should bear the loss.113  
 
110 “For each group of vaccinated children born during a given year [in the United States], an 
estimated . . . 33,500 premature deaths are prevented over the course of a lifetime.” Press Release, 
CDC, Most U.S. Parents are Vaccinating According to New CDC Survey: Vaccine Coverage 
Rates for Children Remain High (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel 
/2008/r080904.htm. 
111 Edmund W. Kitch, Vaccines and Product Liability: A Case of Contagious Litigation, REG., 
May–June 1985, at 11, 12. 
112 Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).  
113 Even if the manufacturer was not at fault, the court reasoned, “a strong argument can be 
advanced that the loss ought not lie where it falls (on the victim), but should be borne by the 
manufacturer as a foreseeable cost of doing business.” Id. at 1294. In terms of doctrine, the court 
carved out a new exception to the learned intermediary rule, holding that Wyeth should have 
warned Anita or her parents (not just the nurse who administered the vaccine), even though the 
polio vaccine was not administered as part of a mass immunization program. See id. at 1277. In so 
doing, it was later said, the Reyes court “seeded the clouds for a downpour of litigation.” ARTHUR 
ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST LIFESAVER 266 
(2007). 
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Then, on the heels of the Reyes decision, came the swine flu faux 
epidemic of 1976. There, forty-five million Americans (one-third of the 
adult population) subjected themselves to a flu shot at President Gerald 
Ford’s stern urging only to learn, later, that the flu was not particularly 
dangerous, but the shot itself was—causing in some small proportion of 
patients Guillain-Barré syndrome, a usually reversible but occasionally fatal 
form of paralysis. A flood of litigation and withering press attention 
followed.114  
Rounding out this troubling trilogy, on April 19, 1982, an NBC affiliate 
aired an Emmy-winning, hour-long television documentary titled DPT: 
Vaccine Roulette.115 With footage of dead infants and convulsing children, the 
broadcast charged that the pertussis component in the DTP vaccine (which 
protects against whooping cough) had not been adequately tested and could 
cause “damage to a devastating degree.”116 Publicity from the program 
resulted in the immediate formation of a citizens lobby called Dissatisfied 
Parents Together, kicked off congressional hearings into the pertussis 
vaccine’s safety, and, more generally, stirred growing skepticism about the 
broader vaccination project.117  
Whether buoyed by the Reyes decision, emboldened by the swine flu 
debacle, or galvanized by the Vaccine Roulette documentary, it is clear that, 
starting in the early 1980s, those hurt following vaccination started filing 
suit, for the first time, in significant numbers. In 1980, only twenty-four 
suits were filed alleging vaccine injury; by 1985, that number had spiraled 
upward to 144.118 Indeed, in 1985 alone, plaintiffs filed a total of 100 lawsuits 
against just one manufacturer, Lederle Laboratories, claiming injury 
 
114 For more on this episode, which generated some 1600 lawsuits (all of which, for compli-
cated reasons, were lodged against the United States), see Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 
1188 (D. Colo. 1980); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU 
AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE (1978); David Brown, A Shot in the Dark: 
Swine Flu’s Vaccine Lessons, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A9. 
115 DPT: Vaccine Roulette (NBC television broadcast Apr. 19, 1982). The vaccine protects 
against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. Though many call the vaccine DPT, DTP is the 
abbreviation utilized by the Vaccine Injury Table (and therefore herein). See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 
(2014). 
116 Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for 
the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 839 (1988); see also ALLEN, supra note 113, at 251. 
117 See ALLEN, supra note 113, at 251-55. Though the documentary first aired on an NBC 
affiliate, it was later shown on the NBC program Today. Within three weeks of the program’s 
transmission, a Senate Subcommittee held its first hearing on the pertussis vaccine’s safety and 
efficacy. See id. at 278.  
118 See Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Catherine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensation for Unavoida-
ble Injuries: Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 277, 297 n.126 (1991).  
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following the administration of its DTP vaccine, which eclipsed the number 
of lawsuits filed against Lederle in the previous three years combined.119  
As the number of lawsuits ticked upward, so did manufacturers’ dismay. 
In 1984, for example, Lederle’s President went on record declaring that 
“[t]he present dollar demand of DTP lawsuits against Lederle is 200 times 
greater than our total sales of DTP vaccine in 1983.”120 Then, the following 
year, he complained the situation had deteriorated: “All but two of the more 
than ninety” DTP cases filed against Lederle—in more than forty years of 
distributing the vaccine—had been filed since 1982.121 Another vaccine 
manufacturer—Connaught Laboratories—faced a similar plight, as suits 
filed against it in 1985 and 1986 sought a combined billion dollars in 
damages.122  
Spooked by this increased liability, some manufacturers raised their 
prices—the wholesale price of the DTP vaccine increased some 6000% 
during the period—while others exited the market altogether.123 1984 was a 
particularly eventful year in this regard. On June 13, 1984, Wyeth announced 
it was stopping production of its whooping cough vaccine after thirty years 
of production, blaming “dramatic increases in the cost of participating in 
this market.”124 Then, six months later, Connaught also announced plans to 
stop the vaccine’s production, citing a sharp increase in the cost of insurance 
against lawsuits—a decision The New York Times dubbed a “side effect of the 
side effects.”125  
As manufacturers ceased production, possible vaccine shortages loomed, 
and physicians and public health officials warned of the potential return of 
epidemic infectious disease. Said Martin H. Smith of the American 
 
119 See Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue 
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 16 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House 
Hearing] (statement of Dennis E. Ross, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury). 
120 Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearings on H.R. 5810 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the 
Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 229 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 House 
Hearings] (statement of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Labs.).  
121 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 827 Before the Sen. 
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 99th Cong. 245 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearing] (state-
ment of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Labs.).  
122 See 1987 House Hearing, supra note 119, at 104 (letter from David J. Williams, Vice Presi-
dent & General Manager, Connaught Labs.).  
123 See Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines, 
37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 248 (1994) (reporting that the wholesale price of the DTP vaccine “increased 
by over 6,000 percent from 1970 to 1987”). 
124 Philip M. Boffey, Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1984, at C1. 
125 Richard Levine, Risk Forces Out Vaccine Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1984, at E7. Subse-
quently, on April 25, 1985, Connaught resumed DTP distribution. See 1985 Senate Hearing, supra 
note 121, at 265 (statement of David J. Williams, Vice President & General Manager, Connaught 
Labs.). 
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Academy of Pediatrics in 1984: “At the present time, we are sitting on an 
explosive situation and it could have a short fuse.”126 Seemingly validating 
Smith’s dire warning, on December 13, 1984, the CDC requested that 
doctors postpone DTP “booster shots” for older children in order to ensure 
an adequate supply for infants.127 And by 1986, the number of DTP 
manufacturers had dwindled from eight to two,128 while vaccines for 
measles, mumps, and rubella (the MMR vaccine) and polio were made by 
only a single manufacturer,129 prompting Congress to observe that “the 
withdrawal of even a single manufacturer would present the very real 
possibility of vaccine shortages, and, in turn, increasing numbers of 
unimmunized children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable 
diseases.”130  
On the other side of the “v,” meanwhile, parents of vaccine-injured 
children were themselves unsatisfied. True, throughout the 1980s, more 
parents were suing. But many of these suits ended in defeat, as plaintiffs 
could not necessarily pinpoint which manufacturer made a particular child’s 
vaccine, and, even if they could, often faltered when it came time to prove 
that the vaccine was, in fact, defective or the injury was actually caused by 
the vaccine at issue.131 Moreover, even when compensation did come, it 
came slowly, after wrenching delays and often bitter litigation. As Congress 
explained, “Lawsuits and settlement negotiations can take months and even 
years to complete. Transaction costs—including attorneys’ fees and court 
payments—are high. And in the end, no recovery may be available. Yet 
futures have been destroyed and mounting expenses must be met.”132 
B. The Legislative Solution: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 
By 1986, as worries about a litigation “crisis” swirled, manufacturers’ 
demand for protection grew more insistent, and parents’ pleas for more 
 
126 1984 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 119 (statement of Martin H. Smith, President-
Elect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics). 
127 See Elizabeth Wehr, Concern in Congress: Looming Vaccine Shortage Blamed on Threat of 
Lawsuits, 42 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3146, 3146 (1984).  
128 See Dark, supra note 116, at 801. 
129 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986). 
130 Id. To be sure, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that vaccine manufacturers, eager 
for liability protection, were exaggerating the precariousness of their plight and that price hikes 
and vaccine shortages were orchestrated to force Congress’s hand. See Amy Tarr, DTP Vaccine 
Injuries: Who Should Pay?, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 1 (“[S]ome plaintiffs’ lawyers charge that the 
move to scale down production of the [DTP] vaccine is little more than an industry effort to 
blackmail Congress and the public.”).  
131 For more on challenges facing plaintiffs, see 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 4. 
132 H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6.  
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reliable, predictable, and prompt compensation gained urgency, the table 
was set for a legislative solution.133 In time, Congress obliged. The final 
legislation was, to be sure, nobody’s ideal. As Representative Henry 
Waxman, the Act’s chief sponsor, explained in the summer of 1986:  
I recognize that the bill I have introduced is probably not the first choice of 
most parties to this controversy. Manufacturers would undoubtedly prefer 
greater insulation from liability. Parents of injured children would certainly 
prefer larger compensation and fewer restrictions on court activity. The 
Reagan administration would, I am sure, prefer legislation that spends no 
money.134 
Yet with just enough for all stakeholders, the National Childhood Vaccine 
Injury Act ultimately received broad and bipartisan support, passing on the 
final hours of the 99th Congress.135  
As enacted, the Vaccine Act had two parts. Part one (less important for 
our current purposes) sought to upgrade the nation’s immunization program 
by perfecting vaccines and monitoring adverse reactions thereto.136 Part two, 
meanwhile, sought to shield manufacturers from tort liability, while 
providing “simple justice” to vaccine-injured children.137 Toward that end, 
Congress established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), a 
no-fault scheme run out of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and jointly 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
(which serves as the respondent and therefore represents the Fund’s 
 
133 Congress may also have been influenced by legislative activity, both here and abroad. 
California created a limited compensation program to provide modest benefits to vaccine-injured 
children in 1977, and by 1986, a number of other nations, including Germany, France, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom, also provided payments to vaccine-injured children. 
See Wendy K. Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-Related Injury Abroad: A Comparative 
Analysis, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599, 605-07 (1987). 
134 Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1780, H.R. 4777, and H.R. 5184 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong. 2 (1986) 
(statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman); accord Henry A. Waxman, When a Vaccine Injures a Child: 
A No-Fault Way to Compensate, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1986, at A27 (declaring the legislation a 
“compromise bill” supported by “[a] broad array of conservatives and liberals, consumer advocates 
and pharmaceutical lobbyists”). 
135 For more on the Act’s enactment, see BURKE, supra note 36, at 142-70. 
136 See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, sec. 311(a), 
§§ 2101–2106, 100 Stat. 3755, 3756-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -6 (2012)).  
137 National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearing on S. 2117 Before the S. Comm. 
on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 290-91 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Senate Hearing] (statement of 
Sen. Paula Hawkins) (“[T]hese children have an urgent need and deserve simple justice quick-
ly.”); Martin H. Smith, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, 82 PEDIATRICS 264, 
269 (1988) (“The intent of the Academy for years has been to secure a better and simpler form of 
justice for children as well as to ensure a more secure vaccine supply.”). 
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interests in all VICP proceedings) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
(which represents HHS).138 Financed by a seventy-five-cent excise tax on 
each vaccine dose administered (which creates the Fund upon which injury 
victims draw), the VICP is intended to provide adequate, though abridged, 
compensation to all individuals injured by covered vaccines via “less-
adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding[s].”139  
C. The VICP: The Basics 
To mete out this “simple justice,” the VICP utilizes procedures 
strikingly similar to the procedures health courts would employ. Below, 
Section II.C outlines the VICP’s core features. Then, Part III reviews the 
myriad ways in which health courts and the VICP are alike. 
First, the VICP replaces tort’s negligence standard with a standard of 
strict liability. Pursuant to this standard, the petitioner is entitled to 
compensation as long as her injuries were more likely than not caused or 
significantly aggravated by a covered vaccine. She need not show that the 
doctor erred in the vaccine’s administration or preparation, that the vaccine 
was accompanied by an inadequate warning, or that the vaccine itself was 
defectively manufactured or designed. This means that the Vaccine Act 
winnows down a traditional tort action so that, instead of the many 
elements typically considered, only two must be addressed: (1) actual 
causation (did this vaccine cause this injury?) and (2) damages (how much 
compensation is due?).  
Then, having winnowed down the inquiry to just two elements, the 
Vaccine Act simplifies proof for each. Causation questions are simplified by 
the Vaccine Injury Table—an innovative decision aid designed “to remove 
much of the burden of proof required in traditional tort proceedings.”140 
Initially created by Congress, and periodically amended by the Secretary of 
HHS, the Table lists all covered vaccines, as well as the injuries widely 
recognized as caused thereby, alongside a specific timeframe for each 
injury’s onset.141 If a claimant can show that she suffered an injury listed on 
the Table within the time period specified (so, for example, that she suffered 
 
138 For more on the VICP’s funding and personnel, see MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET 
AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, SPECIALIZED DECISION MAKERS, AND 
CASE-MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION 
PROGRAM 11-12 (1998).  
139 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1), (d)(2)(A) (2012).  
140 H.R. REP. NO. 106-977, at 8 (2000). 
141 For more on the Table’s creation, see JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 13-14. For the 
Table itself, see 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2014). For information on Table modifications, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300aa-14(c) and infra Section V.B. 
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anaphylaxis within four hours of receiving the DTP vaccine), she will have 
suffered an “on-Table” injury. On-Table injuries are presumed to have been 
caused by the vaccine and are thus presumptively entitled to compensation. 
HHS (serving as respondent) may rebut this presumption, but it bears the 
burden of doing so.142 Only if an injury falls outside the Table must the 
traditional actual cause question be addressed.  
Free-wheeling damages calculations are also avoided. Compensation in 
the event of a vaccine-related death is automatically set at $250,000,143 while 
payments to injured claimants are also standardized. Injured claimants, that 
is, are entitled to (1) lost wages, (2) payment for pain and suffering, and (3) 
actual medical and rehabilitation expenses. But, of those three damage 
categories, only the third (medical and rehabilitation expenses) is 
consistently calculated on an individualized basis. Minors’ lost wages are 
pegged to the average gross weekly earnings of workers in the private, non-
farm sector,144 while damages for pain and suffering payments are capped at 
$250,000.145 
In addition to simplifying the questions to be addressed, the Vaccine Act 
alters the site of injury adjudication. As in health courts, entitlement and 
compensation decisions are relocated from generalist courts to specialized, 
dedicated tribunals, as decisional authority is vested in eight special masters 
(seven associates and one chief ), who serve renewable four-year terms and 
work in (and are appointed by judges on) the U.S. Court of Claims.146 
Considered “experts,” these special masters work exclusively on vaccine 
cases and are, according to Congress, to be “well-advised on matters of 
health, medicine, and public health.”147  
 
142 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B). 
143 Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (establishing damages in the event of a vaccine-related death). As of 
2006, deaths accounted for roughly 14% of VICP claims. See Geoffrey Evans, Update on Vaccine 
Liability in the United States: Presentation at the National Vaccine Program Office Workshop on 
Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States, 12 February 2002, 42 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S130, S133 (2006).  
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B) (simplifying calculation of minors’ lost wages). Adults 
are entitled to their “actual and anticipated loss of earnings.” Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A). 
145 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(4). 
146 Because terms are renewable, some special masters serve for long periods. For example, 
one associate special master has served since 1991. See Laura D. Millman, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, 
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/laura-d-millman (last visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/H4YA-ZTBQ. 
147 H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 515 (1989) (Conf. Rep.); see Munn v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declaring that, because special masters are 
“experts,” they shall be entitled to the “statutory deference in fact-finding normally reserved for 
specialized agencies”). For more on special masters’ qualifications, see JOHNSON ET AL., supra 
note 138, at 14-15.  
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Furthermore, the Vaccine Act seeks, to the extent possible, to root 
decisions in scientific evidence—to base decisions on experts’ interpretation 
of the leading scientific literature.148 This ambition is clearly evident in the 
Vaccine Act’s creation of, and reliance on, the Vaccine Injury Table 
(discussed above). It is also evident in the Act’s delegation of decisional 
authority to eight special masters who are schooled in, and devoted to, the 
resolution of vaccine-injury claims. It is apparent in other innovations as 
well. Namely, as in health courts, experts are called upon to assess claims’ 
scientific validity—and chart claims’ course—from the very beginning. As 
soon as a VICP petition is filed, that is, the petition is routed to HHS for 
evaluation by a medical expert within HHS’s Division of Vaccine Injury 
Compensation (DVIC). This expert reviews the petition and determines 
whether it meets medical criteria for compensation. If he or she concludes it 
does and the DOJ concurs, the petition will be conceded, and, with the 
special master’s permission, will move directly to the damages phase.149 
Only if the DVIC expert determines that the petition does not meet the 
medical criteria for compensation will an adjudication ensue. Then, once a 
hearing is in full swing, expert opinion can again be sought: Congress has 
empowered—and encouraged—special masters to retain neutral experts to 
inform their consideration of complex medical questions.150  
The VICP also takes many steps to abridge and expedite proceedings. 
Or, as two commentators have explained: “The overriding guideline of 
th[e]se proceedings is simplification.”151 Toward that end, the Vaccine Act 
 
148 DIVISION OF VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COM-
PENSATION PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN 24 (2006) [hereinafter DVIC STRATEGIC PLAN] 
(stating that a “strength” of the VICP is that the program “endeavors to be science-based in its 
assessment of claims”). 
149 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NA-
TIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: A PROGRAM REVIEW 4 (1992); 1999 
GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 30.  
150 Congress has declared that special masters would “be well-advised to retain independent 
medical experts to assist in the evaluation of medical issues.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 513 
(1989). Despite Congress’s exhortation, in practice, few special masters retain independent 
experts. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE UNDER THE 
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 26 (2014) (“In unusual instances, 
special masters may suggest the hiring of a neutral medical expert to render an opinion on a 
medical dispute, such as the appropriate diagnosis or prognosis.”); JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 
138, at 32-33 (reporting that, of interviewed special masters, none “had . . . actually appointed an 
expert” and providing tentative explanations for special masters’ forbearance, including special 
masters’ respect for the adversarial system, their uncertainty of how to locate and compensate a 
court-appointed expert, and their heavy reliance on medical textbooks (which potentially take 
independent experts’ place)). 
151 Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: 
An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 394 (1987). 
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discards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits neither pretrial 
discovery nor cross-examination as of right, relaxes rules for the admission 
of evidence, and eliminates the need to provide live testimony (instead 
permitting the parties to introduce evidence by affidavit, sworn declaration, 
or via telephone or videotape).152 Rather than sitting passively on the 
sidelines, the Act empowers special masters to take an active, inquisitorial 
role—to question witnesses, demand additional documentation, and inform 
parties what further proof is necessary to facilitate case resolution.153 And 
finally, the Act tops off its desire for speed with a hard deadline: By statute, 
special masters “shall” issue decisions within 240 days of the petition’s filing, 
exclusive of suspended time.154  
At the tail end of litigation, the VICP limits appeals and cabins 
payments to petitioners’ counsel. Within the VICP, either party (HHS or 
the petitioner) may appeal—first to the U.S. Court of Claims, then to the 
Federal Circuit. Appeals, however, proceed pursuant to a highly deferential 
standard of review: Special masters’ findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are set aside only if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”155 Petitioners’ counsel, meanwhile, is 
compensated via a unique payment mechanism. The VICP compensates 
petitioners’ counsel out of the Fund via a lodestar calculation (reasonable 
hours worked times a reasonable hourly wage) and will do so even if the 
petitioner fails in his quest to obtain compensation. The sole requirement is 
that the petition was brought pursuant to a “reasonable basis” and “in good 
faith.”156  
 
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(v) (2012) (limiting discovery and granting the special 
master discretion to conduct hearings); id. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(B) (advising that evidence is to be 
admitted pursuant to “flexible and informal standards”); see also OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, 
supra note 150, at 41 (offering alternatives to live testimony).  
153 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 513 (“The system is intended to allow the proceedings to be 
conducted in what has come to be known as an ‘inquisitorial’ format, with the Master conducting 
discovery (as needed), cross-examination (as needed), and investigation.”). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii). As initially enacted, the Act set a 365-day deadline. See 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, sec. 311(a), § 2112, 100 Stat. 
3755, 3762. Congress subsequently amended that provision to require judgment within 240 days in 
most cases. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, sec. 6601, § 2112, 
103 Stat. 2106, 2288 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii)). If a special master fails to 
enter judgment within the prescribed period, the petitioner may withdraw her petition and file the 
action in state or federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(g). It appears, however, that “petitioners 
rarely exercise this option.” 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 12. 
155 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B); see also Hibbard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 100 
Fed. Cl. 742, 749 (2011) (“If the special master’s decision is based on evidence in the record that is 
not wholly implausible, the Court will uphold the finding as not being arbitrary and capricious.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
156 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B). 
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Finally, at a case’s conclusion, the Vaccine Act supplies a tort opt-out 
provision. Specifically, the Act compels all individuals with vaccine-injury 
claims to first adjudicate their claims within the VICP. But the Act also 
gives unsatisfied petitioners the right to reject the special master’s judgment 
and file a traditional tort claim against the vaccine manufacturer or 
healthcare provider in state or federal court, where the claim is considered 
anew. This tort opt-out provision, however, is very narrow, as the Act both 
restricts the kind of claims that can be asserted and limits the damages that 
may be awarded. Specifically, per the 2011 Supreme Court ruling in 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, the Vaccine Act preempts all design defect claims 
against vaccine manufacturers.157 And, the Act unambiguously creates a 
presumption of adequacy for all warnings that comply with FDA standards 
(thereby preventing state courts from performing an independent 
assessment of a warning’s sufficiency),158 codifies the “learned intermediary 
doctrine” (thereby eliminating claims based on the vaccine manufacturer’s 
failure to furnish direct warnings to patients),159 and erects a heightened 
standard for the provision of punitive damages.160  
Figure 2 offers a visual depiction of a petition’s path through the VICP 
system. 
 
157 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011). 
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(2). 
159 Id. § 300aa-22(c). 
160 Id. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (barring punitive damages except if the manufacturer engaged in 
fraud, intentional wrongdoing, or other illegal activity). 
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Figure 2: VICP Process 
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Victim files petition in U.S. 
Court of Claims 
HHS DVIC Review 
DOJ concedes claim 
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DOJ contests claim 
VICP  
(Special Master 
Decision) 
Appeal (to U.S. Ct. of 
Claims then Fed. Cir.) or 
exit to tort system 
Compensable Not Compensable 
Compensable 
Explanation of  
decision  
Not  
Compensable 
If Unsatisfactory If Unsatisfactory 
VICP Special 
Master 
Damages 
Decision 
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III. A CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL DÉJÀ VU: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN 
HEALTH COURTS AND THE VICP 
As should by now be clear, health courts and the VICP share underlying 
motivations and critical characteristics. This Part will review the two 
reforms’ many similarities (and highlight their occasional differences) to 
show, ultimately, that a study of the VICP sheds light on health courts’ 
likely performance upon adoption. To begin, Table 1 offers a visual 
depiction of the two systems’ key characteristics, with the systems’ few 
differences highlighted in gray. 
 
Table 1: Similarities and Differences Between the VICP and Health Courts 
 
  VICP Health Courts 
Eligibility 
Severity threshold 
excludes those with 
minor injuries? 
Yes 
(Injury lasts six 
months or results 
in hospital stay, 
surgery, or death) 
Yes 
(Claimant misses 
four weeks of 
work or incurs 
$3000+ in medical 
costs)
Outreach to 
potential claimants? 
Yes 
(HHS to inform 
public; attorneys 
have ethical 
obligation to 
advise)
Yes 
(Hospitals must 
notify patients of 
avoidable 
iatrogenic injury) 
Personnel 
Respondent(s) HHS, 
represented by 
DOJ 
Physician(s) and 
Hospital(s) 
(sometimes 
multiple)
Specialized  
adjudicators?
Yes 
(Special Masters)
Yes 
(ALJs)
Juries? No No
Proof 
Petitioner must 
prove fault?
No Kind of 
(“Avoidability”) 
Petitioner must 
prove causation?
Yes Yes 
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  VICP Health Courts 
Procedures 
Decision aid fast-
tracks claims 
involving signature 
events? 
Yes 
 (Table) 
Yes 
 (ACEs) 
Respondent’s 
response to claim 
informed by expert 
review? 
Yes 
(DVIC Expert) 
Yes 
(“Expert Panel”) 
Adjudicator 
empowered to hire 
neutral experts?
Yes Yes 
Relaxed rules of 
evidence and 
procedure?
Yes Yes 
All decisions  
published?
Yes Yes 
Damages 
Full economic loss 
(subject to 
abrogation of CSR)?
Yes 
(though death 
benefits  
and minors’  
lost wages  
standardized)
Yes 
Limit on 
noneconomic 
damages? 
Yes 
($250,000 cap) 
Yes 
(sliding scale) 
Appeals 
Appeals permitted? Yes 
(U.S. Ct. of Fed. 
Claims then Fed. 
Cir.)
Yes 
(Admin. panel 
then  
judicial court) 
Deferential 
appellate standard 
of review?
Yes 
(“Arbitrary and 
Capricious”)
Yes 
 (“Arbitrary and 
Capricious”) 
Attorney 
Compensation 
Petitioner’s attorney 
compensated via 
lodestar?
Yes 
(From VICP 
Fund)
Yes 
(From Claimant) 
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  VICP Health Courts 
Petitioner’s attorney 
paid if claim denied? 
Yes 
(subject to limited 
exception)
No 
 
Exclusive 
Remedy 
Tribunal exclusive 
remedy? 
No 
(limited tort opt-
out provision)
Yes 
A. Similarities, Revisited 
As Parts I and II suggested and Table 1 illustrates, health courts and the 
VICP share many similarities. They both address similar claims: serious 
personal injury claims of those injured in the course of a medical 
intervention.161 These claims raise similar questions, generate similar 
conflicts, and compel the consideration of similar evidence. And indeed, 
rather than mere similarity, there is actual overlap between claims within 
the two systems as, prior to the Vaccine Act’s preemption of these claims, 
vaccine-injured children would sometimes sue doctors, alleging that that the 
vaccine at issue was contraindicated or improperly administered.162  
Next, health courts and the VICP both embody a similar ideology 
concerning the nature of, and proper response to, accidents. 
Conceptualizing accidents as either the result of larger “system failures” (as 
in the case of health courts) or altogether inevitable (as in the case of the 
VICP), both systems view injuries as a poor fit for traditional liability 
actions, which tend to emphasize the personal fault of the ostensible 
tortfeasor.163 Operationalizing this perception, both systems jettison tort’s 
 
161 The word “serious” reflects the fact that, in order to control cost and keep caseloads in 
check, both health courts and the VICP use injury-severity thresholds to exclude those with small 
losses. Health court compensation would likely be available only to those who miss four weeks of 
work or incur $3000 (or perhaps $4000) in medical expenses. See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra 
note 85, at 467. To be eligible for compensation within the VICP, the effects of petitioner’s injury 
must last for more than six months, result in a hospital stay or surgery, or culminate in death. See 
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i)-(iii). 
162 See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976) (involving a lawsuit against 
a physician for the improper administration of a vaccine). The Vaccine Act preempts such 
lawsuits. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(3). 
163 Compare Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of 
Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 600 (2008) (discussing 
“system failures”), with S.A. Sturges, Comment, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort 
Compensation System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919, 934 & n.125 (1986) (reporting that events that 
culminate in a vaccine-related injury have been labeled “dyspractice,” rather than “malpractice,” 
which “pertains to an undesirable, yet unavoidable, result”). 
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“fault” concept in favor of a less punitive finding—“avoidability” in health 
courts, no-fault in the VICP.  
Next, both reforms strive to be even-handed.164 Unlike the modern tort 
reform movement, which, in its support of contingency fee caps and damage 
limits, transparently benefits defendants and their insurers at injured 
plaintiffs’ expense165—health courts and the VICP offer benefits, and 
impose burdens, on those on both sides of the “v.” And, perhaps as a 
consequence, both reforms have received broad and bipartisan support.166 
Further, both health courts and the VICP are born of frustration with 
the lack of predictability within the traditional tort system.167 And both seek 
to reduce decisional disparities in the same way: by demanding the 
publication of decisions, and by placing power, whenever possible, in the 
hands of experts.168 On the former, to promote consistency, both systems 
compel the publication of ALJ and special master decisions, facilitating the 
creation of a databank of written decisions upon which future physicians, 
litigants, and decisionmakers can draw.169 On the latter, both exemplify the 
“expertise model” of decisionmaking.170 As such, they both call upon neutral 
experts to assess claims’ scientific validity as soon as claims are filed (the 
“expert panel” within health courts and DVIC review within the VICP).171 
They both vest decisionmaking authority in dedicated, independent, expert 
 
164 Compare Peters, supra note 13, at 253 (observing that health courts “demonstrate[] an 
evenhandedness that is uncommon among tort reformers”), with BURKE, supra note 36, at 149-58 
(discussing the VICP’s bipartisan lineage). To be sure, some question health courts’ commitment 
to even-handedness. See generally Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5. 
165 See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
13, 22 (1988) (referring to most modern tort reforms as “victim take-away programs”).  
166 Compare sources cited supra notes 5-17 (describing widespread support for health courts), 
with BURKE, supra note 36, at 149-58 (noting the VICP’s bipartisan lineage). 
167 Compare Howard, supra note 15 (championing health courts because they would “deliver[] 
fair and reliable decisions”), with infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (showing that support 
for the VICP came, in part, from a desire to inject predictability into the system for compensation 
for vaccine injury). 
168 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to 
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 437 (2007) (noting that “reasoned written opinions should, all 
else equal, enhance consistency”). 
169 Compare Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 (proposing that “[t]he health 
court’s written decision would be recorded in a keyword-searchable electronic database that could 
be accessed by adjudicators in future cases”), with 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B) (2012) (compel-
ling the publication of VICP decisions, except if disclosure would reveal a trade secret or would 
“constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy”).  
170 For discussion of the “expertise model,” see Robert L. Rabin, The Vaccine No-Fault Act: 
An Overview, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 269, 271 (2011).  
171 Compare Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 468 (describing the role of the 
“expert panel” in proposed health courts), with sources cited supra note 149 (concerning review by 
experts within the DVIC). 
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adjudicators (ALJs and special masters, respectively). They both arm these 
expert decisionmakers with powerful decision aids (ACEs and the Table), 
which were, themselves, created by experts.172 And, when a claimant’s 
eligibility for compensation turns on complex scientific issues, both reforms 
empower decisionmakers to retain still other independent experts to guide 
their judgments.173  
Next, both reforms also arise out of impatience with the tort system’s 
sometimes intolerable delays—and thus aim to expedite proceedings 
considerably. In fact, both reforms promise to resolve all, or nearly all, 
entitlement decisions within one year from the date of filing.174 Pursuing 
that objective, both systems streamline the substantive determinations that 
must be made, site the adjudication of claims within a specialized court (as 
specialists are thought to resolve cases more quickly than generalists),175 
impose injury-severity thresholds (to ensure tribunals do not become 
clogged resolving the claims of those with only minor impairments),176 and 
abridge and simplify procedures that must be followed. 
Finally, both reforms seek to expand but also limit compensation, 
believing more claimants should recover, but successful claimants should 
recover less. To accomplish the former, both systems relax the fault 
standard, conduct affirmative outreach to notify potential injury victims of 
their possible entitlement to relief,177 and (again) streamline filing and 
 
172 Notably, a leading ACE architect recognizes that the Table is “akin to ACEs.” Bovbjerg, 
supra note 32, at 277. 
173 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 (noting that an ALJ’s determina-
tions should be guided by “court-appointed medical experts”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 513 
(1989) (recommending that VICP special masters “retain independent medical experts”). Like the 
VICP, health courts would also, it appears, permit parties to retain and utilize their own experts. 
See Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing on S. 1337 
Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions Comm., 109th Cong. 40 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 
Senate Hearing] (statement of Philip K. Howard, Founder and Chair, Common Good) (clarifying 
that “parties could have their own experts as well”). 
174 Compare supra note 95 (compiling claims by health court proponents), with supra note 154 
and infra notes 245-50 (compiling claims by supporters of the VICP).  
175 See BAUM, supra note 33, at 32-33 (“[J]udges who regularly handle a single class of cases 
are expected to dispose of their work in less time than their counterparts on generalist courts who 
see that class of cases less frequently.”). 
176 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (describing health courts’ and the VICP’s 
injury-severity thresholds). 
177 As noted, health courts would compel hospitals to notify patients if the patient sustains a 
compensable injury. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The Vaccine Act also contains an 
outreach obligation, as it directs HHS to undertake “reasonable efforts to inform the public of the 
availability of the Program” and simultaneously imposes an “ethical obligation” on all attorneys 
who are consulted “with respect to a vaccine-related injury or death” to explain “that compensa-
tion may be available under the program.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10(b) to (c) (2012).  
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adjudication procedures (which should, logically, entice more to enter the 
claims system). To accomplish the latter, both systems abridge and 
standardize damages. Specifically, both offer only partial compensation for 
noneconomic loss (health courts utilize a sliding scale, the VICP imposes a 
$250,000 cap). And, both permit the full recovery of economic loss only to 
the extent those losses are not elsewhere compensated.178 
B. A Few Differences 
Still, for all their similarities, health courts and the VICP are not 
identical. In fact, they differ in a number of respects, including: (1) In the 
VICP, the HHS, represented by the DOJ, is the respondent, whereas in 
health courts, the culpable party or parties remain on the hook; (2) the 
VICP is a true no-fault scheme, whereas health courts continue to require 
an assessment of whether the physician or hospital erred; (3) the VICP is a 
non-exclusive remedy, whereas the health court system would completely 
preempt the medical malpractice field; and (4) in the VICP, petitioner’s 
counsel is paid from the Fund, regardless of whether or not the petitioner 
prevails, whereas, in health courts, attorneys’ fees come from the petitioner 
and are contingent on success. Below, I explore these differences in greater 
detail, while forecasting their probable effects.  
1. The Respondent: Government Versus Physician or Hospital 
First, unlike health courts, the VICP is a true alternative compensation 
mechanism. It is funded by a seventy-five-cent per dose surcharge on each 
vaccine dose administered, and the respondent in VICP adjudications is the 
Secretary of HHS, represented by staff attorneys in the Torts Branch of the 
DOJ. The potentially culpable party (the erring physician or maker of the 
errant vaccine) is not present, is not represented, and is not in any way 
affected if a decision is made to compensate the petitioner. 
By contrast, in health courts, the potentially responsible party or parties 
will be present, represented, and financially responsible. If the physician or 
hospital is found to be liable (albeit under the relaxed avoidability 
standard), the physician or hospital will have to pay the claimant and, 
depending on whether reporting obligations to the National Petitioner Data 
Bank (NPDB) are or are not modified, the physician might need to report 
 
178 For more on damage calculations, see infra Section IV.C. 
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the payment to the NPDB and, subsequently, disclose the fact of payment 
to licensing authorities, affiliated hospitals, and insurance carriers.179  
When forecasting the likely effect of this distinction, one might predict 
that the active participation of the potentially culpable and financially 
responsible party within the health court system would render those 
proceedings more adversarial and combative, as compared to proceedings 
within the VICP.180 The effect would be particularly stark if NPDB 
reporting requirements remain in place or insurance premiums are 
experience-rated, because if premiums are experience-rated (i.e., if they 
fluctuate based on claims experience), claim payment would carry for 
physicians or hospitals a clear financial penalty.181 
2. Liability Standard: No-Fault Versus “Avoidability” 
Second, the VICP is a true no-fault remedy, while health courts relax the 
fault element without eliminating it. Even under the liberalized avoidability 
standard, a health court claimant must still prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the care she received was suboptimal and that her doctor or 
hospital neglected to utilize “best practices.”182 This won’t always be easy. 
For example, health court proponents have said that “the avoidability 
standard could result in liability in some situations in which hospitals could 
have improved their systems at reasonable cost, but opted not to.”183 This 
means that, to assign liability in at least these cases, the ALJ will have to 
determine what constitutes or does not constitute “reasonable cost”—which, 
in turn, means that health courts will, at least sometimes, confront precisely 
the same vexing questions frequently confronted in the tort liability system.  
Once again, the difference between health courts and the VICP is 
significant. And, on balance, one might expect the difference to complicate 
 
179 Currently, if a claim is paid on behalf of a physician (either by judgment or settlement), 
the payment must be reported to the NPDB. Then, the fact of payment dogs the physician going 
forward, resurfacing whenever she fills out forms from state licensing boards or seeks to renew her 
liability insurance, managed care contracts, or hospital privileges. Peters, supra note 13, at 256. It is 
not clear whether health court payments would trigger the same reporting obligation, though 
health court proponents have cautioned against it. See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, 
at 484-87.  
180 Cf. Danzon, supra note 21, at 460 (stating that “the key to low litigation expense [in the 
Swedish patient compensation insurance system] is that individual providers have no personal 
stake in the outcome”). 
181 Health court proponents advocate rating hospitals’ or care units’ premiums to their claims 
experience. See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 475.  
182 Id. at 461.  
183 Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 496.  
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proceedings within health courts relative to the VICP, perhaps 
dramatically.184 
3. Remedy: Non-Exclusive Versus Exclusive 
Third, the Vaccine Act contains a tort opt-out provision: Though all 
seeking compensation for vaccine-related injury must initially file in the 
VICP, unsatisfied petitioners can reject the special master’s judgment and 
file a traditional (albeit restricted) tort claim against the vaccine 
manufacturer or healthcare provider in state or federal court. Health courts, 
by contrast, would offer an exclusive remedy: Though a health court 
claimant might ultimately appeal an ALJ’s denial to a judicial court, there is 
no de novo exit from the health court system.  
Highlighting the availability of the VICP’s opt-out option and its 
concomitant unavailability within health courts, some have argued that the 
former “is not an apt analogy” for the latter “for the simple reason” that 
dissatisfied VICP petitioners “may pursue a civil action for damages.”185 
This characterization, however, exaggerates the practical importance of the 
VICP’s civil action possibility. As noted above, the petitioner’s ability to file 
a civil suit for vaccine injury is circumscribed by law—and, perhaps more 
importantly, it is rarely exercised in practice. Even before the Supreme 
Court’s recent (and further limiting) Bruesewitz decision, fewer than 0.5% of 
vaccine claimants who received an award within the VICP rejected their 
award in favor of a civil action.186 Furthermore, also prior to Bruesewitz, 
“virtually all” unsuccessful VICP claimants acquiesced to the rejection, 
rather than initiating lawsuits in state or federal court.187 No matter its on-
paper possibilities, in other words, the VICP typically functions as an 
exclusive remedy—minimizing the practical effect of this formal distinction. 
 
184 MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 32, at 31 (recognizing that, as compared to an avoidabil-
ity standard, a no-fault standard is “easier to administer”). 
185 Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5, at 78.  
186 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28, Bruesewitz 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152) (“Department of Justice records indicate that 
99.8% of successful Compensation Program claimants have accepted their awards, foregoing any 
tort remedies against vaccine manufacturers.”).  
187 STANLEY A. PLOTKIN ET AL., VACCINES 1673 (5th ed. 2008); see Katherine M. Cook & 
Geoffrey Evans, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 127 PEDIATRICS S74, S76 
(2011) (“The program is aware of only a small number of VICP claims that go on to the civil (tort) 
system.”). 
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4. Attorneys’ Fees: Fund Versus Petitioner 
Fourth and finally, both systems are similar in that both restrict fees to 
claimants’ counsel and also calculate those fees using the lodestar method 
(hours worked times a reasonable hourly rate).188 The systems differ, 
however, when it comes to claimants’ attorneys’ fees’ source and certainty. 
The VICP pays from the Fund, and the sole prerequisite for payment is that 
the petition was brought pursuant to “a reasonable basis” and “in good 
faith.”189 By contrast, leading advocates suggest that in health courts a 
claimant’s lawyer’s fee would come from the claimant’s recovery and would 
be conditional upon her success.190 
At first glance, it might appear that this difference is significant—that 
health court counsel, paid only if successful, would have a much greater 
incentive to screen clients prior to retention and zealously (maybe 
overzealously) advocate on clients’ behalf. On the other hand, VICP 
lawyers, paid hourly irrespective of victory, might be more likely to accept 
dubious claims and, once retained, drag their heels, possibly prolonging 
litigation even after the case appears doomed.191 Yet while these incentives 
surely exist to some extent—and might well promote both the filing of non-
meritorious claims and protracted contestation in the VICP context, relative 
to the health court context—differences between the systems should not be 
overstated. In reality, VICP special masters award higher fees to counsel for 
prevailing as compared to non-prevailing petitioners, partially bridging the 
incentive gap between the two systems.192  
IV. THE VICP IN ACTION: HEALTH COURTS ARE UNLIKELY TO 
RESOLVE CLAIMS AS PREDICTABLY OR AS QUICKLY  
AS PROPONENTS NOW SUGGEST 
Health court proponents have pointed to the above design innovations—
pre-adjudication review, specialized ALJs, neutral experts, ACEs, the 
avoidability standard, published decisions, and streamlined damage 
 
188 See supra notes 109 (for health courts), 156 (for the VICP) and accompanying text. 
189 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (2012).  
190 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 463 (“Claimants would pay their attor-
neys on a contingent basis (i.e., only if the claim resulted in a compensation payment) . . . .”). 
191 See generally Brandon L. Boxler, Fixing the Vaccine Act’s Structural Moral Hazard, 12 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2012).  
192 One study showed a mean of $22,052 to successful counsel, compared to $14,053 to unsuc-
cessful counsel. See Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 74 (1999). In addition, it should 
be noted that this “difference” is entirely a product of the health court model, as it currently exists. 
There is no inherent impediment to treating attorneys’ fees identically in both regimes. 
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determinations—and have asserted that these innovations will ensure that 
health courts will expedite adjudications (resolving nearly all claims within 
one year of the date of filing), quell the adversarialism of dispute resolution, 
and provide consistent, rational rulings that would “restore faith in the 
reliability of medical justice.”193 Indeed, as noted at the outset, achieving 
these administrative gains is central to health courts’ appeal—and, upon 
adoption, health courts’ ability to withstand inevitable constitutional 
attack.194 The $64,000 question, though, is whether health courts’ procedural 
innovations will usher in those salutary consequences. How confident, in 
other words, can we be of the above predictions? 
The VICP offers a near-ideal laboratory to consider that question. As 
seen above, the VICP shares most of the design innovations health court 
proponents now enthusiastically tout. Furthermore, echoing current 
predictions of health court processes, back when the VICP was created, 
Congress expressed confidence that the Program would resolve claims 
“quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity,”195 while contemporary 
commentators predicted that the VICP would “offer prompt justice”196 to 
vaccine-injured children while “guarantee[ing]” equal compensation to 
“similarly situated individuals.”197  
So, what do we learn when we assess health court advocates’ claims 
through the prism of VICP experience? The picture is bleak. The VICP has 
simply failed to offer compensation as consistently, as quickly, as easily, or as 
simply as its proponents had predicted. Indeed, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has studied the Program and concluded: 
“While [the Program] was expected to provide compensation for vaccine-
related injuries quickly and easily, these expectations have often not been 
met.”198 A leader in the parents’ lobby, instrumental in the Act’s passage, has 
concluded that the VICP’s administration has constituted “a betrayal of the 
promise that was made to parents about how the compensation program 
 
193 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
194 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.  
195 H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3 (1986). 
196 Editorial, A Way Out of the Vaccine Morass, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1986, at A34; see also, e.g., 
Barbara J. Connolly, Note, The Necessary Complement to Mandatory Immunizations: A National 
Vaccination Compensation Program, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 155 (1986) (“A no-fault, nonadversari-
al national program will assure expedited, just compensation, at low transaction costs for those 
who have sustained vaccine-related injuries.”); Neraas, supra note 54, at 164 (“The 
Act . . . guarantees prompt compensation.”); id. at 165 (“In no case should a petitioner have to wait 
more than a year to receive compensation.”). 
197 Neraas, supra note 54, at 163. 
198 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 19.  
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would be implemented.”199 And, the man who served for over two decades 
as the VICP’s chief special master has publicly lamented: “[L]itigating 
causation cases has proven the antithesis of Congress’s desire for the 
Program.”200 Below, I dissect the above contentions and identify what 
concrete lessons the VICP offers for health courts going forward. 
A. Predictability Remains Elusive 
Predictability has long been touted as a prime advantage of judicial 
specialization.201 And increasing the reliability and accuracy of medical 
liability judgments is inarguably key to health courts’ appeal.202 So, too, in 
the VICP. As the Vaccine Act was debated, predictability was prominent. 
Vaccine Act proponents criticized the tort system for its unpredictability.203 
They attributed the tort system’s unpredictability to its reliance on “lay 
judgments.”204 And, they expressed faith that the VICP’s predictability-
promoting innovations—most prominently, a small set of specialized, 
experienced adjudicators and the Vaccine Injury Table (which mirrors 
ACEs, in many respects)—would “eliminate[] the tremendous discrepancies 
of injury awards under the tort recovery system.”205  
 
199 Barbara Loe Fisher, Vaccine Injury Compensation: A Failed Experiment in Tort Reform?, 
VACCINE AWAKENING (Nov. 20, 2008, 7:37 AM), http://vaccineawakening.blogspot.com/2008/11/ 
vaccine-injury-compensation-failed.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7BEC-YCUX; see also 
Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Schwartz, former President, Dissatisfied Parents Together 
(Aug. 25, 2014) (“Q: If you had to do it over again, would you support the VICP? A: If I knew 
then everything I know now, I would not support the enactment of the VICP compensation 
system. . . . It does not provide simple justice for children as we had hoped and been told that it 
would.”). 
200 Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 WL 387418, at 
*7 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001). For the fact that the author of the Stevens decision, Gary Golkiewicz, 
served as chief special master for more than two decades, see Advisory Comm’n on Childhood 
Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of June 10, 2010, at 3, available 
at http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/accvtranscript61010.pdf. Still, the system has its 
defenders. See, e.g., James R. Copland, Administrative Compensation for Pharmaceutical- and Vaccine-
Related Injuries, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 277, 285 (2011) (“In general, the VICP must be judged as 
an unqualified success.”). 
201 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 15, 92 and accompanying text.  
203 See, e.g., 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 137, at 277 (statement of John E. Lyons, Presi-
dent, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Division of Merck & Co., Inc.) (“The existing tort system poses a 
number of problems, the most significant of which is its unpredictability.”); 1984 House Hearings, 
supra note 120, at 237 (statement of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Labs. Division, 
American Cyanamid Co.) (identifying “unpredictability” as “the fundamental problem facing the 
U.S. industry in these cases”). 
204 1984 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 235 (statement of Robert B. Johnson). 
205 Neraas, supra note 54, at 164; see also BURKE, supra note 36, at 168-169 (observing that the 
tort system’s “uncertainty” was “a consistent theme in the vaccine litigation debate” and that the 
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1. The VICP Experience 
Yet in reality, in the vaccine injury context, those innovations have fallen 
far short of expectations. A working group convened by HHS’s Division of 
Vaccine Injury Compensation has acknowledged that “[t]he decisions of the 
Court are inconsistent.”206 The Program’s long-serving chief special master 
has criticized the program for “inconsistent decision-making . . . even for 
similarly situated litigants.”207 And lawyers have also observed that VICP 
special masters sometimes decide cases differently. In an interview, I asked 
one prominent lawyer to identify the biggest challenge an attorney 
encounters while representing petitioners within the VICP. The lawyer 
replied: “The lack of consistency between special masters: When we file a 
case, we know that if we receive a particular special master, we’re not going 
to win on the causation issue.”208 When the Federal Judicial Center 
conducted a survey of petitioners’ counsel, it found much the same. For 
example, one lawyer complained that “outcome often depends on 
assignment,” while another lamented that “the biggest factor in winning or 
losing a case in this program is which special master is assigned your 
case.”209 
The one empirical study on the matter lends support to these anecdotal 
reports. In 1999, a researcher studied all published VICP opinions, yielding 
a dataset of 786 claims. He found significant variability when it came to the 
special masters themselves. Among those who had decided more than fifty 
claims, petitioners’ success rate ranged from a low of 32.8% to a high of 
65.8%.210 This is surprising, since cases are usually randomly assigned.211 
 
VICP’s promise to deliver “much more reliable compensation” was critical to the Vaccine Act’s 
passage). 
206 DVIC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 148, app. H at 25. 
207 Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 WL 387418, at 
*11 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001); see also Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of Mar. 5, 2003, at 76 [hereinafter March 5, 2003 ACCV 
Transcript] (on file with author) (“Though we see many of the same cases day after day, same 
vaccines, same injury, same literature, extensive litigation continues and different results occur.” 
(quoting Gary Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master, VICP)); id. at 73 (observing that “cases that look 
very similar are decided very differently” (quoting Gary Golkiewicz)); U.S. Court of Fed. Claims, 
Transcript of the 17th Judicial Conference, Nov. 9, 2004, at 62 (observing that, if two petitioners 
have “different attorneys and different experts” the petitioners “can get very different results” 
(quoting Richard B. Abell, Special Master, VICP)); id. (“[W]e’re looking for consistency, and, of 
course, quite clearly, that isn’t always there.” (quoting Richard B. Abell)). 
208 Telephone Interview with Attorney for VICP Petitioners (Oct. 1, 2014). 
209 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 38.  
210 See Ridgway, supra note 192, at 66.  
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There was also variability based on attorney representation; of the attorneys 
who had represented more than twenty claimants, claimants’ success rates 
ranged from 37.9% to 72%.212 All told, after crunching the numbers, the 
study concluded that, despite the VICP’s many predictability-promoting 
innovations, “idiosyncratic differences among judges and litigators” 
continue to “influenc[e] the outcome of cases.”213  
2. Prospects for Health Courts? 
Will health courts—which have staked much of their success on their 
ability to “eliminate,” or at least substantially reduce, decisional 
discrepancies—also disappoint when it comes to rationalizing compensation 
decisions? The answer, it seems, is almost certainly yes.  
a. Health Courts Face Additional Impediments  
The first reason health courts seem poised to disappoint is that theory 
concerning judicial specialization and decisionmaking suggests that the 
VICP ought to outperform health courts when it comes to reducing 
decisional disparities. Part of the reason is structural. According to 
Professor Stephen Legomsky, a leading expert on judicial specialization: All 
else equal, the fewer adjudicators there are in a given area, the more 
consistent their decisions, as “[i]t is easier to monitor and conform to the 
decisions of one’s colleagues when they are few in number than it is when 
they are many.”214 Applying that principle, the VICP consists of only eight 
special masters (one chief and seven associates), who toil in close quarters, 
over extended periods.215 By contrast, owing to case volumes, health courts 
would necessarily require many more—and many more far-flung—
decisionmakers, disadvantaging it along this dimension.  
 
211 Most claims are randomly assigned, though it is possible for claims to be directed to a 
particular special master if he or she has particularly relevant expertise. See 2014 GAO REPORT, 
supra note 52, at 6 n.20.  
212 See Ridgway, supra note 192, at 66. This statistic ought to be viewed with caution, as it 
could say more about case inputs than case outputs. Some counsel, that is, might be better at 
identifying clients with stronger claims. Or, some counsel might specialize in off-Table claims, 
which (as noted below) face longer odds.  
213 Id. at 68. Even so, of course, it is possible that the VICP represents an improvement over 
the traditional tort system. Making that apples-to-apples comparison is impossible with available 
evidence. See BAUM, supra note 33, at 218 (discussing relevant challenges). 
214 Legomsky, supra note 168, at 429.  
215 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1) (2012).  
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 Second, Legomsky suggests that consistency suffers as cases become 
more plentiful in number and complex in substance.216 This, too, cuts in 
favor of the VICP, as compared to health courts, VICP review is quite 
circumscribed. VICP special masters handle relatively few petitions (only 
about 500 VICP petitions are filed per year).217 They only adjudicate certain 
kinds of petitions—namely, petitions alleging serious injury following 
inoculation from one of about two-dozen covered vaccines. And, since the 
VICP is a true no-fault remedy, special masters only ask one question when 
making entitlement decisions: Was the petitioner’s injury caused, more-
likely-than-not, by a covered vaccine? Health courts, by contrast, are apt to 
adjudicate more claims and wrestle with a far wider array of injuries—
considering everything from prescription-drug side effects, to hospital 
infections, to birth injuries, to drug overdoses, to diagnostic mistakes, to 
surgical mishaps, to physicians’ failure to obtain informed consent. 
Additionally, because the quality of care remains an issue, health court ALJs 
must determine, not just whether the physician caused the claimant’s injury, 
but also whether the injury was avoidable, which (as noted above) seems 
destined to complicate the relevant analysis.  
Finally, the structure of appellate review also favors the VICP. In 
general, Legomsky explains, appellate review enhances consistency if review 
is lodged within a single, centralized tribunal.218 Lodging appellate review 
within myriad generalist tribunals, he cautions, tends to have the opposite 
effect.219 The VICP takes the former tack—consolidating appeals in 
specialized courts: the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, then the Federal 
Circuit. Health courts, by contrast, take the latter (disfavored) approach—
offering one layer of specialized review (to a higher-level administrative 
tribunal), but relegating to generalist courts all subsequent appeals.220  
b. Some Other Specialized Tribunals Have Failed to Achieve Consistency 
A second problem for health court proponents is that, in failing to 
eliminate decisional disparities, the VICP is not alone. In other (diverse) 
 
216 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 432 (concerning case number effects); id. at 441-42 (con-
cerning complexity). 
217 See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 31 (revealing that 386 claims were filed 
in fiscal year 2011, 401 claims were filed in fiscal year 2012, 503 claims were filed in 2013, and 633 
claims were filed in 2014). 
218 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 436-37; cf. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Admin-
istrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 339 (1991) (“[A]llocations of subject matter should avoid 
combining generalists and specialists in ways that erode gains from specialization.”). 
219 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 436-37. 
220 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465. 
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areas of law, specialized adjudicators have labored to create consistency—
strongly suggesting that specialization is no predictability-promoting 
panacea.221 For example, immigration courts are specialized; they are all part 
of a single national Executive Office for Immigration Review, and 
immigration judges, who devote themselves to immigration adjudications, 
must all meet the same qualifications.222 But asylum decisions are 
inconsistent. Indeed, a groundbreaking 2007 study examined 140,000 
decisions rendered by immigration judges over a four-and-a-half-year 
period and found stunning disparities. These disparities existed between 
courts: For instance, Chinese nationals seeking asylum in the United States 
had a 7% chance of success in Atlanta, but a whopping 76% chance of success 
in Orlando.223 Disparities also existed between judges on the same court: In 
New York, for example, one judge granted asylum in only 6% of the relevant 
cases before him, while another’s grant rate was 91%, even though petitions 
were randomly assigned.224  
Decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offer another 
exemplar. By law, veterans are entitled to compensation for disabling 
conditions incurred or aggravated during military service. To award and 
calculate payment, trained specialists within the VA (called Rating Veterans 
Service Representatives) evaluate claims, determine eligibility, and, if the 
veteran’s disability is service related, assign a disability percentage rating.225 
Once again, however, though they are made by specialists, judgments are 
 
221 Others would add that the experience of the Federal Circuit also “cautions against assum-
ing that concentration of cases in a single court will produce a high level of uniformity in the law.” 
Baum, supra note 34, at 1557. The Federal Circuit was created, in large part, to promote consisten-
cy in patent law. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2-7 (1981) (noting that the creation of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would “improve the administration of the patent 
law by centralizing appeals in patent cases”). In action, however, many suggest the Federal Circuit 
has labored on this score. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1802 (2013) (“It is not clear whether the Federal Circuit has brought 
uniformity, quality, or efficiency to patent law.”).  
222 See Baum, supra note 34, at 1546-47 (reporting that immigration judges are highly special-
ized and extremely knowledgeable); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 380 n.146 (2007) (outlining relevant qualifications of 
immigration judges). 
223 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 222, at 329-30. The authors acknowledge that the 
disparity may be partially explained by unidentified differences within certain cities’ migrant 
populations. But they also note that any hypothesized difference in migrant populations “could 
not possibly explain the differences in grant rates from officer to officer within regional asylum 
offices.” Id. at 321-22. 
224 See id. at 334. 
225 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BEN-
EFITS: TIMELY PROCESSING REMAINS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE 4 (2012) (outlining the 
process of veterans’ disability compensation claims). 
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not consistent. To the contrary, the Veterans’ Disability Benefits 
Commission reports that the program has “long struggled with timeliness, 
accuracy, and consistency,”226 while the GAO reports that “nearly one-third 
of decisions are incorrect or have technical or procedural errors.”227  
The Social Security Disability System, which provides monetary 
benefits to persons with disabilities, offers another case in point. Within the 
system, disability decisions are initially made by state agencies, using 
federal guidelines. Then, if benefits are denied, claimants may request a 
hearing before an ALJ.228 These ALJs are specialized; they do nothing but 
adjudicate social security disability determinations. But their decisions, too, 
are marred by glaring inconsistencies. In fact, one recent study found that, 
nationally, ALJs’ “allowance rates” (determinations that were at least partly 
favorable to the claimant) ranged from a meager 4% to a whopping 98%,229 
while stark variations existed between ALJs within the same office. In Atlanta, 
for example, one ALJ’s allowance rate was 19%, while a colleague’s rate was 
89%, even though claims were randomly assigned.230  
Perhaps most dishearteningly, theorists suggest that these adjudicatory 
inconsistencies are, to some degree, inescapable. Returning, again, to 
Professor Legomsky: 
 
226 VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY: VET-
ERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 327 (2007); see also U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRA-
TION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING 5 (2000) 
[hereinafter Bascetta Testimony] (statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta, Associate Director, Veterans 
Benefits Admin.) (discussing a “perception of inconsistency in decisions made by different 
regional offices”). This “perception” has been difficult to test empirically, as the VA has repeatedly 
failed to conduct planned reviews. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, NO. 08-02073-96, AUDIT OF VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION COMPENSA-
TION RATING ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY REVIEWS, at i (2009). 
227 Bascetta Testimony, supra note 226, at 1.  
228 See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOM-
MENDATION 2013-1, IMPROVING CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICA-
TIONS 2 (2013) (discussing the Social Security disability claims adjudication process). 
229 HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT ON 
ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 13-14 (2013). Some variation may be attributable 
to regional variations in the claimant population (i.e., certain injuries are particularly common in 
certain regions of the country). See Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Inconsistency and Angst in 
District Court Resolution of Social Security Disability Appeals 12 (Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Research 
Paper No. 2014-30, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530158 
(making this observation). 
230 See Krent & Morris, supra note 229, at 13; id. at 19 (concluding “the percentage of disabil-
ity claims awarded by ALJs differ markedly from region to region and from ALJ to ALJ”). 
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As long as adjudicators are flesh-and-blood human beings, as long as the 
subject matter is ideologically and emotionally volatile, and as long as limits 
to the human imagination constrain the capacity of legislatures to prescribe 
the specific results for every conceivable fact situation, there will be large 
disparities in adjudicative outcomes . . . .231 
Particularly worrisome for health courts, leading theorists have suggested 
that inconsistency may be particularly inescapable when the area is highly 
charged (as medical malpractice is)232 and when cases hinge on witness 
credibility (as medical malpractices cases often do).233  
c. Some Inconsistency Is Inevitable in Medical Evaluation 
When it comes to certain health court proponents’ pledge to “eliminate” 
decisional disparities, the third obstacle is that eliminating disparities in 
medical valuation is, by all accounts, impossible. When passing judgment on 
physician conduct, even trained and independent experts, it turns out, have 
difficulty determining whether physicians erred and whether a given 
physician’s error precipitated or aggravated a given patient’s injury. Or, to 
quote a 2001 study published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association: “In all general medical and surgical chart review studies to date, 
reviewers have had a difficult time agreeing on whether an error caused an 
adverse event or even on whether something was an error at all.”234 One 
recent study, for example, found that when independent reviewers (insurer-
retained physicians) evaluated closed medical malpractice insurer claims 
files, they disagreed with one another “in 34.3% of the cases.”235 Another 
 
231 Legomsky, supra note 168, at 415-16. Gary Golkiewicz, the VICP’s long-serving chief 
special master, has said much the same: “Wherever there is human involvement, you will have 
variance in outcome.” March 5, 2003 ACCV Transcript, supra note 207, at 81.  
232 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 442 (cautioning that “subjects that inspire ideological or 
emotional fervor would seem to have the greatest potential for disparate outcomes”); cf. W. John 
Thomas, The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: A Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L. 
REV. 459, 460 (1992) (“Medical malpractice is perhaps the most controversial tort in the American 
legal system.”). 
233 See Baum, supra note 34, at 1543 (suggesting that specialization confers no benefit when it 
comes to assessing witness credibility); cf. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE 
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, 
AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 175 (1995) (“[Q]uestions bearing on credibility of 
witnesses—different versions of events between patient and doctor or between medical person-
nel—pervade many malpractice disputes.”). 
234 Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical 
Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 415, 419 (2001) (footnotes 
omitted). 
235 Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of Stand-
ard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 884 (2002); see also, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., 
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recent study discerned little agreement among experts as to whether a 
patient’s death was preventable: “If one reviewer rated a death as definitely 
or probably preventable,” the researchers found, “the probability that the 
next reviewer would rate that case as definitely not preventable (18%) was 
actually slightly higher than the probability that the second reviewer would 
agree with the first (16%).”236  
d. A Sober Look at the Status Quo 
Finally, it is wise to recall the admonition of David P. Currie and Frank 
I. Goodman in their classic article on judicial specialization. “[B]efore 
drastic alterations are made in the present jurisdictional system in the name 
of removing disuniformity,” they advise, “a serious effort should be made to 
determine the extent of the problem.”237 Such an effort, it turns out, reveals 
that the current medical malpractice system is not the whimsical lottery that 
some health court proponents accuse it of being.  
While some health court champions declare, for example, that 
“[m]alpractice law has become so muddled that going to court is like rolling 
the dice,”238 or, worse, that the malpractice system “resembles Russian 
Roulette,”239 decades of research indicates, to the contrary, that the current 
system does a fairly good, though not perfect, job sorting between 
meritorious and non-meritorious claims. A 2006 study by David Studdert 
and co-authors found, for example, that “[c]laims without merit were 
generally resolved appropriately: only one in four resulted in payment.”240 
Other evidence likewise shows that jury verdicts and medical malpractice 
 
Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of Physician Agreement in a Retrospective 
Chart Review, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 460 (1996) (finding relatively frequent “extreme 
disagreement on the occurrence of an adverse event”); Karen L. Posner et al., Variation in Expert 
Opinion in Medical Malpractice Review, 85 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1049, 1051 (1996) (finding that when 
participating anesthesiologists reviewed claimants’ original medical records, they disagreed about 
the appropriateness of care—whether the care was “reasonable and prudent by the standards of 
anesthetic care at the time of the event”—38% of the time). 
236 Hayward & Hofer, supra note 234, at 417.  
237 Currie & Goodman, supra note 33, at 66.  
238 UDELL & KENDALL, supra note 11, at 1. 
239 2006 Senate Hearing, supra note 173, at 44 (statement of Philip K. Howard); see also U.S. 
SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., supra note 14, at 2 (“The current system for compensating 
injured patients operates somewhat like a lottery; jury verdicts are characterized more by their 
random nature than by good medicine.”); Jeffrey D. Pariser, Specialized Health Care Courts: Could 
They Create Clear Standards and Greater Reliability?, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, Aug. 
2004, at 3 (“Medical justice today, studies show, is worse than random.”). For criticism of tort 
reformers’ persistent use of the lottery metaphor, see Timothy D. Lytton et al., Tort as a Litigation 
Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 267 (2011). 
240 Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2029.  
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settlement decisions generally comport with expert determinations.241 So 
the question is not whether health courts will rationalize a hopelessly 
irrational system. The question is whether health courts will substantially 
improve an already fairly rational system. That is a much tougher task. And 
when assessing whether it is doable, it is worrying that (1) the VICP, which 
is, theory would suggest, better positioned to reduce decisional disparities, 
has seemingly struggled on this score; (2) in other contexts, specialized 
tribunals have failed to create consistency; and (3) even experts sometimes 
disagree about preventability and causality questions, in the course of 
medical record review. 
B. “Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly”242 
Next, specialized courts have long been championed for expediting 
compensation decisions.243 And, as noted above, speeding payments is 
touted as one of health court’s principal advantages.244 Speed was also 
central to the VICP plan. In the run-up to the Vaccine Act’s enactment, 
many of the Act’s backers emphasized the need to expedite adjudications. 
For example, the main parents’ group supporting the legislation 
(Dissatisfied Parents Together) implored congressional leaders: “There 
needs to be an up or down decision within a reasonable time . . . . The 
compensation process must not drag on for years while the children are left 
uncared for.”245 Representatives from vaccine manufacturers emphasized 
that the Act’s “most important” objective was to “ensure that injured 
children and their parents are fairly compensated, with a minimum of 
delay.”246 And the President-Elect of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
 
241 See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2007) (sifting 
through three decades of empirical research on jury decisionmaking in the medical malpractice 
context and concluding that jury decisions generally comport with expert determinations); 
Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5 (analyzing empirical evidence that undermines claims that the 
medical malpractice system resembles a lottery). The above evidence is at odds with a frequently 
cited finding of the Harvard Medical Practice Study. However, as many have discussed, that 
study was not designed to assess adjudication accuracy. See generally, e.g., Tom Baker, Reconsidering 
the Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501 (2005). 
242 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52. 
243 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
245 1987 House Hearing, supra note 119, at 80 (statement of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, President, 
Dissatisfied Parents Together). 
246 Id. at 93 (statement of Douglas MacMaster, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme Division, 
Merck & Co., Inc.). 
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joined the chorus, calling “a prompt settlement of claims . . . fundamental to 
any improved system.”247 
Establishing a statutory 240-day deadline for all VICP adjudication 
decisions, Congress appeared to take these pleas seriously.248 Indeed, 
explaining this deadline, the House Report accompanying the Vaccine Act 
provided that, whereas “[l]awsuits and settlement negotiations” under the 
traditional tort system took “months and even years to complete,” “[t]he 
entire [VICP] proceeding . . . is to take place as expeditiously as 
possible.”249 Expediting compensation, Congress continued, was vital, 
because “much of the equity in limiting compensation and limiting other 
remedies arises from the speed and reliability with which the petitioner can 
expect judgment; without such quick and certain conclusion of proceedings, 
the compensation system would work an injustice upon the petitioner.”250  
1. The VICP Experience 
So, how has the VICP fared when it comes to the expeditious resolution 
of petitions? Not well. Indeed, despite Congress’s high hope and clear 
demand, the VICP in action is notable not for its speed but rather for its 
long times to decision. Few petitions (less than 5%) satisfy the statutory 
240-day deadline.251 Most exceed it by a wide margin. Of petitions filed 
prior to 1999, only 14% were decided within one year, 19% took between one 
and two years, 39% took between two and five years, and 18% dragged on for 
five years or more.252 From there, things got worse. Of petitions filed 
between 1999 and March 31, 2014, the Program’s average adjudication time 
clocked in at about five-and-a-half years, while most petitions (51%) 
remained pending for over a half-decade.253  
 
247 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 137, at 148 (statement of Martin H. Smith). 
248 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6601, 103 Stat. 
2106, 2288 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012)). 
249 H.R. REP. NO. 99-108, at 6, 17 (1986). 
250 Id. at 17; see also WENDY K. MARINER, INNOVATION AND CHALLENGE: THE FIRST 
YEAR OF THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 9-10 (1991) (“[A] 
prompt award was the major justification for limiting the compensation payable to recipients.”). 
251 See Mitch Weiss et al., AP IMPACT: “Vaccine Court” Keeps Claimants Waiting, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Nov. 17, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/637dbaa7b993454981320907b0972cf6/ 
ap-impact-vaccine-court-keeps-claimants-waiting (concluding, as of January 2013, that just 4.5% of 
petitions were resolved within Congress’s 240-day framework). 
252 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 8 fig.1. 
253 The fact that most petitions remained pending for over five years logically means that the 
VICP’s median time to resolution also exceeded five years during the period. See 2014 GAO 
REPORT, supra note 52, at 10 fig.1 (showing that 51% of VICP claims filed between 1999 and 
March 31, 2014 required more than five years to resolve); id. at 9 (reporting that the roughly 8800 
claims filed as of 1999 and resolved as of March 31, 2014 took an average of about 5.5 years to 
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Critically, it takes more time, on average, to process claims within the 
Program than it does to process claims, through judgment, within the 
traditional tort system: approximately 66 months within the VICP, as 
compared to 25.6 months for tort cases that terminate in a judgment or 
verdict.254 VICP proceedings take longer than consumer class actions 
 
adjudicate). For successful petitioners, reported adjudication times (both the mean and median) 
include the time to calculate the compensation amount. See id. at 13.  
More recently, since 2009, the average time to adjudication has dropped to about 1.6 years—a 
positive development that is presumably traceable to a rise in negotiated settlements and a 
reduction in the proportion of petitions involving a catastrophic injury. Id. at 9-13. (These days, a 
high proportion of petitions involve relatively minor injuries to adults, caused by the flu vaccine. 
See infra note 292.) Even so, drawing definite conclusions about acceleration would be premature; 
some post-2009 claims are still pending and gains may erode once those pending claims are 
resolved and factored in. See 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 10-12; see also Telephone 
Interview with Curtis Webb, Attorney for VICP Petitioners and former Chair, Advisory Comm. 
on Childhood Vaccines (Oct. 27, 2014) (“The statistics suggest that cases are being resolved more 
quickly, but that is because the cases that are in the Program today are less likely to involve 
seriously injured children.”). 
When discussing time to adjudication, a final point to recognize is that many delays are 
caused by petitioners—as petitioners sometimes take time to compile medical records, submit 
expert reports, and finalize life-care plans. See Advisory Comm’n of Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of June 1, 2005, at 21 [hereinafter June 1, 2005 
ACCV Transcript] (on file with author) (“[I]t’s problematic to measure the effectiveness of a 
program by how long it takes to process a petition when the . . . petitioner[] is the one requesting 
the delay, and that happens with significant frequency.” (quoting Mark Rogers, Torts Branch, 
Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)). Still, even if petitioners are the ones “requesting the delay,” it 
would be wrong to lay all the blame at petitioners’ feet, for petitioners’ need to take time to 
assemble detailed documentation is logically influenced by others’ demand for detailed documenta-
tion. The GAO observed this interaction while compiling its 1999 report:  
Another factor significantly increasing processing times is that as the program received ad-
ditional funding for staff and experts to defend claims, the government increasingly chal-
lenged claims in which the cause of injury was in doubt. As a result, petitioners needed 
more information and time to prepare cases, which resulted in processing times that were 
much longer than envisioned when the program began. 
1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 3. Furthermore, the GAO found that, even after all the 
information was submitted, “in most cases, it took the court over another year to reach its 
decision.” Id. at 11. 
254 See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 
2001, at 8 (2004); see also THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 228129, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 9 (2009) 
(reporting that, in 2005, the median tort case processing time, from the filing of the complaint to 
verdict or judgment was 22.3 months). Curiously, some writing about the VICP seem uncon-
cerned about the VICP’s adjudication times, while substantially overestimating the delays within 
the traditional tort system. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 143, at S134 (“Adjudication times for VICP 
cases are much shorter than those for the civil system, averaging 3.0 years for vaccines adminis-
tered after 1988.”). 
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(which take roughly 32 months).255 And, VICP petitions appear to take 
substantially more time to resolve than medical malpractice claims, which, 
in terms of injury severity and scientific complexity, probably offer the 
closest comparator.256  
For some cases, the path through the system can be downright 
byzantine. One such case is Kolakowski v. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.257 Born “vigorous and alert” on December 17, 1998, Thomas 
Kolakowski was given a Hepatitis B vaccine on January 20, 1999.258 He died 
five days later.259 Believing there to be a link between the vaccine and what 
was listed on Thomas’s death certificate as a “sudden unexplained death,” 
Thomas’s parents filed a VICP petition on August 4, 1999.260 The petition 
was not finally decided until November 23, 2010—when it was denied in a 
130-page ruling.261 Baby Doe/90’s claim went no speedier. Administered a 
DTP vaccine in 1995 that triggered a seizure disorder, Baby Doe/90 filed a 
petition for compensation on October 26, 1998.262 Still, no entitlement 
decision was made until June 18, 2009, and no award was finalized until 
September 29, 2010—nearly twelve years after filing.263 Ilya Dobrydnev 
encountered comparable difficulties. He filed a petition for injuries 
allegedly caused by a Hepatitis B vaccine on October 25, 2004.264 After 
 
255 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 820 tbl.2 (2010) (dividing 963 days by 30 to arrive at 
32.1 months). 
256 According to a recent study of closed medical malpractice claims, the average time from 
filing with the insurer to closure either with or without payment was 20.3 months, while claims 
involving pediatricians (arguably, the most analogous to VICP claims) averaged 24.1 months. See 
Seabury et al., supra note 72, at 113, 116 fig.3. Or, for medical malpractice cases resolved by an 
actual court verdict or judgment, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that the average 
adjudication time is roughly 33.2 months. See COHEN & SMITH, supra note 254, at 8; see also 
COHEN, supra note 254, at 9 tbl.8 (reporting that, in 2005, the median medical malpractice case 
processing time, from filing to resolution by verdict or judgment, was 30 months); VIDMAR, supra 
note 233, at 60 (reporting that, in a 1984–1987 sample of North Carolina medical malpractice 
claims, an average of 26 months elapsed between the filing of a lawsuit and trial); Studdert et al., 
Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2025, 2027 tbl.1 (reporting that roughly 
three years elapsed (mean and median) between the opening and closing of a medical malpractice 
claim (with “claim” defined as a written demand for compensation)). 
257 No. 99-0625V, 2010 WL 5672753 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 23, 2010). 
258 Id. at *3, *97. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. at *1. 
261 See id.  
262 Doe/90 v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.[Redacted]V, 2010 WL 
3943641, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29, 2010). 
263 See id.  
264 See Dobrydnev v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 
5631230, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 23, 2013). 
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ping-ponging around the system for nearly a decade, his entitlement to 
compensation was only recently rejected.265 Here, I do not suggest that 
these cases are typical. They, fortunately, are not.266 Instead, my point is to 
illustrate that, just as cases can get bogged down within the traditional tort 
system, cases can, and sometimes do, get bogged down within the 
supposedly “streamlined” process of the VICP. 
2. Prospects for Health Courts? 
The above shows that the VICP was sold to the public, in large measure, 
as a way to expedite compensation for vaccine-injured claimants. But in 
practice on this score, the VICP has failed to deliver. The relevant question 
now becomes whether health courts—which ascribe many problems that 
afflict the current medical malpractice environment to its slow time to 
decision—are apt to suffer the same setbacks. 
There is an argument that the above delays are unique to the VICP. The 
best argument in favor of this VICP exceptionalism would be that the VICP 
has twice been hit by an onslaught of unanticipated filings. First, early in its 
lifecycle, the VICP anticipated receiving roughly 1000 “retrospective claims” 
(i.e., claims for vaccine injuries sustained prior to the Act’s October 1988 
effective date).267 Instead, 4500 such claims were filed.268 These filings 
created a backlog, which for many years strained resources, thereby slowing 
adjudications.269 Then, just as the VICP dug itself out from that mountain 
of retrospective cases, the Program got hit a second time by a barrage of 
petitions (over 5500 in all) alleging a link between vaccines and autism.270 If 
 
265 See Dobrydnev v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 566 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
266 Nor are they total outliers. See Weiss et al., supra note 251 (concluding, after conducting a 
comprehensive study of VICP petitions and completing more than 100 interviews with relevant 
stakeholders, that “[h]undreds [of petitions] have surpassed the decade mark”); Telephone 
Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“Most cases that involve catastrophic injury, if they 
are contested and successful, last between six or ten years, and cases with appeals can last even 
longer.”). 
267 See Louise Palmer, Government Can’t Meet Vaccine Injury Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
1993, at 6 (quoting Thomas Balbier, VICP Director, as stating, “We thought there would be 
maybe a thousand.”). 
268 See id. 
269 See June 1, 2005 ACCV Transcript, supra note 53, at 27 (“There are many reasons why 
the program has been unable to meet [the 240-day deadline]. The first one came right at the 
inception of the program, and those were the retrospective cases. The program was besieged with 
thousands of them and it stressed the program and it took us 10 years to work through that 
backlog.”). 
270 The first autism spectrum disorder petition was filed in 1998. By 2003, 2437 petitions had 
been filed; by 2011, 5636 petitions had been logged. See Laura A. Binski, Note, Balancing Policy 
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health courts are not similarly overrun, one might argue, they might fulfill 
their promise of resolving claims quickly.  
Yet while that conclusion is surely possible, there are important reasons 
why health court advocates should not write off the VICP experience. Most 
notably, the VICP’s inundation problem fits squarely within the literature 
concerning specialized courts. When identifying concerns about specialized 
tribunals, that is, legal theorists have long argued that, precisely because 
specialized tribunals aren’t diversified, they are susceptible to abrupt swings 
in the size of their dockets. As Judge Richard Posner has explained: “It is a 
mathematical law that the federal appellate caseload as a whole changes less 
from year to year than the components of that caseload. So if each 
component were assigned to a special court it would be harder to match 
supply to demand.”271  
Also worrying, other specialized tribunals exhibit this dynamic—
occasionally encountering long delays when caseloads shift. For example, 
between 2009 and 2012, the average length of time to complete a claim for 
disability benefits within the Veterans Administration (VA) ballooned from 
161 days to 260 days, while the VA’s backlog of claims—defined as claims 
awaiting a decision for over 125 days—more than tripled.272 Why? 
According to the GAO, the chief culprit was that, in 2010, a court decision 
forced the VA to re-adjudicate 260,000 claims initiated by Vietnam veterans 
for injuries allegedly sustained by exposure to the defoliant Agent Orange. 
These re-adjudications consumed 37% of the VA’s adjudicatory resources, 
substantially impairing the systemwide pace of claims resolution.273 The 
upshot of the above is that both theory and some evidence suggest that what 
happened in the VICP was not isolated or anomalous. Caseload volatility is, 
instead, an unfortunate but inevitable drawback of tribunal specialization. 
Meanwhile, the VICP experience—initially underestimating the number 
of claims that would be filed, becoming inundated by claims, and then 
falling behind in adjudications—raises the related question of whether 
health courts would be able to accurately predict caseloads (and create 
 
Tensions of the Vaccine Act in Light of the Omnibus Autism Proceeding: Are Petitioners Getting a Fair 
Shot at Compensation?, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 683, 701 (2011) (compiling these statistics). 
271 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 259-60 
(1996); accord Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 33, at 805 (“[W]hen the docket of a specialized court 
is growing, it will not have an adequate number of judges, and getting new judges is difficult, time 
consuming, and imprudent in light of the probability that the caseload will soon turn down 
again.”). 
272 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 225, at 1.  
273 See id. at 6-7; see also id. at 12 (“37% of its claim processing resources nationally were de-
voted to adjudicating Agent Orange claims.”). 
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adequate adjudicatory capacity) ex ante. On that question, it is relevant 
that, in grossly underestimating initial claim filings, the VICP is not alone. 
To the contrary, a number of federal compensation programs (including the 
Radiation Exposure Compensation Program, the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program, and the Black Lung Program) 
have done precisely the same thing—to precisely the same effect.274 
Furthermore, matching adjudicatory capacity with claimant demand may be 
particularly tough in the health court context. This is because “[a] primary 
goal of health court proposals is to expand the pool of injured patients who 
are eligible for compensation.”275 Currently, there are roughly 9000 
successful medical malpractice claims lodged against physicians in the 
United States each year,276 even while roughly 700,000 Americans sustain 
preventable medical injuries annually.277 Just how many of those 
preventably injured patients would seek health court compensation—and 
thus, how much adjudicatory capacity health courts would need—would be 
anyone’s guess.278  
 
274 When the Radiation Exposure Compensation Program was enacted, the DOJ estimated 
that 13,000 claims would be filed. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-628T, 
FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: PERSPECTIVES ON FOUR PROGRAMS FOR INDIVIDU-
ALS INJURED BY EXPOSURE TO HARMFUL SUBSTANCES 10 (2008) (statement of Anne-Marie 
Lasowski, Acting Director, Educ., Workforce, & Income Sec. Issues, Gov’t Accountability 
Office). In fact, 20,600 claims were eventually lodged. See id. Or, when the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program was created, the Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that 13,400 claims would be filed. See id. But in fact, 59,500 were filed. See id. Or, when 
the Black Lung Program was established, the Department of Labor anticipated the receipt of 
520,000 claims; instead 960,800 were filed. See id. According to the GAO, these miscalculations 
“affected the length of time it took to finalize claims and compensate eligible claimants.” Id. at i.  
275 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465. 
276 See Myungho Paik et al., The Receding Tide of Medical Practice Litigation: Part 1—National 
Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612, 617 fig.1 (2013).  
277 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (estimating that 700,000 patients are preventably 
injured each year). 
278 Of course, not all 700,000 would be eligible for compensation because of health courts’ 
injury-severity thresholds. A further concern is that, if health courts do become overwhelmed, 
speed may not be the only casualty. In other contexts, delays accompanying inundation have 
sometimes prompted policymakers to take controversial steps to expedite or streamline adjudica-
tions. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for 
Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461, 499-501 (discussing how disposition “goals” imposed on ALJs 
when the SSA was “faced with large caseload backlogs” created “an atmosphere at SSA in 
which . . . ALJs felt pressure to process claims quickly and deny benefits whenever possible”). 
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C. Calculating Individualized Compensation Is Time Consuming and 
Challenging 
The next concrete lesson that the VICP offers for health courts concerns 
the difficulty of calculating individualized compensation. This insight is not 
new. Robert Keeton, a pioneer of the no-fault movement, cautioned back in 
1973 that “[i]f a nonfault system undertakes to individualize compensation, 
it cannot escape the significant administrative cost of doing so.”279 The 
VICP illustrates Keeton’s warning in vivid detail: It shows that, even when 
an act’s architects bend over backwards to simplify damage calculations, 
projecting future losses can still be challenging. This fact, once again, has 
troubling implications for health courts, as well as certain other no-fault 
mechanisms. 
As noted above, the VICP goes to great lengths to simplify damage 
determinations. Compensation in the event of a vaccine-related death is 
automatically set at $250,000,280 while payment calculations for injuries are 
also standardized. Injured claimants, that is, are entitled to (1) lost wages, 
(2) compensation for pain and suffering, and (3) actual medical and 
rehabilitation expenses. But, of those three damage categories, only the 
third is consistently calculated on an individualized basis. Minors’ lost 
wages are pegged to a national average,281 while damages for pain and 
suffering are capped at $250,000.282 Further, even within the third category, 
calculating past medical and rehabilitation expenses is typically easy and 
uncontroversial, leaving only future medical or remedial care as the locus of 
dispute.  
1. The VICP Experience 
Given these statutory shortcuts, soon after enactment, the VICP was 
praised for “provid[ing] a straightforward means of measuring damages.”283 
Yet while the VICP does formally take numerous steps to simplify damage 
calculations, those efforts have, once again, fallen short of expectations. By 
May 1991, a commentator had dryly observed that “determining the amount 
of compensation payable to eligible petitioners has been more time-
 
279 Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 611 (1973). 
280 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (2012). 
281 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B). Adults are entitled to their “actual and anticipated loss of 
earnings.” Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A). 
282 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(4). 
283 Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation 
Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 959 (1993); see also id. (noting that, at least on paper, the VICP 
“assesses damages in a simple and administratively efficient manner”). 
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consuming than might have been predicted.”284 That turned out to be an 
understatement. In 2002, for example, a median of 533 days elapsed 
between when a victim was found to be eligible for compensation and the 
time when damages were actually awarded; in 2003, a median of 564 days 
elapsed; in 2004, a median of 529 days elapsed; and in 2005, a median of 484 
days elapsed.285 This means that it often takes the VICP twice as long to 
calculate damages as Congress—which, recall, imposed a 240-day statutory 
deadline on vaccine adjudications—thought it would take to resolve cases 
from start-to-finish.  
Worse, some damage disputes devolve into debates over minutiae. For 
example, one former special master has complained, “It’s a game. I had 
people arguing over the cost of the thing you put in the bottom of the 
bathtub so people don’t slip.”286 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times reported in 
2004: 
 Even when families do win compensation, officials have sometimes 
battled them over just a few dollars.  
In one case, government representatives argued that $150 a year was too 
much to spend on wheelchair maintenance. They have haggled over how 
much to allow for replacement shoes and braces for people with polio. 
Another time, they recommended rubber sheets for the bed of an 
incontinent person because they were cheaper, although less comfortable, 
than disposables costing $135 a year.287 
In other cases, disputes have arisen concerning whether a fourteen-year-old 
girl with profound mental retardation and severe spastic quadriplegia is or is 
not entitled to a $40 pair of high-top tennis shoes;288 whether a child, 
crippled at the age of ten years old by the Hepatitis B vaccination, is 
entitled to have the help of an assistant for either five or alternatively eight 
hours per day;289 and whether the services of a licensed practical nurse can 
be obtained for $50 or $60, per hour.290  
 
284 MARINER, supra note 250, at 36. 
285 See DVIC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 148, at 9.  
286 Palmer, supra note 267 (quoting Denis Hauptly, Special Master, VICP). 
287 Myron Levin, Vaccine Injury Claims Face Grueling Fight: Victims Increasingly View U.S. 
Compensation Program as Adversarial and Tightfisted, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A1. 
288 See Wilkerson v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-0822V, 1998 WL 
106132, at *12 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 24, 1998). 
289 See I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *7 
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 19, 2013). 
290 See Ku v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1370V, 2012 WL 6879061, at *8-9 
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 9, 2012). 
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2. Prospects for Health Courts? 
Like the VICP, health courts are apt to encounter significant—yet 
heretofore unforeseen—difficulties in the course of damage calculations. 
Indeed, while there are relevant differences between the two systems, by the 
time these differences are tallied and their effects analyzed, it seems that, 
compared to the VICP, health courts are actually poised to have a harder 
time. 
a. Four Characteristics of Health Courts that Might Produce a Comparative 
Advantage  
There are four ways in which health courts differ from the VICP, where, 
when it comes to simplifying damage calculations, health courts might offer 
a comparative advantage. First, health courts would simplify all 
noneconomic damage awards, while the VICP requires an individualized 
assessment of such awards if the petitioner’s damages fall below the 
$250,000 cap.291  
Second, claimant characteristics probably cut in favor of health courts. 
Health courts probably have the edge because a non-trivial proportion of 
VICP petitioners are young, suffer permanent injuries, and yet have normal 
(or close-to-normal) life expectancies—a combination which compels special 
masters to estimate what care will be needed over the course of a long 
period.292 In comparison, the health court claimant population is apt to be 
older and sicker, with shorter life expectancies demanding damage 
estimation.293 
Third, health courts would have one ALJ-appointed life-care planner 
(i.e., an expert who obtains up-to-date information about the victim to 
project and quantify the victim’s future needs) monetize the victim’s past 
and future economic loss.294 In comparison, in the VICP, it is “common 
practice” for each party (the petitioner and HHS) to retain its own life-care 
planner.295 Then, once the dueling planners’ reports are compiled, the 
 
291 Compare supra note 101 (concerning health courts), with supra note 143 (concerning the 
VICP). 
292 This, however, is changing. With the Program’s inclusion of the flu vaccine in 2005, 
adults have, in recent years, comprised the majority of petitioners seeking VICP compensation. 
See Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Transcript of 
Meeting of Dec. 6, 2012, at 13-14, 26-29, 50-51, 60, available at http://www.hrsa.gov/ 
vaccinecompensation/accvtranscript1262012.pdf. 
293 See infra notes 300-01 (concerning the poor health of many medical malpractice victims). 
294 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 468. 
295 I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *2 (Fed. 
Cl. Apr. 19, 2013). 
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parties will either compromise their differences, or, in rare instances, they 
will call upon the special master to evaluate the competing plans and issue a 
judgment.296 The effect of this one-planner versus two-planner difference is 
debatable. Limiting life-care planners eliminates certain conflicts (removing 
the need for a special master to weigh in, for instance, on a nurse’s hourly 
wage). This could simplify calculations. On the other hand, health courts’ 
one-planner requirement might just alter disputes’ timing and character. If 
only one planner can be selected, that is, gone will be disagreements over 
the relative merit of dueling plans. But those disagreements could be 
replaced with new clashes over the planner’s selection, the evidence the 
planner can consult, and the methodology he or she ought to utilize.  
Fourth, compared to the VICP, where damages are awarded once and in 
a lump sum—though often with an annuity—damages in health courts are 
to be paid periodically and remain open to modification.297 Again, the effect 
of this difference is questionable. Permitting award modifications might 
expedite initial compensation calculations, effectively taking the pressure off 
getting it right the first time around. On the other hand, the cumulative 
effect of periodic review might be to complicate compensation 
determinations—essentially replacing one time-consuming and costly 
adjudication with several such skirmishes. On this score, it is worth noting 
that the Vaccine Act initially permitted damage revisions. Prevailing VICP 
petitioners, Congress initially explained, could seek additional damages if, 
for example, their medical costs rose or their condition deteriorated, while 
they had the duty to return to the Program if their costs fell or their 
condition improved.298 Congress repealed those provisions in a 1987 
amendment, however—prompted, at least in part, by parents’ demands for 
greater certainty and finality.299  
 
296 See Toomey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 98-643V, 2007 WL 5173629, at *4 
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 2, 2007) (describing the damages procedure); cf. Advisory Comm’n on Childhood 
Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript of the Meeting of Dec. 8, 2011, at 17-18 
(“[I]n the last few years . . . there has been a settlement in every single case on the issue of 
damages.” (quoting Mark Rogers, Torts Branch, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)). 
297 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465. Alongside the problems discussed 
above, this approach encourages malingering, sometimes called after-the-event moral hazard. 
298 See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 311(a), 100 
Stat. 3755, 3762; see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 17 (1986) (explaining that “[a] petitioner 
awarded compensation shall notify the Program of any changes which significantly affect the 
compensation to be paid” while also advising that “if medical costs rise more quickly than expected 
or if the petitioner’s injury becomes more serious, he or she may ask for increased and more 
frequent payment”). 
299 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4303(d)(2)(A), 101 
Stat. 1330-1, 1330-222 (1987). At the time of the 1987 amendment, Representative Henry Waxman 
(the Vaccine Act’s main sponsor) explained: “We cannot expect these people to give up funda-
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b. Six Characteristics of Health Courts that Might Produce a Disadvantage  
Now, while the effect of the deviations above might cut in favor of 
health courts, there are six ways in which health courts’ damage calculations 
are likely to be more complex and cumbersome than damage calculations 
within the VICP. First, as noted previously, the Vaccine Act simplifies 
damages in all death cases (imposing a hard limit of $250,000) and also 
streamlines the calculation of minors’ lost wage. Leading health court plans 
do not contain these shortcuts.  
Second, unlike the VICP, which adjudicates mostly claims of those who 
were well prior to vaccination, health courts will typically adjudicate claims 
of those who were sick.300 Indeed, Paul Weiler’s classic New York study 
reports: “[A] substantial proportion of patients were gravely ill, and many 
would have died from their underlying illnesses in months, days, perhaps 
hours, even absent the mishap in treatment.” 301 This fact not only creates 
difficult causation questions (discussed below), it is also apt to raise, within 
health courts, vexing questions of damage aggravation and apportionment. 
Specifically, physicians are likely to argue that they are responsible for only 
the aggravation of the patient’s underlying condition (which, itself, will 
require detailed evidence of the patient’s pre-avoidable-injury prognosis). 
Patients, meanwhile, are likely to counter that, in at least some cases, the 
aggravation combines with the existing injury to create an indivisible injury 
for which the physician is wholly responsible. Creating tangled questions of 
fact and law, these damage aggravation issues are unlikely to be easily 
resolved.302 
Third, unlike in the VICP context where there is just one respondent 
(HHS, represented by staff lawyers within the DOJ), many health court 
 
mental rights if they cannot depend on the compensation payments.” 1987 House Hearing, supra 
note 119, at 11 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman); see id. at 61 (statement of Jeffrey H. 
Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents Together) (advocating lump-sum payments and 
maintaining that “[f ]unding sources have to be reliable and adequate”).  
300 The CDC cautions against administering childhood vaccines to ill individuals. See Chart 
of Contraindications and Precautions to Commonly Used Vaccines, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/vac-admin/contraindications-vacc.htm (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5VJD-MUHG.  
301 WEILER ET AL., supra note 59, at 55. Similarly, a 2001 study found that “many deaths 
reportedly due to medical errors occur at the end of life or in critically ill patients in whom death 
was the most likely outcome, either during that hospitalization or in the coming months, 
regardless of the care received.” Hayward & Hofer, supra note 234, at 418-19. 
302 See, e.g., Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1974) (explaining that the defendant 
physician typically bears “the burden of segregating recoverable damages from those solely 
incident to the preexisting disease”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 177, at 433 
(2000) (describing the “[e]specially difficult problems of causation [that] arise when the defendant 
is negligent toward a plaintiff who is already suffering from a disease or disability”). 
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claims will implicate numerous defendants. Relevant here, Neil Vidmar’s 
North Carolina study found that less than one-third of medical malpractice 
cases were brought against a single healthcare provider; 16% of claims 
involved five defendants or more.303 This means that, in health courts 
(though not in the VICP), the liability of multiple defendants will need to 
be assessed, with the damages attributable to each quantified and 
monetized.  
Fourth, because health courts evaluate the physician’s conduct, they 
presumably will evaluate the plaintiff ’s conduct—most notably in 
considering whether the plaintiff reasonably mitigated her damages after 
sustaining a compensable medical injury.304 Assuming this mitigation is fair 
game,305 health courts will have to assess and quantify which portion of the 
plaintiff ’s injury would have been avoided if the plaintiff had utilized 
reasonable care and then determine how to subtract this from the plaintiff ’s 
compensable damages.306 
Fifth, health courts will likely adjudicate claims involving a physician’s 
failure to obtain informed consent prior to initiating treatment. These 
informed consent claims raise unique causation pitfalls. To prevail, the 
plaintiff must first establish “injury causation” (i.e., that the plaintiff would 
have been spared the particular harm if she had not undergone the 
challenged procedure). This inquiry requires conjecture about what 
alternate procedure the doctor may have performed and the foreseeable 
risks thereof. Then, a plaintiff must also show “decision causation.” This 
requires showing both that the plaintiff, personally, would have withheld 
consent to the challenged course of treatment if she had been adequately 
informed, and also that a “prudent person in the patient’s position” would 
 
303 See VIDMAR, supra note 233, at 33. For more on this study, involving medical malpractice 
cases filed in North Carolina federal and state courts from 1984–1987 and 1987–1989, see id. at 23-
24. Likewise, a 2006 study of medical malpractice claims found that “the majority of injuries 
involved more than one health care provider: 60% involved two or more clinicians, and a quarter 
involved three or more.” Mello & Studdert, supra note 163, at 605; accord Charles Silver, Does 
Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2102 (2002) (concluding that “increasing the 
number of defendants causes litigation costs per dollar transferred to rise”). 
304 See DOBBS, supra note 302, §§ 203–204, at 510-14 (describing the avoidable consequences 
doctrine).  
305 Of course, health courts could ignore the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate her injuries—but to 
do so would be contrary to health courts’ broader aim of reducing the social cost of medical injury. 
306 Cf. COMM’N ON MED. PROF’L LIAB., AM. BAR ASS’N, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE 
EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 67-68 (1979) (recognizing that, “to invite inquiry on a 
case by cases basis into the effects of patients’ conduct would generate the sorts of delays and 
transaction costs which the DCE approach [similar to the ACE approach] is designed to 
eliminate”). 
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have likewise declined treatment.307 Hypothesizing what this patient, and 
also what any reasonably prudent patient, would do in a given scenario is 
hardly straightforward—and, in fact, it is an inquiry that juries (comprised, 
of course, of current and future patients), not official “experts,” might be 
better suited to conduct. 
Sixth and finally, health courts, but not the VICP, must presumably 
wrestle with the “loss of chance” doctrine. Accepted now in over twenty 
states, this doctrine enables a plaintiff to obtain damages when the 
physician’s medical malpractice reduced the patient’s chance of recovery or 
survival—even if it cannot be said that the medical malpractice more-likely-
than-not caused the patient’s injury or death.308 Again, lost chance cases 
raise complications for health courts as, assuming they accept the doctrine, 
health courts would not only need to pinpoint the “avoidable” misdiagnosis 
or error in treatment.309 They would also, necessarily, have to quantify and 
then monetize the probability of the patient’s survival or recovery both 
before and after the physician’s misdiagnosis or mistake.  
*      *      * 
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that, in the VICP context, it was 
assumed that damages would be relatively easy to quantify. In reality, 
however, VICP damages calculations are surprisingly difficult. Many take 
years. Health courts will also need to calculate a victim’s future economic 
loss and, compared to the VICP, will have to do so (1) with arguably fewer 
statutory shortcuts; (2) often in the course of apportioning damages 
between various healthcare providers; (3) typically while quantifying the 
defendant’s aggravation of a plaintiff ’s underlying medical condition; (4) 
while, at least sometimes, reducing the plaintiff ’s damages because of the 
plaintiff ’s negligent aggravation of her avoidably inflicted injury; (5) while, 
on some occasions, guessing what a hypothetical patient would have agreed 
to concerning medical treatment if adequately informed; and (6) in certain 
 
307 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also DOBBS, supra note 302, 
§ 250, at 657 (describing the rule and noting that it “does not reflect the [normal] causation 
requirement but imposes some additional and most unusual obstacle”).  
308 For more on this doctrine’s application and acceptance, see Herskovits v. Group Health 
Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions of Authority, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 975-77 (2009); Steven R. Koch, Whose Loss Is It Anyway? Effects of the 
“Lost Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV. 595, 
606 n.56 (2010). 
309 If the doctrine is rejected, health courts’ adoption would effect a major, though so far 
unacknowledged, change in substantive law. 
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cases, calculating compensation for a plaintiff ’s lost chance at recovery or 
survival. In light of these obstacles, damage calculations within health 
courts are almost certain to be more nettlesome than many now anticipate. 
V. LARGER LESSONS: WHY DID THE VICP STUMBLE, AND WHAT DOES 
IT MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF ALTERNATIVE 
 COMPENSATION MECHANISMS? 
Many of the VICP’s promises have gone unfulfilled. Despite 
expectations that the VICP would rationalize entitlement decisions, a lack 
of predictability continues to bedevil the program. Despite assurances that 
VICP petitions would be resolved quickly—within 240 days—most cases 
stretch on for years. And, despite valiant legislative efforts to streamline 
damages determinations, calculating individualized compensation remains 
time-consuming and challenging.  
Part IV’s exploration of the VICP’s unfulfilled promises cast a shadow 
on certain of health courts’ proponents’ claims. It simultaneously revealed 
key insights that transcend health courts in their scope and applicability. 
Generalizable insights include: (1) some inconsistency in decisionmaking is, 
by all accounts, inevitable, particularly when cases are complex, politically 
charged, and dependent on findings concerning witness credibility; (2) 
because specialized tribunals are not diversified, they are susceptible to 
abrupt swings in the size of their dockets, which (as Richard Posner has 
theorized, and the VA Agent Orange experience illustrates) can stall or 
stymie case resolution; and (3) no matter how much policymakers strive to 
streamline compensation decisions, at least when injuries are serious, the 
individualized calculation of future economic loss remains difficult.  
Now, Part V steps back from particular problems (such as inconsistency, 
delay, and damage difficulties) to ask two broader questions: Why did the 
VICP stumble? And: What larger lessons can be drawn from the VICP 
experience? This broader perspective reveals four additional insights, with 
implications, not only for health courts, but for our design and deployment 
of future specialized courts and tort replacement mechanisms in areas far 
beyond the medical malpractice arena. These include: (1) certain kinds of 
causation questions are insusceptible to easy resolution; (2) decision aids 
can be a double-edged sword; (3) boundary claims and segregability issues 
can pose a substantial burden—and the less self-contained a substantive area 
is, the more serious those problems will be; and (4) adversarialism is 
inescapable.  
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A. Certain Kinds of Causation Questions Are Insusceptible to Easy Resolution 
It has long been known that, in order for a no-fault system to maintain 
low transaction costs, the system must be able to resolve causation questions 
quickly, reliably, and with minimal discovery. Given this, it is perhaps no 
surprise that workplace and automobile accidents have, so far, been most 
amenable to a no-fault solution. In both, determining whether an injury 
“arises out of ” employment (in the case of workers’ compensation) or the 
use of a motor vehicle (in the case of automobile no-fault) is generally 
straightforward, as injuries typically result from visible and undeniable 
trauma, as machines misfire or cars collide.310 In contrast, there are other 
kinds of injuries that are not traumatic, visible, or otherwise uncontested. 
When confronting this constellation of injury, American no-fault regimes 
have consistently struggled.  
Vaccine injuries fall into this latter, troublesome category. Unlike car 
wrecks or traditional workplace accidents, vaccine injuries are not traumatic 
or observable. Then, further confounding the causation inquiry, vaccines do 
not trigger “signature diseases,” meaning that ailments caused by vaccines 
can also be caused by other mechanisms. And, many vaccines are 
administered to infants and young children, while neurological disorders 
often—just coincidentally—show up in the first years of life. This means 
that many neurological disorders become evident on the heels of a child’s 
vaccination, creating a suspicious, though sometimes merely coincidental, 
temporal association.311  
Not surprisingly, the above facts have complicated causation 
determinations within the VICP. And this complexity has, in turn, been a 
substantial, though unanticipated, drag on the system, contributing to many 
of the problems identified above, including the difficult judgment calls 
special masters must make (which leads to a lack of consistency and 
predictability) and the long times to decision. Thus, when assessing why the 
VICP has stumbled, some of the blame ought to be laid here: at the 
elemental scientific uncertainty at the root of the causal inquiry. 
Importantly, too, in confronting—and becoming stymied by—elemental 
scientific uncertainty, the VICP is not alone. Comparable problems have 
plagued both state workers’ compensation systems when adjudicating 
occupational disease claims and the neurological birth injury funds in 
Florida and Virginia. On the former, occupational disease claims compel 
adjudicators to determine whether this disease was caused by that workplace 
 
310 A notable exception is workplace occupational disease, discussed below. 
311 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 4.  
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contaminant, which is challenging, particularly when the disease is non-
signature, latent (i.e., exposure and disease manifestation are separated in 
time), and can arise synergistically from the interaction of several 
substances.312 Predictably, given these factual impediments, occupational 
disease cases have been insusceptible to easy resolution, generating long 
delays,313 inconsistent outcomes,314 high rates of attorney retention,315 high 
levels of formal contestation,316 and a high degree of undercompensation.317 
The experience of neurological birth injury funds in Florida and Virginia 
tells a similar story.318 The crux of the problem there is that many 
neurological birth injury claims involve cerebral palsy, a general term for a 
group of permanent, non-progressive movement disorders that cause 
physical disability. Most cases of cerebral palsy (perhaps as many as 90%) 
are attributable to genetic or other conditions; relatively few are iatrogenic. 
But knowing which box to put a particular child’s injury into is 
extraordinarily difficult—leading authors of one recent study to conclude 
regretfully “as long as determination of causal factors remains part of the 
compensation criteria, pivotal uncertainties persist.”319  
This yields a pair of crucial insights: (1) If particular conditions are met 
(namely, injuries are not traumatic, visible, or otherwise obvious), causation 
questions are unlikely to be easily resolved, and (2) in such cases, 
adjudications are unlikely to be predictable, simple, or swift. Indeed, many 
of a no-fault system’s supposed benefits appear to dissipate the moment 
those systems confront causation questions steeped in scientific 
uncertainty.320 
 
312 See PETER S. BARTH WITH H. ALLAN HUNT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION & WORK-
RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 5-10, 62-89 (1980) (cataloging factual challenges). 
313 See id. at 163, 169. 
314 See id. at 61-62. 
315 See id. at 163 tbl.5.17 (reporting that, whereas lawyers are involved in only 14.6% of acci-
dent claims, lawyers are involved in 65.5% of claims asserting occupational disease). 
316 See id. at 163 tbl.5.16 (reporting that, whereas 9.8% of accident claims proceed to a formal 
hearing, 62.7% of occupational disease claims do). 
317 See J. Paul Leigh & John A. Robbins, Occupational Disease and Workers’ Compensation: 
Coverage, Costs, and Consequences, 82 MILBANK Q. 689, 709 (2004) (estimating that, at most, 
workers’ compensation covers 20% of the costs of occupational disease). 
318 A recent review of the Florida and Virginia birth injury programs explains that “no one 
anticipated the reverberations that the causal complexities at the root of the inquiry would create.” 
Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 506. 
319 Id.  
320 Accord O’CONNELL, supra note 42, at 72 (“[A]ny system of coverage or compensation for 
injury which moves beyond simple external traumatic impact is destined to encounter prodigious 
questions of causation.”). 
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Applying those lessons, the ease and confidence with which causation 
questions can be resolved might inform our selection of accident types 
amenable to no-fault regimes going forward. Here, for example, it is much 
easier to assess whether an injury is caused by gun fire, a schoolyard 
accident, a railroad derailment, or an airline crash, on the one hand, than it 
is to determine whether an injury is caused by a prescription drug or a 
cigarette, on the other.321 The former injuries are visible and traumatic; the 
latter injuries are not (and most illnesses caused by cigarettes and 
prescription drugs do not qualify as signature diseases). Thus, we might 
confidently say that (political barriers aside) a no-fault regime for handguns 
is far more promising than one for cigarettes. 
Further applying the above lessons, those who seek to create a quasi-no-
fault regime for medical injury face almost inevitable disappointment, as the 
causal questions health courts must address will often be suffused with 
scientific uncertainty. After all, most medical injuries are not traumatic or 
visible. Most patients seek care because they are sick, and sick people’s 
health often deteriorates further. This means that most injuries stemming 
from medical malpractice will also, necessarily, have competing causes, 
wholly apart from a physician’s error.322 Like occupational disease claims, 
some medical injuries have long time lags between the physician’s mistake 
(e.g., the missed or delayed diagnosis) and its effect (e.g., the cancer 
metastasized).323 These delays create complications.324 Then finally, the 
health court project adds an additional wrinkle: As noted above, the inquiry 
in a health court case will not be merely whether medical care caused the 
patient’s injury. It will, instead, be whether “avoidable” or suboptimal 
medical care caused the patient’s injury—a much harder determination. 
 
321 See supra notes, 40, 44, 49, and 50 (advocating no-fault regimes for railway accidents, 
prescription drugs,  cigarettes, and firearm injuries, respectively).  
322 See JEFFREY O’CONNELL & CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR BALANCED 
TORT REFORM: EARLY OFFERS WITH SWIFT SETTLEMENTS 108 (2008) (“Under a medical no-
fault scheme it would be therefore necessary to distinguish between the injuries caused by medical 
treatment, and those caused by, say, the ‘presenting complaint.’ Unfortunately, it is often 
impossible to determine whether a patient was injured by the treatment rendered or just by a 
normal extension of the condition that prompted treatment in the first place.”). 
323 Misdiagnoses account for a large proportion of medical malpractice lawsuits. See Tejal K. 
Gandhi et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Ambulatory Setting: A Study of Closed Malpractice 
Claims, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488, 488 (2006) (“Over the past decade, lawsuits alleging 
negligent misdiagnoses have become the most prevalent type of claim in the United States.”). 
324 See DANZON, supra note 59, at 175 (observing that “delay creates technological uncertain-
ty in establishing the connection between the triggering event and the injury”). 
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B. Decision Aids Are a Double-Edged Sword 
When analyzing why the VICP has stumbled, the next culprit is surely 
the Vaccine Injury Table. The Table has not streamlined causation questions 
as substantially as many expected. It has, itself, become the subject of bitter 
controversy. And Table amendments have tarnished public perceptions of 
the Program. Again, this experience contains a sobering lesson for health 
courts, as well as other future specialized courts and replacement regimes 
that would rely on decision aids to streamline causation or compensation 
questions. 
Recall that Congress created the Vaccine Injury Table to simplify and 
rationalize causation questions—essentially, to sidestep many of the issues 
above. Note, too, that at the time of the VICP’s enactment, it was assumed 
that most petitioners would assert on-Table injuries—and, for a time, the 
assumption held. Early in the Program’s lifecycle (prior to 1995), roughly 
75% of petitioners proceeded down the on-Table track,325 and, consistent 
with expectations, these petitioners’ claims were, for the most part, easily 
and expeditiously resolved. In the words of the VICP’s chief special master: 
“[L]itigating Table cases . . . met Congress’s programmatic desire; that is, 
the special masters handle[d] the cases relatively quickly and render[ed] 
decisions with certainty.”326 
In the mid-1990s, however, there was a momentous shift. Exercising her 
statutory Table-modification authority—and relying, in large part, on 
findings of the IOM (the health arm of the National Academy of 
Sciences)—on March 10, 1995 and again on March 24, 1997, the Secretary of 
HHS amended the Table to add to and strike from the Table certain 
associated injuries.327 At first glance, the amendments were a wash. In fact, 
more injuries were added than were subtracted. However, because HHS 
removed the injuries that had been the most frequently utilized by 
petitioners, the practical effect of these additions and subtractions was to 
shrink the Table’s scope, and importance, dramatically. While 74% of 
 
325 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 14.  
326 Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 WL 387418, at 
*7 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001); see also OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, supra note 150, at 42 (“When 
the Vaccine Program was created, the expectation was that most cases would involve Table 
injuries, and in the early days of the Program, that expectation was borne out. Most Table cases 
are quickly resolved, in keeping with the Congressional intent that vaccine injured persons be 
compensated quickly, easily, and with generosity.”); Telephone Interview with Gary J. Golkie-
wicz, VICP Chief Special Master from 1988–2010 (Sept. 23, 2014) (“Under the Table, the system 
worked as closely to what Congress intended as you are going to get.”). 
327 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 13-14. For more on the sources HHS consulted 
while amending the Table, see id. at 22. 
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petitions sought compensation for on-Table injuries prior to 1995, only 55% 
did by 1999, and now, only about 2% of VICP petitions proceed down the 
on-Table path.328 Thus, the Table, which at enactment was viewed as the 
VICP’s “most important feature,”329 has, in the words of one lawyer for 
petitioners, morphed into “a meaningless thing.”330 
This migration away from the Table has had ripple effects, touching 
every corner of VICP administration. Compared to on-Table petitions, off-
Table petitions (where causation is determined by reference to traditional 
tort principles) are more likely to be contested, rather than conceded, and 
once contested, “take longer to prepare, longer to present, and longer to 
decide.”331 Off-Table petitions are also, quite importantly, far less likely to 
result in compensation for the petitioner.332 This means that much of the 
trouble identified above can be traced, directly, to the Table amendments.  
What lessons can we draw from this experience? The most obvious 
takeaway is that decision aids’ malleability is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, decision aids that attempt to crystallize scientific understanding 
must be susceptible to amendment, as scientific understanding evolves over 
time. If decision aids can’t be updated, they will become antiquated and 
inaccurate. On the other hand, though, the need to amend a decision aid 
comes with the power to amend a decision aid. If a decision aid is malleable, 
in other words, it is also, by definition, manipulable. This means, by 
expanding or shrinking a decision aid, the modifying body has the power to 
dramatically alter a program’s size, scope, and character.  
Further, because these modifications will be so consequential, and 
because, too, the science supporting or refuting a modification is rarely 
clear-cut,333 decision aid modification is apt to generate controversy. The 
 
328 Compare id. at 14 (offering the 74% and 55% figures), with 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 
52, at 20 (reporting that, since 2009, over 98% of petitions allege off-Table injuries). Further 
accelerating the shift toward off-Table adjudications, in recent years, six vaccines have been added 
to the Table without the addition of any associated injuries. See id. at 17-20. 
329 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 5. 
330 Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript 
of Meeting of Sept. 17, 2009, at 56 (statement of Clifford Shoemaker, Attorney); see also Tele-
phone Interview with Gary J. Golkiewicz, supra note 326 (“The Table was the centerpiece of the 
Program, and now it’s virtually irrelevant.”). 
331 Stevens, 2001 WL 387418, at *7. 
332 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 12 (reporting, as of 1999, that on-Table claims 
were nearly three times more likely to be compensated, as compared to their off-Table counter-
parts). 
333 For example, in 1994, the IOM conducted a review of the relationship between vaccines 
and medical conditions. IOM’s review found that there was insufficient evidence to prove or 
disprove a relationship between vaccines and two-thirds of the seventy-five medical conditions 
studied. See id. at 13 n.13.  
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VICP illustrates this point, as HHS’s mid-1990s amendments ignited a 
firestorm of criticism. Parents and a parents’ advocacy group challenged the 
amendments in court, contending that the Secretary of HHS had exceeded 
her statutory authority.334 The GAO scolded HHS for “bas[ing] its 
decisions to add or remove table injuries on various factors” without “a clear 
and transparent methodology to demonstrate that these factors were 
consistently applied.”335 The VICP’s chief special master chastised the 
government for “alter[ing] the game so that it’s clearly in their favor.”336 The 
then-Chair of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines (a group 
created by Congress to oversee the VICP) called the amendments “a 
repudiation of the principles on which the compensation program” was 
enacted.337 And Congress also expressed stern disapproval.338 HHS, for its 
part, offered a somewhat tepid defense—highlighting that the amendments 
were necessary to ensure that the Table “conform[ed] with the scientific 
evidence”339 and emphasizing how “difficult” and “not practical” it is “to try 
and fit causation science into very narrow boxes.”340  
This discussion of the Table’s controversial status reveals a pair of 
additional insights. The first is that decision aids are easily politicized and, 
in fact, the more a decision aid helps to resolve close cases (and, thus, the 
more value it has from a procedural perspective), the more controversial it will 
become. Here’s an illustration from the health court context: Today, it turns 
out, patients can catch and identify some errors, such as wrong-site 
surgeries, extreme drug overdoses, transfusions with mismatched blood, and 
complications caused by forgotten surgical instruments.341 These cases are 
 
334 See Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1996); see also ALLEN, supra note 113, at 293 (discussing 
the pervasive “bitterness” parents felt following these amendments); Advisory Comm’n on 
Childhood Vaccines, Transcript of Meeting of March 1, 1995, at 113 [hereinafter March 1, 1995 
ACCV Transcript] (on file with author) (“We feel like we have been betrayed.” (quoting Barbara 
Loe Fisher, Parents’ Activist)). 
335 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 3; see also id. at 15 (observing that HHS’s actions 
“do not always convey a sense of consistency”). 
336 ALLEN, supra note 113, at 293 (quoting Gary Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master, VICP). 
337 March 1, 1995 ACCV Transcript, supra note 334, at 2 (statement of Curtis R. Webb, 
Chair, ACCV) (on file with author). For more on the ACCV, see supra note 53; see also Telephone 
Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“The petitioner community understood that the 
Table modifications were a betrayal, a complete abrogation of the principles that underlie the 
Program. It was an attempt to neuter the Program.”). 
338 H.R. REP. NO. 106-977, at 2 (2000) (finding that HHS’s actions had “undermin[ed] the 
remedial nature of the program as intended by the Congress”). 
339 Levin, supra note 287 (quoting Joyce G. Somsak, Acting Director, VICP). 
340 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 41. 
341 See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s 
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1113 (2006) (offering these, and other, examples). 
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easy. They are apt to result in payment, and they are unlikely to trigger 
prolonged contestation. Indeed, susceptible to resolution via the common 
knowledge exception or the ancient tort doctrine res ipsa loquitur, many of 
these cases do not even require the retention of costly medical experts.342 As 
such, if all ACEs do is capture these unequivocal cases, their practical effect 
will be marginal. They will be picking only low-hanging fruit, simplifying 
only those cases that are already straightforward. On the other hand, if 
ACEs do take sides on contested questions—offering guidance at the 
frontier of medical injury where, for example, the standard of care is 
evolving or treatment guidelines are in flux—they will be truly helpful, 
streamlining litigation that would otherwise be hard-fought and spirited.343 
But the creation and subsequent amendment of the ACE list will spark 
significant criticism.344  
The second insight that flows from the Table’s controversial amendment 
is related, and concerns health courts’—and other specialized tribunals’—
perceived legitimacy. It has long been said that in order to be effective, 
tribunals have to be perceived as legitimate. And in order to be perceived as 
legitimate, tribunals must be perceived as being fair.345 If the public, or if 
litigants, lack confidence in a tribunal’s fairness, that lack of confidence 
diminishes the public’s faith in government, makes unfavorable decisions 
harder to accept, and potentially jeopardizes compliance with tribunal 
decisions.346 Meanwhile, a drawback long identified with specialized courts 
is that, when it comes to being viewed as fair, these tribunals start at a 
deficit; they tend to lack generalist courts’ widespread public acceptance and 
are “peculiarly susceptible to being thought partisan.”347 The broader lesson, 
 
342 See DANZON, supra note 59, at 38-39, 217 (noting that empirical examination tends to 
support “the conventional wisdom that cases involving obvious error tend to be settled out of 
court, with relatively low litigation costs”). 
343 Cf. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a 
Selective No-Fault System, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2836, 2841-42 (1991) (concluding that ACEs can 
be used to resolve cases that would otherwise generate controversy). 
344 See Clark C. Havighurst, “Medical Adversity Insurance”—Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE 
L.J. 1233, 1270 (offering a similar analysis).  
345 See Stempel, supra note 33, at 107 (stating that “tribunals must be perceived as fair in 
order to adjudicate effectively”). 
346 Accord Bruff, supra note 218, at 331 (“Part of a court’s success in obtaining compliance 
with its mandates flows from the respect others have for it.”). 
347 Currie & Goodman, supra note 33, at 72; see also Stempel, supra note 33, at 89 (suggesting 
that a drawback of specialized courts is that they “lack the widespread public acceptance and 
perception of fairness that traditionally surround generalist courts”). Health courts’ perceived 
legitimacy might be particularly fragile because the plaintiffs’ bar is already opposed to these 
tribunals, partly owing to a suspicion that they would be “anti-patient” in orientation. See supra 
notes 23-27 (providing examples of arguments opposing health courts). 
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then, is the following: If specialized courts or no-fault compensation 
schemes rely heavily on decision aids, and if those decision aids must be 
initially created and then periodically amended, the decision aids’ creation 
and amendment will be politically charged.348 When it comes time first to 
create and then subsequently to update the decision aid, there will be 
winners and losers. And, among the losers, the public perception of fairness, 
already somewhat fragile in specialized courts, risks being tarnished, 
perhaps substantially.349 
C. Boundary Claims Impose a Substantial Burden 
A third broad lesson that flows from the VICP experience is the burden 
of boundary definition. Theorists have long identified “boundary problems” 
as a potential drawback to specialized courts’ and replacement regimes’ 
creation.350 What theorists mean is that the creation of specialized schemes 
requires policymakers to draw lines to distinguish the cases that fall within 
the scheme from those that do not. Then, once lines are drawn, they must 
be policed, as litigants, with different incentives, will seek to push lines in 
different directions, either to make an end-run around the specialized 
tribunal and into the traditional court system, or vice versa.351  
 
348 These lessons also apply—and arguably, especially apply—to the noneconomic damage 
schedule that health court proponents plan to devise, as health court architects will need to decide 
how to classify injuries by severity, the dollar value to assign to each injury classification, how to 
adjust awards for inflation, and whether (or to what extent) ALJs can depart from the heartland in 
compelling circumstances. Moreover, health court proponents anticipate periodically amending 
this schedule based on “social judgments” concerning what is or is not appropriate injury 
compensation. Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 470. If Table revisions based on the 
IOM’s findings created a “firestorm” in the VICP context, it is hard to comprehend the conflagra-
tion that would attend damage revisions based on amorphous “social judgments.” Cf. Peters, supra 
note 13, at 269 (calling these damage revisions a “genuinely frightening idea”). 
349 Accord Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Schwartz, supra note 199 (“The action of the 
Secretary of Health in changing the Table without good science to back up that decision was 
simply the final straw.”); Telephone Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“[C]ertainly for 
people whose children suffered neurological injury shortly after vaccination, the Table changes 
badly damaged perceptions. The Program lost a great deal of legitimacy.”). 
350 See, e.g., Oldfather, supra note 33, at 863 (noting that “boundary problems” can give rise 
to “administrative difficulties”). 
351 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, 6 J. 
TORT L. 75, 75-80 (2015) (identifying the recurring problem of “exit” and explaining how exit, if 
left unchecked, can erode many of specialization’s ostensible advantages); see also Peter H. Schuck, 
Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 198 (2008) (“So long as any categorical 
boundaries between no-fault and tort exist . . . claimants and their lawyers will always face strong 
incentives to prosecute claims in whatever remains of the tort system . . . .”).  
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1. Traditional Boundary Claims 
These boundary problems have been a significant and well-documented 
drag on workers’ compensation—as, when the employer is not at fault, 
workers strive to fall within the system, and when the employers’ 
misfeasance is obvious, workers are just as eager to hatch their escape.352 
Boundary problems have also dogged the Florida neurological birth injury 
program described above as, again, those with strong negligence claims have 
exited the program, seemingly at will.353 Boundary problems have plagued 
automobile no-fault regimes, contributing to the high cost of no-fault 
automobile insurance and, ultimately, legislators’ repeal of the legislation in 
several states.354 And boundary problems (though of an unusual and 
unexpected character) have also bedeviled the VICP.355 
Autism litigation offers a case in point. As noted, autism petitions—
typically alleging that Thimerosal (a mercury-containing vaccine 
preservative) cause the affliction—have recently flooded the Program.356 
Complicating these cases is the jurisdictional question of whether 
Thimerosal claims have to be filed—or even can be filed—in the VICP since 
Thimerosal is not obviously a “vaccine” within the Vaccine Act’s statutory 
definition.357 That question, in turn, raises a tricky question of statutory 
interpretation: Is Thimerosal an “adulterant or contaminant,” as petitioners 
claim, which would exclude these cases from the Vaccine Act’s purview? Or 
is Thimerosal a “constituent material” of vaccines, as vaccine manufacturers 
and HHS insist, which would mean that the Vaccine Act preempts 
Thimerosal-related litigation? The question has generated a boatload of 
 
352 See Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, supra note 351, at 
83-85 (cataloging ways in which workers bypass workers’ compensation, in favor of recovery 
within the traditional tort system). 
353 See generally Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In, supra note 22 (describing claimants’ suc-
cessful “end run” around the Florida birth injury fund). 
354 See Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation, supra note 21, at 344-47. 
355 I say “unusual and unexpected” because, when the VICP was enacted, many fretted that 
vaccine-injured claimants would enter the tort system using the tort opt-out provision, described 
above in Section II.B. As noted, those worries were misplaced; few petitioners who receive an 
award within the VICP reject their award and proceed to file a civil action, and even petitioners 
whose claims are denied tend to acquiesce to the denial. However, vaccine-injured litigants have 
nonetheless entered the tort system via other unanticipated avenues. 
356 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.  
357 The provision defines the term “vaccine-related injury or death” to mean “an illness, 
injury, condition, or death associated with one or more of the vaccines set forth in the Vaccine 
Injury Table, except that the term does not include an illness, injury, condition, or death 
associated with an adulterant or contaminant intentionally added to such a vaccine.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300aa-33(5) (2012).  
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litigation, in both the VICP and beyond.358 Further complicating matters, in 
2002, Congress passed a statute to clarify that the Vaccine Act’s “Definition 
of Vaccine” “includes all components and ingredients listed in the vaccine’s 
product license application and product label.”359 This measure seemingly 
settled the controversy. But then, the following year, Congress repealed the 
amendment,360 while noting that its action should not be interpreted to 
mean that Leroy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (a case that held 
that the Vaccine Act encompassed Thimerosal claims) was incorrectly 
decided.361 Then, in 2006, the Fifth Circuit held that, though Thimerosal is 
a vaccine, Thimerosal manufacturers are not vaccine “manufacturers” under 
the Act—and, thus, suits specifically targeting these defendants can proceed 
unencumbered.362  
Thimerosal’s murky status has thus been a substantial, but unexpected, 
site of controversy. It has not been the only one. In recent years, some 
autism plaintiffs have snuck out of the VICP and into court by seeking de 
minimis damages below the Vaccine Act’s jurisdictional injury-severity 
threshold.363 Recognizing that the Vaccine Act does not preempt claims for 
injunctive relief, other plaintiffs have sought court-ordered medical 
monitoring of all Thimerosal-exposed, but currently healthy, individuals.364 
Finally, seizing on the fact that the Vaccine Act applies only to those who 
have “received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table,”365 still other 
 
358 See, e.g., Laughter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 406 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Benas-
co v. Am. Home Prods., No. 02-3577, 2003 WL 22174270 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2003); Wax v. 
Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Bertrand v. Aventis Pasteur Labs., 
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Ariz. 2002); Liu v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 762 
(W.D. Tex. 2002); Owens v. Am. Home Prods., 203 F. Supp. 2d 748 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Garcia v. 
Aventis Pasteur Inc., No. 02-0168, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15122 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2002); 
Leroy v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-392V, 2002 WL 31730680 (Fed. Cl. 
Oct. 11, 2002). 
359 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1716, 116 Stat. 2135, 2321. 
360 See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. L, § 102(a), 117 
Stat. 11, 528. 
361 See id. § 102(c), 117 Stat. at 528 (citing Leroy, 2002 WL 31730680). Congress’s retraction 
was apparently precipitated by an outcry from parents’ groups. See Beverly Jones Sill, Comment, 
Toussaint v. Merck & Co.: Opening the Door to Thimerosal Vaccine Litigation in Civil Court?, 21 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 773, 785 (2005). 
362 See Holder v. Abbot Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Reilly ex rel. 
Reilly v. Wyeth, 876 N.E.2d 740, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
363 See Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Div. of Vaccine Injury Comp., Transcript 
of Meeting of Mar. 16, 2004, at 79-80 (statement of Randy Moss, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering) (on file with author).  
364 See id. 
365 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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plaintiffs have filed derivative suits, seeking damages for parents’ loss of 
consortium when an autism-afflicted child fell ill.366  
All told, the lesson from the autism saga, which involved over 5500 
VICP petitions, at least 350 lawsuits, eleven putative class actions (including 
one brought on behalf of 175 million Americans), all three branches of 
government, years of litigation, and tens of millions of dollars in legal fees, 
is that, even when boundaries are carefully demarcated, gray areas persist. It 
is, of course, difficult to identify the fault lines in health courts’ current 
jurisdictional definition. (Perhaps plaintiffs will take a page from VICP 
petitioners and enter the tort system seeking medical monitoring or by 
raising loss of consortium claims for a family member’s impairment. 
Perhaps they will seize on health courts’ carve-out for intentional torts and 
mixed coverage/treatment claims against managed health care 
organizations.367 Perhaps they will invent entirely new arguments.) But the 
VICP experience, especially when considered alongside the experiences of 
workers’ compensation regimes, neurological birth injury funds, and auto 
no-fault statutes, underscores that if the stakes are high, gaps will be 
found—and, when gaps are found, end-runs around the no-fault scheme can 
erode its administrative advantages. 
2. Segregability 
A closely related issue is what Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss calls 
“segregability,” by which she means the extent to which claims in specialized 
courts are self-contained or instead spill over into courts of general 
jurisdiction. All things equal, the more self-contained an area of law is, the 
better suited it is to specialized treatment; the more “integrated” an area of 
law is, the less suited it is to such specialized treatment.368 And of course, 
when considering whether to deploy a specialized court or no-fault regime, 
a policymaker ought to weigh the substantive area’s factual and legal 
entanglements. 
This insight is ominous for health courts because some medical 
malpractice claims are not self-contained.369 Some such claims, for example, 
 
366 See, e.g., Moss v. Merck & Co., 381 F.3d 501, 504-06 (5th Cir. 2004); Schafer v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994). 
367 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461 (explaining that such claims would 
remain under the jurisdiction of general tort law). 
368 See Dreyfuss, supra note 33, at 409-12; see also Bruff, supra note 218, at 339 (suggesting 
that, when constructing specialized courts, policymakers should select areas that do not contain 
“integrated subject matter”). 
369 Problems identified herein would be exacerbated if health courts are initially rolled out in 
small pilot projects where “[p]atients would join the system through their choice of provider.” 
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arise out of another tortious injury: A plaintiff might be tortiously injured 
in a car wreck and then negligently treated once in the hospital. It is black-
letter law in most states that the at-fault motorist bears some liability for 
the actions of the errant physician; the two actions in this example are, thus, 
“integrated.”370 Meanwhile, some medical malpractice claims arise alongside 
product liability claims. So, for example, plaintiffs alleging pharmaceutical 
injury frequently sue both the drug manufacturer and the clinician who 
prescribed or administered the dangerous drug.371 Again, the liability of the 
two actors is logically connected, and the current system sensibly 
adjudicates both at once. So, too, some medical malpractice claims give rise 
to civil rights actions, such as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal 
Rehabilitation Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).372 Here, 
a secondary defendant is not involved; however, the claim’s resolution still 
requires consideration of decidedly non-medical matters. 
It remains to be seen how these “integrated” claims would be 
adjudicated within a health court system, as there are four obvious 
adjudicatory possibilities, but each has serious drawbacks. The first option 
would be to give plaintiffs with integrated claims the freedom to select their 
tribunal. Yet arming plaintiffs with this freedom would, in some cases, run 
up against certain defendants’ right of removal373 and, even when it is 
 
Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461; see also id. (advocating these roll-outs). It is not 
at all clear where a patient who sustains a single tortiously inflicted, indivisible injury at the hands 
of doctor x (enrolled in a health court) and doctor y (not enrolled in a health court) would be able 
to initiate a claim for compensation. 
370 See V. Woerner, Annotation, Civil Liability of One Causing Personal Injury for Consequences 
of Negligence, Mistake, or Lack of Skill of Physician or Surgeon, 100 A.L.R.2d 808 § 2 (1965) (“[M]ost 
of the courts which have considered the question have taken the view that the original tortfeasor is 
liable for the consequences of negligence, mistake, or lack of skill on the part of the physician or 
surgeon who treats the original injury.”). 
371 The landmark Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), is just such a case, as Diana Levine 
initially sued Wyeth and the clinician (and the clinician’s employer) who improperly administered 
the Phenergan at issue.  
372 See, e.g., Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (evaluating a claim that the 
HIV-positive patient’s treatment violated, inter alia, the ADA and the Federal Rehabilitation 
Act); Morgan v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 912, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (considering 
whether the plaintiff’s allegedly unlawful detention at a New York mental health facility 
constituted medical malpractice and violated the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 
U.S.C. § 1981); see also William Landess, Medical Malpractice—New Malpractice Twist: Civil Rights 
Claims, OUTPATIENT SURGERY (Aug. 2012), http://www.outpatientsurgery.net/issues/2012/08/ 
medical-malpractice-new-malpractice-twist-civil-rights-claims, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZWZ-
Z9GC (noting that “we’re now seeing more and more patients claim civil rights violations that 
essentially allege malpractice”). 
373 As it is, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) gives defendants a right of removal, stating:  
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a 
State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may 
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possible, would promote forum shopping, perhaps to the point of tempting 
plaintiffs to tack on frivolous claims (against non-physician secondary 
defendants, for example) since the inclusion of such claims would trigger 
the forum selection choice.374 Second, policymakers might return integrated 
medical malpractice claims to the traditional judicial system en masse. That, 
however, would erode many of the physician-side benefits that health courts 
seek to confer, while (still) encouraging frivolous claiming. Third, 
policymakers might divert integrated claims to health courts en masse. But 
this seems wholly infeasible. This action would again (in some instances) 
raise federal jurisdictional problems, and it also would task ALJs with 
deciding matters totally outside their sphere of expertise (car wreck and 
product liability cases, for example). A final—and apparently the favored—
option is to conduct two separate adjudications.375 However, those separate, 
often overlapping, adjudications would impose a heavy administrative 
burden on litigants (eroding efficiencies health courts might otherwise 
confer), tax public resources (forced to fund parallel adjudications), and 
create a risk of inconsistent judgments. Moreover, when physician and non-
physician defendants are both involved, policymakers would still need to 
resolve the vexing question of how to allocate damages among defendants 
inside and outside the traditional tort system. Or, if there is no damage 
allocation, that would effect a significant, and potentially ill-considered, 
alteration of substantive law.  
D. Adversarialism Is Inescapable 
The final broad insight is that adversarialism is inescapable. Both the 
VICP and health courts aim to quell the adversarialism of dispute 
resolution.376 But, when assessing why the VICP has struggled, it seems 
obvious that one final reason is that adversarialism has crept back in. 
Adversarialism’s persistence within the VICP, once again, has implications, 
 
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States 
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012). 
374 See Bruff, supra note 218, at 339 (discussing the forum shopping risk). 
375 Cf. Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461 (stating that “medical product liabil-
ity claims . . . would remain under the jurisdiction of the tort system”). 
376 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A) (2012) (charging VICP special masters with crafting 
rules to “provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding for the resolution of 
[VICP] petitions”); Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 103 tbl.6 (predicting that 
health courts are “less likely to provoke defensiveness and adversarialism among physicians” and 
identifying a “[l]ess adversarial process” as one of eight benefits health courts would confer on 
claimants). 
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not only for health courts, but for our creation and consideration of other 
no-fault mechanisms.  
By statute, Congress directs special masters “to provide for a less-
adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding.”377 Yet as early as 1989, 
Congress expressed regret that, despite this statutory directive, “all 
participants ha[d], to some degree, maintained their traditional adversarial 
litigation postures,” and Congress implored VICP participants to “re-
dedicat[e]” themselves “to the creation of an expeditious, less adversarial, 
and fair system.”378 Notwithstanding Congress’s urging, however, many 
report that, over the years, the system’s adversarial nature has endured—and 
even grown more pronounced. When the Federal Judicial Center conducted 
a survey of VICP special masters in the mid-1990s, the special masters’ chief 
complaint was that the DOJ lawyers were “behaving like . . . adversar[ies]” 
and “over-litigating” various claims.379 Congressional leaders, who have held 
numerous hearings to examine the VICP’s operation, have concluded that 
the Program engenders “avoidable, protracted and adversarial litigation.”380 
A medical expert, who has long participated in the Program, has observed: 
“What should be a quiet, civil, deliberative discussion of facts and medicine 
too frequently degenerates into a contentious, vituperative, decibel-
escalating exchange.”381 Most academics concur. For example, Professor 
Peter Meyers, who has written extensively about the Program and directs 
George Washington University Law School’s Vaccine Injury Clinic 
concluded in 2011 that the VICP “is no longer the quick, informal, and less 
adversarial program that Congress intended it to be.”382 
 
377 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A). 
378 H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 512 (1989). 
379 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 44. 
380 H.R. REP. NO. 106-977, at 2 (2000); see id. at 13 (describing “questionable practices” by 
DOJ lawyers). 
381 Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Justice, Drug Policy, & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 63 (1999) 
[hereinafter 1999 House Hearing] (statement of Dr. Arnold Gale, Medical Expert, Stanford 
Univ.); see also id. at 63 (“Ad hominem attacks on physicians by all attorneys are common.”). 
382 Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 851 (2011); see also BURKE, supra note 36, at 161 (noting that, “over time the 
amount of lawyering and adversarialism in the [VICP] has grown,” as “medical experts and HHS 
officials regularly square off against parents, their lawyers, and opposing medical researchers”); 
Boxler, supra note 191, at 2 (observing that the VICP is “mimicking the adversarial nature of 
traditional tort litigation”); Elizabeth C. Scott, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act Turns Fifteen, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 362 (2001) (“While causation, timing problems, and 
the cost burden of the system all make recovery more difficult for petitioners . . . , the adversarial 
nature of the system is perhaps the most difficult hurdle for the inured plaintiffs.”). Even health 
court proponents concede that the VICP “has become quite adversarial.” Paul J. Barringer et al., 
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Further, though it is hard to know whether this is the cause or the 
consequence, the VICP has also exhibited an unexpectedly heavy reliance 
on lawyers.383 Early on, some apparently anticipated that VICP procedures 
would be straightforward enough to render counsel superfluous. 
Representative Patsy Mink explained in a 1999 hearing, “when we 
established this program, we envisioned a system in which citizens would be 
able to file claims without assistance from attorneys.”384 Contrary to those 
expectations, however, over time, it has become clear that claimants need 
counsel—and typically specialized counsel—to successfully navigate the 
Program.385  
Surprisingly, the adjudication of VICP petitions has been marred by 
combativeness, even though three of the Program’s structural features 
should logically deter this behavior: (1) The ostensibly culpable party (the 
maker of the errant vaccine or at-fault physician) is shielded from liability 
and is not a party to VICP proceedings; (2) petitioners’ counsel is paid win 
or lose; and (3) the Fund now touts a bulging surplus (some $3.5 billion), 
which suggests that a few extra payments (or the provision of $40 sneakers) 
should not arouse particular controversy. (Indeed, the surplus is so large 
 
Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 725, 737 (2008).  
383 Addressing this chicken-and-egg question, some would suggest that the introduction of 
lawyers precipitated the Program’s adversarial nature. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 324-26 (1985) (observing that “[t]he regular introduction of lawyers” into 
proceedings is unlikely to contribute to the proceedings’ informality or expedience); Robert A. 
Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2, 
6-7 (1994) (contending that the legal profession “promot[es] and perpetuat[es] adversarial legal 
contestation”).  
384 1999 House Hearing, supra note 381, at 13 (statement of Rep. Patsy T. Mink); see also 
Telephone Interview with Gary J. Golkiewicz, supra note 326 (noting that, when the Program was 
created, “it was expected that pro se’s could handle their cases”); Advisory Comm’n on Childhood 
Vaccines, Div. of Vaccine Injury Comp., Transcript of Meeting of Dec. 5, 2001, at 43-44 
(statement of Timothy Westmoreland, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform) (on file with author) 
(suggesting that, at the time of enactment, congressional leaders anticipated that at least on-Table 
claimants would be able to navigate the Program without attorney assistance). But cf. MARINER, 
supra note 250, at 43 (observing that the Act “contemplates” that petitioners will be represented by 
counsel). 
385 In 1992, HHS’s Inspector General reported that 20% of all claimants who had filed peti-
tions as of August 1991 proceeded without the assistance of counsel. But the same report found 
that “all of [pro se petitioners’] cases have been dismissed for lack of evidence.” OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 149, at 16 & app. B; accord Telephone Interview with Gary J. 
Golkiewicz, supra note 326 (noting that, these days, some cases require technical briefing and 
generate legal fees on the claimants’ side of $700,000 to $800,000, calculated on an hourly basis).  
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that if payments continue at the current clip, the Program could last another 
quarter century with no new revenue.386)  
Nor can the VICP experience be written off as idiosyncratic, as in facing 
unexpectedly high levels of attorney involvement and a rising tide of 
adversarialism, the VICP is not alone.387 Studies of workers’ compensation 
systems reveal a similar story—especially in (seemingly analogous) cases of 
occupational disease.388 Studies of Florida’s and Virginia’s neurological birth 
injury programs surfaced near-identical complaints.389 And a review of auto 
no-fault systems reveals a similar rising lawyer-retention tide.390  
This discussion reveals two final insights. The first and more concrete 
observation is this: Notwithstanding health court proponents’ confident 
 
386 See Jeryl Bier, House to Consider Tax on New Flu Vaccines, WKLY. STANDARD ( June 18, 
2013, 10:52 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/house-consider-tax-new-flu-vaccines_ 
736725.html, archived at https://perma.cc/G8QP-AZKY. On the other hand, it is possible that the 
VICP’s unusual attorney payment mechanism (whereby lawyers are paid win or lose) encourages 
prolonged contestation. See Boxler, supra note 191, at 24-36 (contending that the VICP’s payment 
mechanism creates perverse incentives). Similarly, it may be that careerist lawyers within the DOJ 
are uniquely inclined to litigate aggressively—and that lawyers hired by liability insurers or 
physicians would face resource or reputational constraints to dampen their adversarial impulses. 
Cf. Telephone Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“My experience is that the DOJ is at 
least as bad as a typical litigant, as, say, a drug company. The typical defendant risks a huge award 
if they’re unfeeling about what a seriously injured child needs. But here, the DOJ doesn’t face 
repercussions when they take extreme positions.”).  
387 See generally Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, supra note 
351 (discussing how adversarialism has stymied various no-fault compensation mechanisms within 
the United States). 
388 See supra note 315 (noting that the majority of occupational disease cases are contested 
and involve counsel); see also BURKE, supra note 36, at 39 (“Over time, workers’ compensation 
systems have come to look more litigation-like, with lawyers playing a larger role . . . .”); Elinor P. 
Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational 
Disease, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 157-58 (1987) (“[T]he system that was supposed to 
provide speedy compensation as the workers’ quid pro quo to relinquishing tort actions has taken 
on many of the trappings of common law litigation—retention of lawyers, delays, cost, and 
compromise.” (footnotes omitted)). 
389 At the time of enactment, many assumed that claimants would be able to obtain compen-
sation for birth-related injury “without the hassle and expense of obtaining legal representation.” 
Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 528-30; see VIRGINIA AUDIT, supra note 52, at 6 (“The expectation 
was that the family would not need to hire a lawyer to gain entry into the program.”). In reality, 
however, rates of lawyer retention run high, and both the Florida and Virginia programs have, in 
time, become surprisingly adversarial. See Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn 
Persistence of Tort, supra note 351, at 110-13 (compiling various evidence). 
390 Auto no-fault was dubbed “no-lawyer” insurance at enactment because it was assumed 
that the claims process would be straightforward enough to render counsel superfluous. See 
O’CONNELL, supra note 42, at 10. In fact, however, a significant and growing proportion of injury 
victims retain counsel, even to process first-party claims. See Press Release, Ins. Research Council, 
Study Finds More Auto Injury Claimaints Are Hiring Attorneys ( July 8, 2014) (on file with 
author) (reporting that 36% of personal injury protection claimants retained counsel in 2012, up 
from 17% in 1977). 
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claims to the contrary,391 claimants in health court claimants will need 
lawyers. Health courts may confer many benefits on injury victims, but the 
ability to obtain adequate compensation without the assistance of counsel 
will not be one of them.  
The second and broader insight is that tort replacement regimes, if 
around long enough, seem destined to become adversarial. They seem to 
reach some kind of “adversarial equilibrium”—becoming, over time, ever 
more similar to the tort system that they were designed to supplant.392 
Adversarialism’s durability within the VICP—a system that, from an 
institutional design perspective, did so many things right—contains a 
sobering lesson for the future construction of no-fault mechanisms and also 
points the way toward future research on the generalizability and genesis of 
this phenomenon.393  
CONCLUSION 
The above paints a gloomy portrait of the VICP and identifies lessons 
that ought to inform the health court debate, as well as our creation and 
utilization of future specialized courts and alternative compensation 
mechanisms. Still, it is important to keep the above critique in proper 
perspective. 
First, it is important to recognize that, for all its trouble, the VICP has 
not been an unmitigated failure. Successfully shielding manufacturers from 
liability, the Program has revitalized the vaccine marketplace. Since the 
VICP’s creation, vaccine research has flourished, several new vaccines have 
been approved for use, and vaccine prices have (partly) stabilized.394 
 
391 See, e.g., Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 103 tbl.6 (identifying 
“[e]nhanced ability to file a claim without assistance of attorney” as one of the eight benefits 
health courts would confer on claimants); see also Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 
(“[C]laimants could easily proceed without the assistance of counsel in most cases.”); Q&A, Health 
Courts Seen as Remedy to Rising Health Care Costs, HARTFORDBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20131021/PRINTEDITION/310189963/health-courts-seen-
as-remedy-to-rising-health-care-costs, archived at http://perma.cc/UKS4-WHKJ (quoting Philip 
K. Howard as stating that “health courts will eliminate the need to even hire a lawyer for most 
plaintiffs, shaving considerable time and expense off of the current process”); cf. Peters, supra note 
13, at 267 (characterizing the assumption that lawyers could be jettisoned as “breathtakingly 
naïve”).  
392 See Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation, supra note 21, at 371-79 (coining the term “ad-
versarial equilibrium” and studying these dynamics in the auto no-fault context).  
393 I intend to explore these questions in future work. See NORA FREEMAN ENGSTROM, 
WHY NO-FAULT FAILS (forthcoming). 
394 See Cook & Evans, supra note 187, at 877 (“The vaccine marketplace remains healthy; 
liability-related vaccine shortages are a distant memory, new vaccines are being licensed, and 
many are in various stages of development.”); Avery Johnson, Vaccine Makers Enjoy Immunity: 
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Transaction costs are another success story. Mostly owing to strict limits on 
payments to petitioners’ counsel, transaction costs within the VICP hover at 
around 14% of benefits paid; some 86% of Program funds go directly to 
claimants.395 At roughly 50%, the tort liability system’s transaction costs are 
substantially higher.396 Finally, as noted above, with a balance of roughly 
$3.5 billion, the VICP is certainly on a firm financial footing.397 The VICP, 
it bears emphasis, has done certain things well. 
Second, this Article’s limits, and ambition, must be clear. Though this 
Article casts doubt on proponents’ claims that health courts will eliminate 
inconsistencies, resolve cases within a year, and quell adversarialism, there 
are still plenty of reasons to support health courts.398 There are also, of 
course, plenty of reasons to oppose health courts.399 Indeed, much can be 
(and has been) said about health courts, both pro and con, that this Article 
leaves unaddressed. Rather than re-litigate the health court case, this Article 
attempts to reorient, and conceptually ground, the health court debate.  
Third, in identifying problems within the VICP, this Article does not 
definitively prove that health courts will fail to provide prompt and 
predictable compensation to victims of medical injury. After all, though the 
VICP and health courts are alike in many respects, they are not clones. As 
with all case studies, it is conceivable that the experience of the VICP 
cannot be generalized. And, perhaps most importantly, though this Article 
raises numerous concerns about the VICP, only occasionally can it show that 
 
Drug Firms Defend Legal Shield but Others Say Special Court Limits Recourse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2009, at B2 (reporting that the Act “is an important reason why the vaccine business has been 
transformed from a risky, low-profit venture in the 1970s to one of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
most attractive product lines today”). That said, following the VICP’s creation, vaccine prices did 
not drop nearly as sharply as anticipated. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Price of Prevention: Vaccine 
Costs are Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2014, at A1 (showing that, in 1986, five recommended 
vaccines were $215, while in 2014, the same vaccines cost $937 in inflation-adjusted dollars). 
395 See Detailed Information on the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Assessment, EXPECT-
MORE.GOV, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003807.2005.html 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XWK3-NMSK (reporting that, “between 
FY 2001 and FY 2004,” 86% of compensation within the Fund went directly to claimants “rather 
than attorneys or administrative entities”).  
396 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN 
TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 29 tbl.4.1 (1987) (reporting that, in 
auto cases, defendant and plaintiff legal fees consumed forty-five cents of every dollar expended); 
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2031 (calculating 
medical malpractice claims’ transaction costs). 
397 See supra note 386 and accompanying text.  
398 For example, the VICP experience does nothing to undermine—and in fact, supports—
assertions that health courts would reduce transaction costs.  
399 For a summary of arguments against health courts, see generally Mehlman & Nance, 
supra note 5. 
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the VICP underperforms vis-à-vis the tort system when it comes to 
adjudicating analogous claims.  
Yet it has been said, “Before the traditional tort system is 
abandoned . . . there must be substantial grounds to ensure confidence in an 
alternative institutional mechanism that would serve as its replacement.”400 
When it comes to resolving claims for medical injury, health court 
proponents seek to replace common law courts, in place for centuries, with a 
new and untested alternative. They have, in large measure, advocated their 
reform idea based on health courts’ ability to offer a few concrete 
administrative advantages. The VICP experience casts significant doubt on 
health courts’ ability to offer those advantages. That experience ought to 
shake public confidence in this new alternative mechanism—and inform 
future analysis. 
 
400 Rabin, supra note 283, at 962; accord BAUM, supra note 33, at 227 (“Proponents of special-
ized courts are often assigned a burden of proof. That burden seems appropriate.”). 
